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ABSTRACT  
 
 
 
In this dissertation, I deploy film studies‘ lexicon and concepts to imagine law cinematically 
and I advance a critical legal pluralist hypothesis to imagine film as law.  The central element 
of this study is the rule-governed interactions between street-involved people and their 
interlocutors; these interactions I consider as one instantiation of a plurality of rule-governed 
interactions that constitute ‗street law‘. I organize my research around three themes.  First, 
the sites of street law (where governance of and by street-involved people is constituted).  
Second, the sights of street law (how it is we perceive the multiple normative matrices that 
govern interactions on the street).  Third, the media of street law (some of the modes through 
which such governance is constituted).  I suggest that cinema provides a conceptual 
apparatus for grappling with street law‘s sites (spaces), sights (perspectives) and media 
(modes) which are currently not apprehended through orthodox and dominant symbolizations 
of street law.   I endeavour to provide such conceptual apparatuses in three ways: I use 
concepts from cinema to think about the street law in a metaphorical register; I interpret 
specific film sequences as jurisgenerative; and I produce a non-linear, collaborative and 
explicitly interactive film to apprehend street law.  Each of these attempts serves to further 
my broader project: cinematically symbolizing interactions between street-involved people 
and their interlocutors as governed by rules.   
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SOMMAIRE 
Dans cette thèse j‘exploite le discours et les théories des Études 
cinématographiques pour repenser le droit en termes cinématographiques et 
proposer une hypothèse de pluralisme juridique critique  en vue d‘imaginer le 
cinéma en tant que droit. La composante principale de cette étude est 
constituée d'interactions réglementées entre des personnes vivant en 
situation d‘itinérance et leurs interlocuteurs-trices; je considère ces 
interactions comme étant une instanciation d‘une pluralité d‘interactions 
réglementées qui constituent le ‗droit de la rue‘. Ma recherche s‘articule 
autour de trois axes: d‘abord, les lieux du droit de la rue (où se 
constituent les gouvernances à laquelle sont assujetties les personnes vivant en 
situation d‘itinérance et dont elles sont les créatrices); ensuite,  les 
visualisations du droit de la rue (comment nous percevons les multiples 
matrices normatives qui régissent les interactions dans la rue); enfin, la 
médiation de ce droit (certaines modalités par lesquelles ces multiples  
gouvernances sont constituées). Je propose que le cinéma fournit un appareil 
conceptuel pour étudier les lieux (espaces), les visualisations 
(perspectives) et la médiation (modalités) qui ne sont pas couramment saisis 
par le biais des symbolisations orthodoxes et dominantes du droit de la rue. 
Je tente de fournir de tels appareils conceptuels de trois façons: j‘utilise 
des concepts empruntés à la cinématographie pour repenser le droit de la rue 
en termes métaphoriques, j‘interprète certaines séquences cinématographiques 
comme étant génératrices de normes et je réalise un film 
documentaire non-linéaire, collaboratif et explicitement interactif dans le but de symboliser le 
droit de la rue. Chacune de ces tentatives sert à faire avancer un projet 
plus vaste, celui de symboliser par le truchement du cinéma, les 
interactions entre les personnes vivant en situation d‘itinérance et leurs 
interlocuteurs-trices telles qu‘elles sont gouvernées par des règlements. 
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INTRODUCTION  
  
 In this dissertation, I deploy film studies‘ lexicon and concepts to imagine law 
cinematically and I advance a critical legal pluralist hypothesis to imagine film as law.1  The 
central element of this study is the governance of and by ‗street-involved people‘.2 I engage 
with that question through two principal interests: critical legal scholarship and contemporary 
audiovisual culture.  I organize my research around three themes.  First, the sites of street 
law, or where governance of and by street-involved people is constituted.  Second, the sights 
of street law, or how it is I propose to perceive the multiple normative matrices that govern 
interactions on the street.  Third, the media of street law, or some of the modes through 
which such governance is constituted. My focus is on rule-governed interactions between 
street-involved people and their interlocutors as one instantiation of a plurality of rule-
governed interactions that constitute street law. 
My research is consequently located within broader discussions around questions that 
occupy legal scholarship, such as an interrogation of law‘s ontology (what is law)3, its 
                                                                
1
 I elaborate what constitutes such a hypothesis in Chapter One, infra 1.1.3 (―Critical Legal Pluralism‖). 
2
 I define and develop this term in Chapter One, infra 1.2.1 (―Street-Involved People‖).   
3
 I will not provide a conspectus of scholars who have struggled with law‘s ontology.  I will say that the 
contemporary story usually begins with two different views and theoretical approaches - natural law and positive 
law – which I oversimplify as follows.  Natural law is the intersection of law and morality; proponents generally 
believe in a universality of forms of ‗human flourishing‘ and of basic requirements for a good life. Lon Fuller, The 
Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964) [hereinafter, Fuller (Morality)].  Positive law is a 
social fact that exists separately from morality.  Valid law can be identified and distinguished from invalid law by 
reference to its source; in terms of analysis, there is a clear separation between law that is and law that ought to 
be: H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 1961).  But see Agamben‘s discussion of the 
relationship between the ontological realm (being) and the epistemological realm (knowing) in law: Giorgio 
Agamben, What is an Apparatus? (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009); and The Signature of All 
Things (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009).  
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substance (of what does law consist),4 and its function (what does law do and how does it 
relate to power).5  My aim is to contribute to more methodological6 and epistemological7 
                                                                
4
 Several perspectives reject the conventional positivist view that law is simply comprised of rules. To Dworkin, 
law-makers draw on ‗non-rule‘ (political and moral) standards.  Like literature, law is an ‗interpretative concept‘ 
and judges are creative beings who attempt to find its best possible interpretation:  Ronald Dworkin, Law's 
Empire (London: Collins, 1986) [hereinafter, Dworkin (Empire)]. But see Hutchinson who argues against 
foundational interpretation methods for law and for whom judges engage in ―rhetorical justification:‖ Alan 
Hutchinson, Its All in the Game: A Non-foundationalist Account of Law and Adjudication (Urbana: Duke 
University Press, 2000). White takes issue with the hermeneutic impulse to present law as the ―perfect 
narrative‖ and as ―exclusively textual and ethical:‖ James Boyd White, Justice as Translation: An Essay in 
Cultural and Legal Criticism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994) [hereinafter, White (Translation)]. 
5
 On the one hand, Fuller‘s functional conception of law suggests that rules must satisfy a number of principles 
(of which he describes eight) in order to perform a normative function: Fuller (Morality), supra note 3 at 39. On 
the other, Socio-Legal and Critical Legal Studies‘ scholars grapple with law as a site where power relations are 
negotiated, reproduced and contested.  To instrumentalist socio-legal accounts, law is a machine designed and 
powered to perform legal work.  It reflects dominant class interests and conceals.  It denies ‗what is going on in 
the world‘ from various marginalized groups‘ perspectives.  For an overview, see: John Henry Merryman, 
"Comparative Law Scholarship" (1998) 21 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 771. 
Constitutive theorists provide critical descriptions of a priori structures that shape law‘s subjects: Alan Hunt, 
"Law as a Constitutive Mode of Regulation", Explorations in Law and Society (New York: Routledge, 1993) 310. 
Compare  Jean-Luc Nancy‘s concept of abandonment whereby it is the ‗other law‘ that constitutes ‗the law‘: 
Being Singular Plural (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001). On the question of power, Cover argues that 
laws, statutes, judgments, administrative decisions all impact people directly and ―legal interpretation takes 
place in a field of pain and death:‖ Robert M. Cover, "Violence and the Word" (1983) 95 Yale Law Journal 1601.  
In his reading of Cover, White reminds us that while this view was acknowledged by early positivists, Hart and 
Kelson both underplayed it.  He adds that writers from the hermeneutic tradition plainly ignored it: James Boyd 
White (Tranlsation), ibid. at 201. To more explicitly postmodern approaches, law‘s function in society reveals 
skepticism about formalism, essentialism, monism and any other foundational ideas about truth, self and reality. 
For a critical overview, see: Anne Barron, "(Legal) Reason and its 'Others': Recent Developments in Legal 
Theory" in James Penner, David Schiff & Richard Nobles, eds., Introduction to Jurisprudence and Legal Theory: 
Commentary and Materials (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 1035.  For a critical introduction to CLS: 
Robert Gordon, "Some Critical Theories of Law and their Critics" in David Kairys, ed., The Politics of Law: A 
Progressive Critique (New York: Pantheon Books, 1998) 641. As to CLS‘s complicated relationship with 
feminism(s): Katharine  Bartlett, "Feminist Legal Methods" (1990) 103 Harvard Law Review 550. 
6
 To some writers, legal methodology asks whether law should uncover facts or suggest values; and 
correspondingly, should legal scholars describe or proscribe law.  If one accepts the distinction between 
descriptive and prescriptive approaches to law, descriptive methods are directed toward facts: they endeavour 
to explain a particular doctrine, understand how legal systems operate, and assess what consequences flow 
from law.  Normative theories evaluate the ethical principles that inform law and suggest how law should be.  
For instance, some theorists of ‗autopoiesis‘ distinguish their approach from empirical research in law (and vice 
versa): Peter Kennealy Firenze, "Taking About Autopoiesis - Order From Noise?" in Gunther Teubner, ed., 
Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1987) 349. Any assumed distinction 
between descriptive and normative approaches to law unravels when we consider how normative theories 
actually rely on factual accounts to produce meaning and how descriptive accounts are always embedded in the 
perceivers‘ ethical convictions.  Thus, some critical researcher at the intersection of law and society emphasizes 
how it is possible (and necessary) to be empirical and theoretical, which in their view, means emphasizing 
everyday social interactions as law: Susan Silbey & Austin Sarat, "Critical Traditions in Law and Society 
Research" (1987) 21 Law and Society Review 165. More recently: Douglas Vicks, "Interdisciplinarity and the 
Discipline of Law" (2004) 31:2 Journal of Law and Society 163.  
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discussions.  Namely: what is legal knowledge? How is it constituted? How does it circulate? 
How is law embodied and performed? These questions inform three specific areas of inquiry.   
First, how might we foster conditions through which interactions on the street can better meet 
the exigencies of those who must negotiate particular forms of street law on a daily and 
nightly basis? Second, what are the shared life conditions which street-involved people face 
(in varying degrees and durations) that we will, as a society,  consider as vitiating our 
contemporary understanding of agency, autonomy, and the ability to be make meaningful life 
choices?  Third, what are the alternative normative structures to which we may look for more 
ethical ways to structure relationships between street-involved people and their interlocutors 
(whether they emerge from the state or from other normative communities)?  These more 
localized questions in turn give shape to the more immediate aim of my research: I 
endeavour to cinematically express some of the sites, sights and media through which street-
involved people govern and are governed.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
7
 For instance, some legal constructivists begin from the view that law is an autonomous mode of knowledge 
production with its own unique role in relation to other forms of knowledge production as well as in relation to 
social power and governance: Gunther Teubner, "How Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of 
Law" (1989) 23 Law and Society Review 727. Constructivist epistemologies are sometimes challenged for their 
reductive view of human capacity and agency and for reifying law as an entity that exists beyond human 
interactions.   However other scholars emphasize how law is already embedded within and embedding other 
modes of meaning-making.  Desmond Manderson reads Levinas in ways that suggest the necessary interplay 
between law and ethics:  Proximity: Levinas and the Soul of Law (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 
2006). Finally, much of the work that can be identified as ‗critical legal pluralist,‘ as I shall elaborate, favours an 
ethos or way of thinking about law rather than developing legal theory per se: Macdonald, Roderick A. 
"L'hypothèse du pluralisme juridique dans les sociétés démocratiques avancées" (2003) 33 Revue de droit de 
l‘Université de Sherbrooke 133 [hereinafter, Macdonald (Hypothèse)].  See also: Margaret Davies, "The Ethos 
of Pluralism" (2005) 4 Sydney Law Review 27 [hereinafter, Davies (Ethos)] . 
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STREET LAW SITES  
 
By sites I refer to three overlapping social-emotional-temporal-spatial spaces in and 
through which street law is generated: the city, the community, and the self.  One of my 
assumptions in organizing this research is that in any zone of normative production, there 
exist multiple normative forms (including institutional forms) and multiple modes of rationality 
(including modes of legitimation).8 In this dissertation, I hold up three such zones of 
normative production: the city (Montreal), the community (street-involved people and their 
interlocutors) and the self (each normative agent in her singularity).  In any of these 
normative sites, street law can be expressed canonically and in formal texts.  It can also be 
embodied in more inferential and implicit ways through relationships and the values and 
interaction which give them structure.  In each of these three jurisgenerative sites, I engage 
with both the orthodox and the more abstract symbolizations of street law.   
To begin, the city has become one of the fundamental metaphors for contemporary 
human existence and relationships.9  In this dissertation, I consider the city less in terms of 
the dominant legal understandings of it as a static material entity upon which formal law‘s 
definitions are imposed (e.g., a city is a city insofar as it is a creature of statute). Rather the 
city is event, process, cluster of networks, striated entity that is never fixed; it is a conduit for 
discursive and symbolic flows.10   
                                                                
8
 For an elaboration of this view in the furtherance of a critical legal pluralist hypothesis, see: Roderick A. 
Macdonald, "Critical Legal Pluralism as a Construction of Normativity and the Emergence of Law" in Andrée 
Lajoie et al., eds., Théories et émergence du droit : pluralisme, surdétermination et effectivité  (Montreal: 
Éditions Thémis, 1998) 11-27 at 22 [herainafter, (Emergence)].  
9
 Iain Chambers, "Cities Without Maps", Migrancy, Culture, Identity (London: Routledge, 1994) 92. 
10
 The scholarship in this area is voluminous. On the city as communications system: Ronald Abler, "What 
Makes Cities Important" (1970) March / April Bell Telephone Magazine 10.  On the city as more than a place in 
11 
 
In terms of community, I do not focus solely on external sources (e.g., legislation, 
precedent, and the official and unofficial definitional, spatial and moral practices they 
embody) from which the ‗street community‘ emerges or the particular legal subjectivities 
attributed to some of its members (e.g., vagrant, hobo and aggressive panhandler).11 
Instead, I shift the optic to interactions through which we can consider a plurality of modes of 
street-involvement that does not transform the ‗street community‘ into a fixed, substantial or 
exclusive identity. For my purposes, the street community is not limited to individuals who are 
street-involved; it includes everyone that is in ―being with‖ other street law constituents; it 
includes anyone whose ―abandonment‖ and ―exposure‖ to another might generate conditions 
that preserve the ―I‖ (in all its agency12 and autonomy13) as well as those of mutual 
responsibilities.14  Finally, I agree with Cover that law is a ―force‖ in the sense that it is a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
which we live but as a space that engages our ethics, our sense of justice, and how we relate to difference and 
learn do communicate with one another: Richard Sennett, "The Civitas of Seeing" (1989) 5:4 Places 82. On 
information and communication as the material through which social processes and organizations are 
constituted: Manuel Castells, "European Cities, the Informational Society and the Global Economy" (1994) 204 
New Left Review 18. I return to the scholarship around cities in Chapter Two, and especially infra 2.1.2 (―Law, 
Cinema, City‖). 
11
 See for instance William Chambliss‘ seminal historical work around the development of vagrancy laws as 
instruments of class power that furthered the elite‘s economic interests and needs: "A Sociological Analysis of 
the Law of Vagrancy" (1964) 12 Social Problems 67.  Adler argues against such classical Marxist readings that 
overlook, in his estimation, the ―tangled, confused, and essentially noncriminal orientation of vagrancy statutes‖ 
which essentially targets anyone who threatens social order: Jeffrey Adler, "A Historical Analysis of the Law of 
Vagrancy" (1989) 27 Criminology 209.  I discuss the legislative regulation of street-involved people in Chapter 
Two (especially 2.3.3 ―Close Up‖ in addition to 2.3.4 ―HomelessNation as Tracking Shot‖). 
12
 What the concept of ‗agency‘ means has been the subject of lengthy debate. In feminist philosophy and 
jurisprudence, a theory of women‘s agency presupposes, for instance, women‘s capacity to make individualized 
choices and to act in accordance with those choices.  On the distinction between feminist and liberal 
understandings of agency:  Kathryn Abrams, "Sex War Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory" 
(1995) 95 Columbia Law Review 304.The etymology of the term – from the medieval Latin agentia, facultas 
agenda – suggests that agency is the state or the faculty of an agent to act: The Oxford English Dictionary 2nd 
ed., s.v. ―agency.‖  
13
 ‗Autonomy‘ is also a highly contested concept; at its root, autos is the Greek for self, while nomos is law or 
rule; autonomy, accordingly, refers to the making of own rules: Gerald Dworkin, Theory and Practice of 
Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) at p. 13.  See also:  The Oxford English Dictionary 
2nd ed., s.v. ―autonomy.‖ 
14
 My view of ‗community‘ draws on Fuller‘s morality of duty and morality of aspiration.  He argues that within a 
‗functioning community‘ that is held together by mutual interests, drafting moral codes is relatively easy.  Where 
12 
 
―resource in signification that enables us to submit, rejoice, struggle, pervert, mock, disgrace, 
humiliate or dignify.‖15 To this end, rather than conceptualize street law as always already 
externally imposed on street-involved people (who accordingly are passive legal 
subjects/objects of governance), I turn my gaze to the creative jurisgenerative capacity of the 
self.   
In terms of the self, all street users define acceptable behaviour and interact in ways 
that captivate fluid, competing, always emerging, and multiple selves.16  Our selves-in-
process constantly shift.  That is, we may feel bound to webs of multiple, sometimes 
conflicting legal regimes that reflect, reinforce, implement, and constitute shared and 
personal normative standards.  These regimes may be attributed to various social groups to 
which we belong, whether families, clubs, communities, etc.  They may emerge from our own 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
there are no ‗rational principles‘ for establishing who is within the community, the morality of duty - which 
presupposes explicit or tacit reciprocity - cannot be relied upon to resolve conflict.  The morality of aspiration is, 
as a consequence, what guides our ability to determine who is our ‗other‘ and who is our ‗neighbour‘. However, 
it is also informed by Young‘s skepticism vis-à-vis such idealized conceptualizations of community (she deploys 
‗social group‘ as the relational outcome of interactions, meaning and affinities through which people identify with 
each other); Godbout‘s relational view of the gift as constituting community (people from any social environment 
participate in the ‗modern gift‘ system by donating time, energy, resources, advice, and money – whether 
explicitly or anonymously); and Nancy‘s metaphysical view of community (community is not necessarily about 
commmon values or consensus; it is the experience of difference, exteriority, outwardness that occur through 
our encounters with ‗others‘). See respectively: Fuller (Morality), supra note 3; Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative 
Community (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991); Jacques Godbout, The World of Gifts, trans. by 
Donald Winkler (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1998) [hereinafter (Gifts)]; Iris Marion Young, 
Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) [hereinafter (Justice)].   
15
Robert Cover, "Nomos and Narrative" in Martha Minow, Michael Ryan & Austin  Sarat, eds., Narrative, 
Violence and the Law: The Essays of Robert Cover (Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press 1992) 95-172 at 
100 [hereinafter (Nomos)]. 
16
 My conceptualization of emerging selves relies on Levinas‘ view that the self is not substance but process: 
Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. by Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University 
Press, 1987) [hereinafter, Levinas (Time)].  I am also deeply indebted to feminist insights on how our senses of 
self vary with our shifiting location on varying axes of advantage and disadvantage, see for instance: Emily 
Grabham, et al., Intersectionality and Beyond: Law, Power and the Politics of Location (London & Sydney: 
Routledge / Cavendish 2008).  For the view that selves are lived, embodied, narrativized and performed: James 
Holstein & Jaber Gubrium, The Self We Live By: Narrative Identity in a Postmodern World (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000) [hereinafter, Holstein & Gubrium].  Finally, that individuals respond to, monitor, evaluate 
and create law as agents rather than subjects: Macdonald, (Hypothèse) supra note 7 at 143-44.  
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normative locations along axes of race, class, gender, age, ethnicity, sexuality, culture, 
geography which morph throughout our everyday lives.  They may also develop through our 
interaction with institutions, whether churches, prisons, schools, self-regulating bodies, 
corporations, etc.  Street law emerges through these myriad relationships: individuals in 
interaction are the irreducible site of street law.   
 
STREET LAW SIGHTS 
 
By sights, I refer to perspectives on, or visions of, street law.  The paradigms (whether 
as a question of law, charity, public safety, risk management, economics, or morality for 
instance) and subject positions (whether those instantiated in formal and explicit regulatory 
instruments designed to regulate conduct in urban spaces, those performed by people most 
affected by street law‘s demands, those imagined by filmmakers who use art to suggest new 
meanings about regulation and governance, and my perspective as a researcher which is 
shaped and reflected by all these sights of street law) through which we view social 
phenomena will effect whether, and if so, how we believe such phenomena should be 
regulated.  And yet, no single analytic provides a complete view of the complexity by which 
human beings psychically, physically, and socially negotiate the relations of power, shared 
commitments, and personal expectations which I refer to as street law.  While I endeavour to 
apprehend street law from multiple vantage points (from various subject positions) I do so 
within an ethos of critical legal pluralism.  As a result, each perspective I suggest is a 
14 
 
simultaneous, on-going, and incomplete mode of apprehending what counts as street law 
and by whom it is generated, enforced, and embodied.  
 
STREET LAW MEDIA  
 
Finally, by media I mean two things.  On one level, I refer to the media I deploy to 
articulate my hypothesis of street law.   I argue that street law can be expressed through 
multiple forms, upon two of which I focus: the written monograph with which my reader is 
currently interacting and the explicitly interactive, non-linear, web-based experimental 
documentary film available at: www.filmaslaw.com.17 On another level, given law‘s irreducible 
plurality – fluid normative expectations and commitments, shifting interpretations, myriad 
jurisgenerative sites, and plurality of normative agents – street law is difficult to apprehend.  
Consequently, what I advance as media through which to perceive street law should also be 
as plural and pluralist as possible. To this end, I propose three conceptual apparatuses - 
which I call street law‘s media - for apprehending street law.  
Firstly, I deploy concepts from cinema to think about street law in a metaphorical 
register.  This endeavour is grounded in empirical research on street-involved people‘s 
various normative engagements and the multiple legalities they navigate.18  Secondly, I 
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 The transposition that I argue occurs between these two media will be elaborated in Chapter One, infra 1.3.2 
(―Ambidextrous Practices‖).  
18
 After receiving ethics approval by McGill University‘s institutional review board, I conducted twenty semi-
structured interviews in Montreal over a period of three years; I also conducted an additional five informal and 
unstructured interviews.  See ―Appendix: Ethics Application &Templates.‖ Of these, fourteen interviews were 
with street-involved people. I did not ask them ‗demographic questions‘ such as where they may be located 
along vectors of class, race, gender, sexuality, and cultural background. For a review of the literature on such 
demographics, see infra 1.2.1 (―Street-Involved People‖). Research participants are not necessarily 
representative of ‗street-involved people‘ or of ‗anti-poverty activists‘ for that matter. Yet I believe that there are 
sufficient similarities in these individuals‘ interpretations and understandings of their everyday interactions.  To 
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interpret specific film sequences as normative spaces.  The main assumption upon which this 
undertaking is founded is that interactions between street-involved people and their 
interlocutors that occur in and through film are one of the ways in which street law is 
constituted. Thirdly, I produce a non-linear, collaborative and explicitly interactive film to 
apprehend street law.  This endeavour is my personal expression of street law.    
With these overarching themes in mind, below is a summary of the aim and function of 
each subsequent chapter in relation to my broader project: the endeavour to cinematically 
symbolize interactions between street-involved people and their interlocutors as governed by 
rules.     
 
CHAPTER BREAKDOWN   
 
Chapter One ―Establishing Shot: Assumptions, Concepts and Methods‖ is a map for 
subsequent chapters.  It begins with a discussion of how a critical legal pluralist attitude 
functions as a framing device for my project. I begin with a review of how legal pluralism 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
this end, though limited, these interviews can suggest some broader patterns about how street-involved people 
govern and are governed.  Based on the transcripts of our interviews and my on-going interactions with 
participants who are ‗street-involved‘, I can say that of this group, four were women (of which three were under 
35 and one in her mid-40s, three of whom had French as a first language; one of whom identified as being of 
first nations‘ descent, another as being first generation Quebecoise; one had just moved into social housing; 
two had or were pursuing part-time studies); of the men (four were under thirty, three between 30 and 40, one in 
his mid-40s and two over 50; two identified as being from racialized groups; three lived in shared or social 
housing; three were enrolled in career development programs; one had permanently left the street and was with 
full-time employment). I also interviewed four service-providers, four anti-poverty activists, and three academics 
(from Geography, Law, and Social Work).  Some of these interviews were video recorded and selected footage 
was used to produce the non-linear interactive documentary that is the subject of Chapter Four: ―Film as Law as 
Film.‖ I recruited participants through my work with a mobile legal clinic offering legal information and support 
services to the street community (Clinique Droits Devant) and my time as a volunteer with Le Bon Dieu dans la 
rue (an organization serving youth living on, or at-risk of living on the streets), le Réseau d’aide aux personnes 
seules et itinérantes de Montréal (RAPSIM) and HomelessNation (a website ‗for and by‘ the street community).  
Finally, I draw extensively on the multiple informal conversations I have had in my daily interactions on the 
street with multiple street-users and with various street law constituents at conferences, rallies, and 
parliamentary commissions all grappling with the complexities of street-involvement and the appropriate means, 
methods, and visions for the governance of interactions on the street as imagined through rules.  
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irritates centralist and monist approaches to law. I then go onto to discuss some of the key 
insights of critical legal pluralist endeavours that either describe or suggest alternative 
normative sites, modes, and instruments that are at times overlooked within classical pluralist 
understandings of street law.  This critical legal pluralist ethos is like the epidermis to my 
dissertation: it gives shape to the world I constitute here, but is necessarily malleable, 
sensitive to flux.  Furthermore, I will draw attention to how boundaries blur and relinquish as 
is appropriate and necessary.  In Part Two of that same chapter, I locate my research within 
scholarly discussion around four concepts which will be deployed and potentially re-imagined 
throughout my dissertation.19  These concepts are: street-involved people, cinematic, 
governance, and street law. In Part Three, I explain what I refer to as the ‗ambidextrous 
practices‘ through which my research is performed. I also engage with methodological 
questions, namely the challenges ‗transdisciplinary‘ scholarship may pose. These 
challenges, I argue, are foregrounded through, but are also the rationality behind, my 
research which is produced in two different registers: one realized in written text, the other in 
audiovisuals.  
 Chapters Two, Three and Four rely on three different media to apprehend some of 
street law‘s sites and sights: the metaphoric register, cinema as a source of street law, and 
a collaborative artistic production, respectively.  Chapter Two ―Cinematic Legal Metaphors‖ 
expresses street law through cinematic metaphors.20  I foreground street law that is 
expressed in formal and explicit regulation of street-involved people as well as the 
                                                                
19
 I do not, as a result, provide a synoptic view of scholarly literature around questions such as the ‗problem‘ of 
street-involvement or even how it has been addressed, tempered or heightened through law. 
20
 As will hopefully be made plain in the next chapters, cinematic metaphors do not refer to the metaphors 
intentionally introduced by filmmakers in their oeuvre.  For work in this area drawn from cognitive psychology, 
see: Trevor Whittock, Metaphor and Film (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
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alternative (often informal and implicit) normativities generated by street-involved people 
and their advocates.  I do so through four concepts from cinema: the Aerial Viewpoint, the 
`Shot/Reverse Sequence, the Close-up and the Tracking Shot.21 I argue that some of the 
metaphors, such as an Aerial Viewpoint of the city of Montreal and a Shot/Reverse 
Sequence between street-involved people and formal legal actors (people who derive their 
authority from the state) work well to highlight how street law can be an externally-wielded 
force directed at the most vulnerable members of society.  However, unlike more 
‗revanchist‘ metaphors22 which may reinforce the view that law‘s ‗subjects‘ are passive 
victims of dominant interests, I claim that cinema‘s concepts can also invite attention to a 
plurality of street law‘s sources, its agents, its interpreters and its institutions. I re-imagine 
interactions through a Close-up and a Tracking Shot in an attempt to grapple with the 
possibility of moral perceptions of street-involved people by their interlocutors.  In part, 
these viewpoints are intended to recognize and respect street-involved people – whether by 
drawing on the stories they circulate about law, or how they embody, live and perform their 
complex normative lives. In addition, the Close-up and Tracking Shot encourage non-street-
                                                                
21
 I provide four case studies of the generation of street law through rule-governed interactions.  Case-study 
researchers select strategies and techniques for gathering data and for analyzing and interpreting what 
emerges. In grounded theory, case-study research follows three phases: a descriptive, a theoretical-heuristic / 
theory-development, and theory testing phase:  Barney Glaser & Anselm Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded 
Theory (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967). While I do not adhere to any strict conventions of grounded 
theory per se, these case studies can be considered phenomenological, in the sense that they emphasize 
participants‘ experiences. My perceptions of participants‘ normative commitments, expectations, interpretations, 
and creation of street law does not begin from the belief that they engage in mechanical response to the 
external world but rather that their actions are meaningful incarnations of their lived realities. Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge, 1962).    
22
 As I will elaborate in Chapter Two, Neil Smith has coined the term ‗revanchist city:‘ The New Urban Frontier: 
Gentrification and the Revanchist City (London: Routledge, 1996) [hereinafter, Smith (Revanchist)]. He uses the 
term to refer to the shifts in political, economic and social practices in the United States from redistribution 
policies (from the wealthy to the less affluent) to revanchist policies against minority groups including the poor, 
the working poor, immigrants, feminists, environmentalists, anti-war activists and racialized groups on behalf of 
the elite. I use the term as short-form for the overlapping metaphors of the city as ‗panopticon,‘ ‗divided‘, 
‗punitive‘ and ‗post-justice‘ which have been used to conceptualize governance in and through urban spaces.  
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involved people to consider their roles as constituents of street law and the normative 
expectations, commitments and interpretations they reflect, embody, reinforce, and create in 
their multiple networks of interactions on the street.  
In Chapter Three ―Cinematic Street Law‖, I explore the law–film relation and the ways 
in which interactions between street-involved people and their interlocutors have been 
symbolized in and through film.  I argue that discursive formations that circulate in cinema 
can, at times, reproduce and reflect those understandings of street-involved people which are 
already performed through formal legal doctrine.  Other discursive formations can inform and 
shape the basis of alternatives to such beliefs. Within the broader context of legal scholarship 
at the nexus of law and film, I discuss five ways we can and do think cinematically about 
street law: film law, law in film, law and film, cinematic street law, legal cinematics.  In each of 
these explorations, I suggest how film is law and in the context of this dissertation, how film is 
street law.  I discuss a few cinematic moments that gesture towards different visions of street 
law from the ones instantiated in more entrenched, formalized and institutionalized law.  My 
concern in this chapter is not with the accuracy of the representations made of street-
involved people.  I argue that street law is constituted through the interactions between these 
fictional characters and their real/imagined others with whom they share multiple and 
overlapping legal constellations.    
In Chapter Four, ―Film as Law as Film,‖ I present the ‗Korsakow System‘23 as a 
metaphor for critical pluralist hypotheses of law.  The Korsakow software, I argue, fosters 
                                                                
23
  The ‗Korsakow System’ is software designed by Florian Thalhofer as a graduate research project.  It 
facilitates the creation of artwork (usually audiovisual in nature) that is interactive, nonlinear, and web-based.  I 
elaborate on my own deployment of the Korsakow System in Chapter 4, ―Film as Law as Film,‖ especially infra 
4.1 (―The Korsakow Film‖).  See also: www.Korsakow.org. 
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interactions as governed by rules; these rule-governed interactions permit vusers 
(viewers/users) to chart their own narrative paths according to their expectations, aesthetic 
preferences and normative assumptions. I then describe the process through which I 
produced a non-linear, digital, web-based, experimental documentary about street law.   I 
conclude that the film is a medium of street law insofar as it negotiates multiple normative 
interactions: first, those between myself and the collected footage I order and define; second, 
those between street-involved people and their interlocutors that occur within the film‘s 
diegesis; third, those that occur among the multiple collaborators who represent, evaluate, 
contest and construct the artifact; fourth, those between various jurisgenerative agents and 
the film.  Through these multiple interactions, the Korsakow film takes on a life of its own and 
is itself constitutive of and constituted through street law. 
By way of conclusion, I revisit the sites, sights and media of governance of and by 
street-involved people to develop a critical legal hypothesis of street law, and of law more 
generally. I suggest additional questions that emerge when we wrestle with our normative 
expectations of and responsibilities towards our real and imagined others within a pluralist 
ethos.     
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CHAPTER ONE: ESTABLISHING SHOT: ASSUMPTIONS, 
CONCEPTS AND METHODS  
  
In filmmaking, an establishing shot – whether a long take or a series of juxtapositions 
– conveys information that permits audiences to infer spatial and temporal relationships 
between characters and their surroundings, anchors subsequent actions, and provides 
diegetic context.24  Like other frames and devices we use to organize and represent our 
lived worlds, values and beliefs, establishing shots contain and order information to be 
apprehended.  They also, paradoxically perhaps, always suggest what exists beyond their 
spatial, temporal and metaphorical confines, beyond the perspectives to which they give 
shape.  We continually create mental establishing shots. Through such perspectives, 
ideologies and theoretical frameworks, we attach meaning to social phenomena; these 
meanings in turn reflect and guide our assumptions, perceptions, interpretations and 
interactions of and with people, things, and events. What I propose as an establishing shot 
for my dissertation is a discussion of some of the assumptions, concepts and methods that 
                                                                
24
 The establishing shot is usually the first of a standard shot sequence.  It is often a long take (an uninterrupted 
shot) but filmmakers and theorists influenced by the work of Lev Kuleshov argue that juxtaposition (a series of 
shots) does the work of the establishing shot by prompting audiences to infer a spatial whole on the basis of 
perceiving some components of the space:  See generally: ―The Kuleshov Effect‖ in Maria Pramaggiore & Tom 
Wallis, Film: A Critical Introduction (London: Laurence King Publishing Ltd., 2006) at 162 [hereinafter, 
Pramaggiore & Wallis]. I use diegesis in the following as it has functioned in literary and film studies (the 
universe in which a story takes place), rather than Plato‘s use of the term to develop an account of narrative as 
a linguistic activity.  In Republic (Book 3), Plato distinguishes haple diegesis (in which a speaker narrates 
directly without dialogue, i.e., in her own voice) from mimesis (in which the speaker narrates indirectly, i.e., 
through other characters).  Plato is skeptical of the latter imitative narrative as it is merely a reproduction of the 
appearance of the real.  In the early 1950s, the term diegesis is reintroduced in the context of theories of and 
about film by way of Etienne Souriau and his daughter Anne Souriau as diégégèse (the place of the film-
signifier) with diégétique (the place of the signified). See generally: Etienne Souriau and Anne Souriau, 
Vocabulaire d'esthétique (Paris: Presse universitaire de France, 1990); Gérard Genette, Narrative Discourse 
Revisited, trans. Jane E. Lewin (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1988).   
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guide, inform, shape and reflect my interpretation of the interactions that constitute street law 
at the level of the city, the community, and the self. 
In Part One, I discuss what I consider some of the assumptions that guide critical legal 
pluralism(s).  The pluralist ethos in which I navigate favours aesthetics of fluidity, ambiguity, 
participation, and situatedness over stability, objectivity, order, and unity.  To this end, it 
cannot be considered a static or fixed frame. Rather, my critical legal pluralist hypothesis is 
like an epidermis.  Insofar as it gives shape to my thoughts, it is also necessarily malleable, 
sensitive to flux, and will blur and relinquish boundaries as appropriate and necessary.25 Part 
Two is a conceptual map to the chapters that follow. Rather than a synoptic view of scholarly 
debates around the broader questions with which I wrangle, I explain my understanding of 
the key concepts upon which I rely and as I interpret them through my critical legal pluralist 
hypothesis. In Part Three, I outline the methods and methodological questions that structure 
my project.  I discuss some of the challenges inherent to transdisciplinary scholarship.  
Finally, I elaborate the rationalities that guide my research which is produced in two different 
registers (one realized in written text, the other through audiovisuals).  
 
 
 
                                                                
25
 On modernist aesthetics in law and the possibilities of a pluralist aesthetic, see: Roderick A. Macdonald, 
"Metaphors of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes, and Legal Pluralism" (1998) 15 Arizona Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 69 [hereinafter, Macdonald, (Multiplicity)]; Desmond Manderson, Songs 
Without Music: Aesthetic Dimensions of Law and Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000) 
[hereinafter, Manderson (Songs)]. To Davies, pluralism is both an ethical and epistemological preference; 
normatively, it promotes ―a more inclusive concept of law‖ while empirically, it ―captures the multiple normative 
engagements within contemporary society:‖ Margaret Davies, "Feminism and the Flat Law Theory" (2008) 16 
Feminist Legal Studies 281 at 288 [hereinafter, Davies (Flat)] 
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1.1 CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS   
 
 In critical surveys of legal pluralist projects, there is often an arc traced from the 
research assumptions and practices of classical legal pluralism to what has more recently 
been performed as the hypothesis of critical legal pluralism.26  In what follows, I begin with a 
review of how legal pluralism shatters centralist and monist approaches to law. I then go on 
to discuss some of the key insights of critical legal pluralist endeavours that either describe or 
suggest alternative normative sites, modes, and instruments that are at times overlooked 
within classical pluralist appreciation of street law. 
 
1.1.2 LEGAL PLURALISM 
 
Legal pluralism is a set of assumptions and research practices organized around the 
fact that there are multiple forms of legal ordering within the same socio-spatial arena.27 
                                                                
26
 Critical scholarship currently distinguishes essentialist from non-essentialist legal pluralisms; structural or 
formal from radical pluralisms; and positivistic from post-modern pluralisms.  See respectively, Brian Tamanaha, 
"A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism" (2000) 27 Journal of Law and Society 296 [hereinafter, 
Tamanaha (Essentialist)]; Macdonald (Emergence) supra note 8; Emmanuel Melissaris, Ubiquitous Law: Legal 
Theory and the Space for Legal Pluralism (London: Ashgate, 2009).  
27
In his earlier work, Jacques Vanderlinden described legal pluralism as «  l‘existence, au sein d‘une société 
déterminée de mécanismes juridiques différents s‘appliquant à des situations identiques » : Jaques 
Vanderlinden, "Le pluralisme juridique: essai de synthèse" in John Gilissen, ed., Le Pluralisme Juridique 
(Bruxelles: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1971) 19 at 19. Since then, Harry Arthurs has referred to legal 
pluralism as including those situations where a ―distinctive subsystem of local and special law‖ relate to 
centralized, institutionally administered law: Harry Arthurs, "Special Courts, Special Law: Legal Pluralism in 
Nineteenth Century England" in Gerry R. Rubin & David Sugarman, eds., Law, Economy and Society, 1750-
1914 (Abingdon: Professional Books, 1984) at 383. In Sally Engle Merry‘s words legal pluralism is ―a situation in 
which two or more legal systems coexist in the same social field‖ (taking legal system in the broad sense to 
include state-supported institutions and actors - courts, judges - as well as ―nonlegal forms of normative 
ordering‖): "Legal Pluralism" (1988) 22:5 Law & Society Review 869 at 871 [hereinafter, Merry (Pluralism)].  
John Griffiths distinguishes ‗soft‘ from ‗strong‘ legal pluralism.  Whereas the former reinforces the myth of legal 
centralism (law as ―an exclusive, systematic and unified hierarchical ordering of normative propositions‖ which 
emanates from the State), the latter is the ―state of affairs‖ in which the same behaviour is governed through 
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Early legal pluralism posed a challenge to the monist view of law, namely that there is a 
single source of legal authority in each socio-political unit.  While some writers highlighted 
how norm-generation has always occurred outside the confines of the nation-state,28 the vast 
majority of scholarship emphasized the persistence of indigenous modes of social ordering 
within Western colonial states.29  
Since this earlier work, scholars advancing legal pluralist frameworks have critically re-
evaluated their approaches.  First, the hierarchical model - emphasizing colonial and imperial 
relations or the domination of one normative system by another - has been displaced for a 
view that there are multiple ‗semi-autonomous‘ legal systems that operate within the same 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
―more than one legal order‖ and where ―more than one ‗legal order‘‖ can be observed: John Griffiths, "What is 
Legal Pluralism?" (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism 1 at 2 and 38.  Finally, to Sally Falk Moore 'legal 
pluralism' includes at least, the relation between the state and other normative sites, administrative diversity and 
multi-directional governance within states, inter-state dialogue and competition for jurisdiction, the ways in 
which states internally and externally weave with non-governmental, jurisgenerative semi-autonomous social 
fields and rely or contest these social fields‘ implementation of state-based norms: Sally Falk Moore, 
"Certainties Undone: Fifty Turbulent Years of Legal Anthropology, 1949 - 1999" (2001) 7 Journal of Royal 
Anthropology Institute 95 at 107.   
28
 This scholarship favoured the frameworks and methodologies of sociology to anthropology. Ehrlich, for 
instance, studied the ‗living law‘ of the guilds that created their own rules long before the rise of the nation state.  
He found that even when created by the State, the living law ‗is preponderantly, as to its content, limited to an 
association:‖ Eugen Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (New York: Russell & Russell, 
1936) at 81. The concept of institutional legal pluralism can be brought back to Montesquieu who wrote that the 
public and civil laws of any nation are simply instances in which the law of human reason applies: Charles L. de 
Montesquieu, "Book I: Of Laws in General" in Anne Cohler, Basia Miller & Harold Stone, eds., The Spirit of 
Laws (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).  See generally:  Rebecca Kingston, Montesquieu and 
His Legacy (New York: SUNY Press, 2009). For a more recent empirical account of the interaction and mutual 
influence between state law and informal governance: Stewart Macaulay, "Images of Law in Everyday Life: The 
Lessons of School, Entertainment and Spectator Sports" (1987) 21 Law and Society Review 185.  
29
 See for instance: Bronislaw Malinowski, Crime and Custom in Savage Society (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 
1926) (through a functionalist lens, he emphasizes the importance of reciprocal relations in social life).  See 
also: Leopold  Pospisil, The Anthropology of Law: A Comparative Theory of Law (New York: Harper & Row, 
1971 ).  For a critical discussion of early efforts that adopt a ‗classical‘ legal pluralism, see: Merry (Pluralism), 
supra note 27 at 869-72. Vanderlinden reflects on legal pluralist scholarship since the publication of his seminal 
text: Jacques Vanderlinden, "Return to Legal Pluralism: Twenty Years Later" (1989) 28 Journal of Legal 
Pluralism and Unofficial Law 149.  For a more recent version of such an approach see: Irene Watson, 
"Indigenous People's law-ways: Survival against the colonial state" (1997) 8 Australian Feminist Law Journal 
39. 
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field.30  While they have their own internal logic, their own rules and symbols, their own 
administrative and enforcement mechanisms, normative fields are not in a unidirectional 
relation of influence -- in the sense that one is entirely productive of or produced by another.  
Rather, they are mutually constitutive of one another.31   Further, scholars developed a more 
expansive view of ‗the legal system‘ which embraces ‗unofficial‘ normative regimes present in 
all societies, including advanced industrial and plural societies.32 With this broader view of 
law and legality, legal pluralism stretched beyond its critique of monism to explicitly reject 
centralism, or the belief that the state is the primary basis of legal, social and political 
organization.33  The legal pluralist project has, accordingly, become an effort to describe 
modes of social regulation that rely on the ―symbols of law‖ but which operate in its 
―shadows‖.34 In so doing, some scholarship has tended toward an overly romantic view of 
‗people‘s law‘ as implicitly more egalitarian than the norms which emanate from ‗the State.‘35   
 While de-centering formal and institutional state-law in favour of other normative sites 
has been a focal point for much innovative and critical thinking in law, more recent legal 
                                                                
30
 Sally Falk Moore, "Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of 
Study" (1973) 7 Law & Society Review 719. While each generates its own rules, each normative site is also ―set 
in a larger social matrix‖ and thus ―vulnerable to rules and decisions and other forces [including the State] 
emanating from the larger world by which it is surrounded‖ at 55.    
31
 Peter Fitzpatrick, "Law and Societies" (1984) 22:1 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 115. Fitzpatrick argues 
elsewhere that ‗combined law‘ emerges through the interaction of multiple – whether formal or informal – legal 
orders: Peter Fitzpatrick, "Legal Plurality and Underdevelopment" in David Sugarman, ed., Legality, Ideology 
and the State (London: Academic Press, 1983) 59. On the ways in which private ordering within a car 
dealership and state-law interact: Stewart Macaulay, "Private Government" in Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler, 
eds., Law and Social Sciences (New York: Russell Sage Foundation 1986).  
32
 Merry (Pluralism), supra note 27 at 872.  In Marc Galanter‘s words, ―just as health is not found primarily in 
hospitals knowledge in schools, so justice is not primarily to be found in official justice-dispensing institutions:‖ 
Marc Galanter, "Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering and Indigenous Law" (1981) 19 Journal of 
Legal Pluralism 35 at 37. 
33
 Griffiths, supra note 27 at 2. 
34
 Merry (Pluralism), supra note 27 at 874. 
35
 For a conspectus of the legal pluralist work in the eighties with an eye toward that which may have been 
uncritically celebratory of ‗unofficial‘ law (pointing to Galanter as an exception), see: Mitra Sharafi, "Justice in 
Many Rooms Since Galanter: De-Romanticizing Legal Pluralism Through the Cultural Defence" (2008) 71 Law 
and Contemporary Problems 139. 
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pluralist hypotheses highlight how ‗social scientific‘ research has nevertheless left 
untouched other complementary tenets of modernist conceptions of law and legal thinking.36 
Thus, what have been referred to as ‗critical,‘37 or ‗radical‘38 or sometimes ‗postmodern‘39 
legal pluralism(s) attempt to further uproot a number of overlapping essentialist interpretive 
biases40 reproduced in earlier pluralist endeavours.  These include: monism (there is a 
single and centralized legal order in each socio-political unit which is governed through the 
principle of internal coherence),41 centralism (all law emerges from the political State),42 and 
positivism (law is a social fact that is born from authorized law-makers and legal 
institutions).43  
                                                                
36
 Tamanaha (Essentialist), supra note 26 at 296.  He argues that ‗essentialist‘ legal pluralism has not lived up 
to its bold and transformative potential.     
37
 Martha Marie Kleinhans & Roderick A. Macdonald, "What is a Critical Legal Pluralism" (1998) 12 Canadian 
Journal of Law and Society / Revue canadienne droit et société 25.  
38
 Melissaris draws on three frameworks - Teubner‘s systems theory, Sousa-Santos‘ intertwined legalities and 
Cover‘s jurisgenerative communities - to ‗radicalize‘ legal pluralism: Emmanuel Melissaris, "The More the 
Merrier?  A New Take on Legal Pluralism" (2004) 13:1 Social & Legal Studies 57.   
39
 To Belley, legal pluralism is a fundamental concept of postmodern legal theory: Jean-Buy Belley, "Le Droit 
comme terra incognita : Conquérir et construire le pluralisme juridique" (1997) 12 Canadian Journal of Law and 
Society / Revue canadienne droit et société 1. See also: Boaventura de Sousa Santos, "Law: A Map of 
Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law" (1987) 14:3 Journal of Law and Society 279 [hereinafter, 
Sousa Santos (Map)].   
40
 Nancy‘s writing is helpful in developing an essenceless view of social relations: (Being), supra note 5.    
41
 On the internal heterogeneity of normative fields, see: Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal 
Common Sense, 2nd ed. Butterworths, 2002) [hereinafter, Sousa Santos (Common Sense)]; Macdonald 
(Multiplicity) supra note 25; William Twinning, Globalization and Legal Theory (London: Butterworths, 2000).  
42
 Brian Tamanaha, "The Folly of the 'Social Scientific' Concept of Legal Pluralism" (1993) 20:2 Journal of Law 
and Society 192. Roderick A. Macdonald, "Here, There ... and Everywhere: Theorizing Legal Pluralism; 
Theorizing Jacques Vanderlinden" in Nicholas Kasirer, ed., Étudier et enseigner le droit: hier, aujourd'hui et 
demain - Études offertes à Jacques Vanderlinden (Montreal: Éditions Yvon Blais, 2006) 381 [hereinafter, 
Macdonald (Everywhere)].  
43
 To Cover lawyer-made rules and institutions form a small part of our normative universes: (Nomos) supra 
note 15. Alan Hunt develops a constitutive theory of law to explain how law is imbricated with social practices 
while at the same time is itself the product of negotiation and struggle with social relations: (Constitutive), supra 
note 5 at 310.   
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 As I will discuss, these critical legal pluralisms add dimensions of analysis which may 
be overlooked or even reinforced in traditional or socio-legal legal pluralism44 explained in 
terms of assumptions about law‘s verticality (that there is hierarchical order of legal 
sources)45, prescriptivism (law is made up of externally-imposed rules or other normative 
standards that exist outside of the individuals whose actions it is believed to govern)46, 
chirographism (favoring textual and written legal forms), 47 logocentricism (privileging the 
linguistic communication and linguistic signifiers over the signified),48  ocularcentricism  
(privileging sight over other sensory modalities),49 linearity (temporal evolutionary 
                                                                
44
 Macdonald shows how traditional legal pluralism points to a plurality of law (whether numerically, spatially 
and analytically) in contradistinction to more monist, centralist and positivist views of law.  It misses, he 
cautions, other dimensions of law such as its inter-subjective aspects: Roderick A. Macdonald, "Unitary Law Re-
form, Pluralistic Law Re-Substance: Illuminating Social Change" (2007) 67:4 Louisiana Law Review 1113 
[hereinafter, Macdonald (Illuminating)]. Similarly, Sousa Santos urges us to beyond our ―abyssal thinking‖ and 
proposes a ―non-derivate‖ mode, a ―radical break‖ with modern conceptualizations based on the recognition of 
the ―plurality of heterogeneous knowledges ….and on the sustained and dynamic interconnections between 
them without compromising their autonomy:‖ Boaventura de Sousa Santos, "Beyond Abyssal Thinking: From 
Global Lines to Ecologies of Knowledges" (2007) XXX:1 Review 1. 
45
  Davies (Flat), supra note 25. 
46
 To Fuller, law‘s prescriptions are always already embedded in history, stories, desires, and interpretations: 
Lon Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself (Chicago: Foundation Press, 1940). See also: (Nomos), supra note 15. 
More recently, Macdonald and Sandomierski illustrate how interactional norms are legal norms and legal norms 
are interactional: Roderick A Macdonald & David Sandomierski, "Against Nomopolies" (2006) 57:4 Northern 
Ireland Legal Quarterly 610.  
47
This, of course, has long been a concern within the literary tradition.  Walter Ong referred to this particular 
bias - the ―chirographic‖ and ―typographic‖ as particularly insidious: Walter Ong, Orality and Literacy: The 
Technologizing of the Word (London: Methuen, 1982). Daniel Chandler calls the belief that speech should be 
relegated to the status of the written word‘s handmaiden as ―graphocentricism:‖ Daniel Chandler, Semiotics: 
The Basics (New York & London: Routledge, 2002). Macdonald has recently argued this point specifically in 
relation to law: Roderick A. Macdonald, "Custom Made: An Argument for a Non-Chirographic Critical Legal 
Pluralism" (forthcoming) Canadian Journal of Law and Society / Revue canadienne droit et société [herainfater, 
Macdonald (Custom Made)].   
48
 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1998). 
49
 See generally: Paul Stoller, Sensous Scholarship (Philadelphia University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997).  
Stoller demonstrates how the fusion of the ‗intelligible‘ and the ‗sensible‘ can be deployed in scholarly practices 
and representations. For an overview of some of legal scholars‘ interrogation of sight, see: Lionel Bently, 
"Introduction" in Lionel Bently & Leo Flynn, eds., Law and the Senses: Sensational Jurisprudence (London: 
Pluto Press, 1996) 1. The field of legal anthropology has been particularly instructive in reconsidering vision as 
privileged site of knowledge. David Howes has pointed out that the challenges posed to dominant dichotomous 
thinking remain disembodied and within the realm of the visual; he argues for interest in intersensorial ways we 
constitute knowledge and how culture mediates sensations of smell, touch, taste and hearing in addition to 
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‗progress‘)50 instrumentalism (state-based law is the instrument of social control par 
excellence and we must remain vigilant of its impacts),51 and territoriality (law is territorially 
fixed in a particular space).52   
 That being said, my summary below of the radical potential of critical legal pluralism 
should not be taken to suggest that everyone dwelling within its ethos will necessarily 
challenge each of the tenets conventionally associated with Western common law, nor will 
they do so in a similar manner.   
1.1.3 CRITICAL LEGAL PLURALISM 
 
Critical legal pluralism grapples with all law as irreducibly plural53 and polycentric;54 
law is apprehended multisensorily55; law‘s subjects are reconceptualized as agents56; laws‘ 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
sight: David Howes, "Introduction: Empire of the Senses" in David Howes, ed., Empire of the Senses: The 
Sensual Culture Reader (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2005).  
50
 Gordon provides a critical overview of the propositions that compose the singular view of historical change 
and its relationship to law: Robert Gordon, "Critical Legal Histories" (1984) 36:1/2 Stanford Law Review 57. 
51
 As Merry writes, ―in industrial societies, despite the apparent autonomy of nonjudicial spheres, the legal 
system stands in relation of superior power to other systems of regulation as the ultimate source of coercive 
power‖: Merry (Pluralism), supra note 27 at 874. See also: Richard L. Abel, The Politics of Informal Justice 
(New York: Academic Press, 1982). More recently, see: Richard Cotterrell, Spectres of Transnationalism: 
Changing Terrains of Sociology of Law (London: Queen Mary University, School of Law, 2009) at 4.   
52
There is also a large body of legal scholarship located at the intersection of law, space and power which 
interrogates how law both shapes and is inflected by the spatialization of social life: Wesley  Pue, "Wrestling 
with Law (Geographical) Specificity vs. (Legal) Abstraction" (1990) 11:6 Urban Geography 566; Nick Blomley, 
"Property, Pluralism and the Gentrification Frontier" (1997) 12 Canadian Journal of Law and Society / Revue 
canadienne droit et société 187; Kirsten Anker, "The Truth in Painting" (2005) 9 Law Text Culture 91; Andreas 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, "Introduction: In the Lawscape" in Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, ed., Law 
and the City (London: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) 1.  Others deploy cartographic metaphors is to map out law.  
For a discussion on whether maps of law are ever possible: Maarten Bavnick & Gordon Woodman, "Can there 
be Maps of Law?" in Franz Von Benda Beckmann, Keebet Von Benda Beckmann & Anne Griffiths, eds., 
Spatializing Law: An Anthropological Geography of Law in Society (Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2009) 195. 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos suggests three topoi or sites of subjectivity that hold the promise of a ‗new 
conception‘ of law and distinguishes geocentric and egocentric projections of legalities: Sousa Santos (Map), 
supra note 39.  Feminist and critical race theorists extend the intersection metaphor to complexify entrenched 
understandings of legal subjectivity and the legal constitution of subjectivity: Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, "Mapping 
the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color" (1991) 43:6 Stanford Law 
Review 1282; Grabham, supra note 16; Gayle MacDonald, Rachel Osborne & Charles Smith, eds., Feminism, 
Law, Inclusion: Intersectionality in Action (Toronto: Sumach Press, 2005).   
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processes are dynamic; and law‘s effects are symbolic.57 Put even more succinctly, law is an 
on-going process of imagining and expressing interactions between humans as being guided 
by future-oriented rules.58  Legal inquiry should be directed to the psycho-spatio-temporal 
interactions that occur ―where rules are meant to achieve governance.‖59 To help better 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
53
 Davies, (Ethos) supra note 7. 
54
 Polycentrism (as opposed to monocentricism) suggests the overlap of multiple normative forms in multiple 
normative universes.  See for instance and attempt direct legal pluralist discourse away from monism: Hanne 
Peterson & Henrik Zahle, eds., Legal Polycentricity: Consequences of Pluralism in Law (Aldershot: Dartmouth 
Publishing Company, 1995). Compare Macdonald who acknowledges that a polycentric view of law is a 
theoretical underpinning of radical legal pluralism but who concedes that radical legal pluralism ―cannot even be 
polycentrist‖ because that metaphor implies a center (and therefore a periphery) to a legal regime: Macdonald 
(Everywhere), supra note 42 at 406.  
55
 See for instance: Bently & Flynn, supra note 49. I elaborate how we experience law multisensorily in Chapter 
Two, infra 2.1.1 (―Beyond Visuality‖).  
56
 See for instance: Roderick A. Macdonald, Background Document: The Governance of Human Agency 
(Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2002) at 24-25 [hereinafter, Macdonald (Governance)]; and Kleinhans & 
Macdonald, supra note 37.   
57
 See generally: Macdonald (Illuminating), supra note 44.  What Davies refers to ‗flat law‘ falls within the ethos 
of critical legal pluralism and includes guiding concepts such as: inclusiveness, incoherence, fluidity of identity, 
layered space, participation, anarchy and situatedness: Davies (Ethos), supra note 7; Davies (Flat), supra note 
25. To be sure, critical legal pluralism(s) draw on, critically engage with, and refine hypotheses from various 
other disciplines and theoretical frameworks, including feminist and critical-race theories, social, cultural and 
political theories, anthropology, music and fine arts.  For a legal pluralism informed by cultural studies, For 
instance, see: Ian Duncanson, "Cultural Studies Encounters Legal Pluralism: Certain Objects of Order, Law and 
Culture" (1997) 12 Canadian Journal of Law and Society / Revue canadienne droit et société 115: cultural 
studies invites legal scholars to consider the extent to which the ordering and disciplining practices ―can be 
understood only by a form of intellectual cosmopolitanism which fails to respect the frontiers some would draw 
between legality and culture‖ at 117. For a specifically feminist vision of legal pluralism: Ambreena S. Manji, 
"Imagining Women's 'Legal World:' Towards a Feminist Theory of Legal Pluralism in Africa" (1999) 8 Social & 
Legal Studies 435. 
58
 This formulation draws extensively on Roderick Macdonald‘s work and that of Lon Fuller, by extension.  To 
Fuller, law‘s purposive enterprise is ―subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules‖: Fuller (Morality), 
supra note 3 at 106.  Macdonald and Sandomierski write from this claim to suggest a critical pluralist hypothesis 
of law as ―the endeavour of symbolizing human interactions as governed by rules:‖ Macdonald & Sandomierski, 
supra note 46 at ftn 16. Macdonald elaborates this thesis in other work: law is not a body of knowledge but an 
intention (―it demands that we commit ourselves towards its achievement‖); law emerges from human 
perception and reflection;  law is performative (―law imagines action‖ – whether speech or movement); law is an 
interaction between two or more subjects (it lies within ―the relationship more than the field within which the 
relationship is built); intentions and behaviours ―refer to a point of reference external to the act or the intention‖; 
rules pre-exist the human behaviour that is being symbolized: Macdonald (Everywhere), supra note 42 at 394-
95. 
59
 Macdonald (Governance), supra note 56 at 14.  
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grasp the nature of such a project, what follows is a greater elaboration of some of the pivotal 
ideas and beliefs that inform the new pluralist ethos in law.60 
First, whereas early legal pluralist efforts emphasized the confrontations between two 
different normative orders (whether intra- or extra-State based), critical legal pluralism 
assumes that acceptable behaviour within the same embodied space will be governed in 
manifold legal fields (sites), multiple legal forms (modes), and variegated legal devices 
(instruments).61  Critical legal pluralist scholars show skepticism about instrumental theories 
of law, that is, the view that state law is a tool used by legal actors – whether judges, lawyers, 
or interest groups - to achieve particular ends such as induce particular behaviour through 
rewards or sanctions.62  Instead, there is a move away from a non-dialectic view of law (i.e. 
that legal texts and practices determine subjectivities, that legal subjects passively accept 
that external definition as inscribed in legal texts) to a dialectic view of law (i.e. subjects co-
construct meaning through their various exchanges in a plurality of sites, modes and 
                                                                
60
 Reflecting much of the general skepticism about ‗meta narratives‘ in other disciplines, critical legal pluralists 
posit an ‗ethos‘ or as ―a set of values, an attitude or an aesthetic emphasis‖ rather than a theory per se: Davies 
(Ethos), supra note 7 at 6. See also: Desmond Manderson, "Beyond the Provincial: Space, Aesthetics, and 
Modernist Legal Theory" (1996) 20 Melbourne University Law Review 1048 [hereinafter, Manderson 
(Provincial)]. But compare a critical stance vis-à-vis the complete ‗end‘ of theory, see: Daphne Palai & Will 
Corral, Theory's Empire: An Anthology of Dissent (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).
 
 
61
 The state, consequently, is not the exclusive (or even the primary) site of governance; legislation is not the 
exclusive mode of governance; and regulatory and criminal sanctions are not the exclusive governing 
instruments: Macdonald (Governance), supra note 56 at 2. Each of these points is elaborated in Chapter Two.  
For instance, infra 2.3.1. (―Street Law in Aerial Viewpoint‖), I discuss how interactions with police may not be the 
most direct mode of regulation experienced by street-involved people.  Infra 2.3.3. (―Street Law as Close-up‖), I 
elaborate it is the assessments we make of our others rather than the existence of anti-panhandling legislation 
that most directly governs interactions between people who panhandle and their interlocutors.   In ―Street Law 
as Tracking Shot,‖ I discuss how the virtual space constituted by and through HomelessNation functions as an 
instrument of street law.  Further, in other chapters, I explore what I consider to be more implicit and more 
meaningful sites of street law, namely, cinema in Chapter Three (―Cinematic Street Law‖) and creativity itself in 
Chapter Four (―Film as Law as Film‖).     
62
 Instrumentalists might, for instance, consider how state law ensures that particular individuals or groups are 
subjected to obligatory commands or how particular groups have been denied access to the protections that 
state law can afford:  Martin L. Friedland, ed., Sanctions and Rewards in the Legal System: A Multidisciplinary 
Approach (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989). For a critique of instrumentalism in law: Macdonald 
(Emergence) supra note 8.    
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instruments).  However, to take a dialectic (and dialogic) view is not to say that power is of no 
concern for legal pluralists.  Rather, power is understood as fluid and distributed differently 
within multiple and overlapping normative regimes.  As I consider later, through the Aerial 
Viewpoint (Chapter Two), these shifting dynamics of power and resistance ―are central to 
tracing trajectories of normative interaction.63  
Second, within each of these multiple zones and moments of jurisgeneration, there 
exist plural scales of normativity.64 Even if imagined in conventionalist terms (as rules 
emanating from the state and expressed in legislation), law is ―irreducibly plural.‖65  Zones or 
moments of normative interaction exist within and through overlapping, at times redundant, 
unfixed, liminal, interstitial spaces for personal, communal and societal networks.66 Every 
normative entity is in continual interaction and flux, always contesting, appropriating, and 
influencing each other‘s rules, decision-making processes, traditions, and institutions. It is 
therefore impossible to map out with any certainty the trajectories of these interactions; we 
can only develop a sense of their tendencies, flows, and rhythms.67 The implicit contingency 
and plurality of normative regimes should not, however, evoke anxiety or fear because of 
lack of continuity or certainty; rather, such a plurality may advance conditions of more 
meaningful communication, fairness and creativity.68      
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 Macdonald (Emergence) supra note 8 at  20.   
64
 Macdonald (Illuminating), supra note 44. Chapter Three ―Cinematic Street Law‖ is organized around the belief 
that films are jurisgenerative and comprised of and comprising a plurality of normative orders.  
65
 Davies (Ethos), supra note 7 at 29. 
66
 Robert Cover, "The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology and Innovation" (1980) 22 William 
& Mary Law Review 639 [hereinafter, Cover (Uses)]; Macdonald (Emergence) supra note 8.     
67
 Macdonald (Emergence), ibid., at 22. 
68
 Cover (Uses), supra note 66. 
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Third, a critical legal pluralist ethos favours relationships in which compliance occurs 
through personal commitments arrived at without coercion or inducement.69  As noted, the 
instrumental view of law does not fully account for our affective responses as relational 
beings: it is through our relationships that we constitute and circulate norms.70 Law is a 
human activity and part of what makes us human.  It is ―neither possible nor comprehensible‖ 
to understand outside of ―the networks of relationships‖ that we comprise and in which we all 
take part.71    
We are always – though to varying degrees and in shifting contexts - actively 
engaging in law-making enterprises as legal agents.72 Judges, lawyers, and other formally 
and institutionally recognized administrators do not possess a monopoly over the 
interpretation and generation of norms.73 Moreover, it is often the norm-generating 
communities to which we belong that influence our beliefs and actions in ways that are more 
profound and immediate than any ‗official‘ state-based rules.  One critical legal pluralist 
endeavour may then be to look at how social actors negotiate and create their own normative 
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 Macdonald (Governance), supra note 56 at 19. 
70
 For instance, to Weber, there are at least four rationalities that govern an individual‘s social action:  the 
instrumental/practical (our relationships with objects and other beings related to and calculated in terms of 
means, ends, and alternatives); value- based/theoretical (intrinsic ethical, moral, aesthetic, religious beliefs 
guide a sense of obligation or duty to act); affective/substantive (action is determined by an individual‘s feelings, 
emotions, pressures in a particular moment, situation, or interaction); and traditional/formal (our behaviour is in 
part learned habituation and develops through organization): Max Weber, "The Nature of Social Action" in W.G. 
Runciman, ed., Weber: Selections in Translation (Cambridge: University Press, 1991).  See more recently, 
Macdonald and Sandomierski who argue that legal norms, whatever their form, site or the instruments that give 
them expression, are ―imagined ... lived ... followed ... modified [and] ... rejected by human beings‖:  Macdonald 
& Sandomierski, supra note 46 at 616.  
71
 Jennifer Nedelsky, "Reconceiving Rights and Constitutionalism" (2008) 7 Journal of Human Rights 139 at 150 
[hereinafter, Nedelsky (Rights)].  
72
 Margaret Davies, "Pluralism and Legal Philosophy" (2006) 57 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 577; and 
Manderson (Provincial), supra note 60. To speak of agency, in the legal pluralist sense, is not to claim that our 
self-conceptions ever exist independently of the social structures within which they are embedded.  Rather, the 
question of agency is always one of its relativity, its potential and its limitations.  See for instance: Kleinhans & 
Macdonald, supra note 37.   
73
 Macdonald & Sandomierski, supra note 46. 
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commitments through interactions (internalization).  Another is to look at the ways in which 
they shape and inform the internalizing processes that generate norms (appropriation).74  
Internalizing processes include the consolidation of affective responses such as guilt, 
disgust, and fear or a desire to feel self-actualized. They may also be more cognitive 
responses such as a learned sense of obligation or shifts in ‗legal consciousness‘ that alter 
our common sense approaches to thinking and talking about law.75  For instance, we might 
consider the rules that define acceptable behaviour and which emerge from interactions - 
between ‗norm entrepreneurs‘ (individuals, affiliations, states etc.) - who engage in 
persuasion and other practices to influence and ultimately shift our individual expectations.76  
 From this perspective, dissenting or non-conforming behaviour (whether through 
ignorance, carelessness, selfishness, context-specific acquiescence, passive or active 
resistance) may be an attempt to articulate a different image of normativity.77  It is therefore 
imperative that we pay attention to law‘s more implicit and inferential instantiations.78 It is 
                                                                
74
 According to cultural psychologist Lev Vygotsky, a child will learn cultural habits of mind (words, speech 
patterns, and other symbolic knowledge) through interaction; the knowledge she acquires through interactions 
(especially with adults) represents the shared knowledge of the culture to which she belongs.  The process of 
internalization is when a child gains mastery of the skills she has learned through these interactions.   
Appropriation occurs when the child utilizes these tools to her own devices and for her own purposes.  See 
generally:  Lev S. Vygotsky, Mind in Society (Cambridge, Harvard University Press: 1978). 
75
 The literature on legal consciousness is rich. Beginning perhaps with Eugen Ehlich‘s living law in which he 
suggest a methodology for its study to Engle Merry, who defines law as "a complex repertoire of meanings and 
categories understood differently by people depending on their experience with and knowledge of the law": 
Eugene Ehrlich, ―Das lebende Recht der Völker der Bukovina‖ (The Living Law of the Peoples in the Bukovina", 
1 (1912) Recht Und Wirtschaft 273 and Sally Engle Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal 
Consciousness Among Working-Class Americans (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1990) at 5. See also: 
Patricia Ewick & Susan Silbey, The Common Place of Law: Stories of Everyday Life (Chicago: University Press, 
1998). More recently, Paul Schiff Berman has grappled with legal consciousness in the field of international law 
and how getting a better grasp of these internalized processes can give us a sense of how international law can 
be effective without ‗teeth‘ or coercive sanctions: Paul Schiff Berman, "Seeing Beyond the Limits of International 
Law" (2006) 84:5 Texas Law Review 1265. 
76
For a critical review of various legal pluralist approaches: Paul Schiff Berman, "The New Legal Pluralism" 
(2009) 5 Annual Review of Law and Social Sciences 225 [hereinafter, Berman (Legal Pluralism)]. 
77
 Macdonald (Illuminating), supra note 44.  
78
 Implicit law has been taken to mean the power-conferring rules that exist by virtue of the rule of recognition 
implicit in official law-making practices: Hart, supra note 3. It has also been understood as the general principles 
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through the imaginary, symbolic realm, the non-institutional, non-formulaic (or implicit and 
inferential) expressions of normativity, the pre-existing, received categories of law and legal 
knowledge and the interpretive practices that give them shape, that we will ignite the ―tacit 
engine of legal change.‖79  It is through the appropriation of symbolic and inferential 
expression of law that people construct their own law, their own regimes of governance.80  I 
return to this point in Chapters Two (―Cinematic Legal Metaphors,‖ especially the subsections 
devoted to the Close-Up and Tracking Shot),81  Three (―Cinematic Street Law‖), and Four 
(―Film as Law as Film‖). 
A fourth assumption that informs critical legal pluralism is that we define acceptable 
behaviour and interact in ways that captivate our fluid, competing, and multiple notions of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
that are not explicitly enacted and yet recognized through the interpretive practices of the judiciary: Ronald 
Dworkin (Empire), supra note 4. However, Lon Fuller‘s conceptualization of implicit law departs from these 
accounts as he argues that law is most fundamentally informed and shaped by informal social practices.  Lon 
Fuller, "Human Interaction and the Law" (1969) 14 American Journal of Jurisprudence 1.  Postema provides a 
very helpful critical and constructive exposé of Fuller‘s account of implicit law: Gerald J. Postema, "Implicit Law" 
(1994) 13:3 Law and Philosophy 361. Working within and expanding the Fullerian framework, Macdonald offers 
the following definition of implicit law: ―the normativity flowing from the reciprocal adjustment of expectations 
arising out of human interaction in the myriad social locations where this interaction occurs‖; the normativity will 
flow whether ―any official legal institution picks it up‖ or ―whether any such institution even acknowledges its 
existence:‖ Macdonald (Illuminating), supra note 44 at 1131. Macdonald provides a heuristic through which 
norms can be understood along two axes.  The first refers to normative sites, which can be explicit or implicit; 
the second refers to normative modes (how a norm is articulated), which can be formulaic or inferential: 
Roderick A. Macdonald, "Vers la reconnaissance d'une normativité implicite et inférentielle" (1986) VXIII 
Sociologie et sociétés 46.  Whereas legislation is a prototypically explicit and formal norm, general principles 
tend to be inferential and unwritten. Whereas precedent is considered explicit and inferential, customary 
practices tend to be implicit but formal. See also: Roderick A. Macdonald, "Les vieilles gardes: hypothèses sur 
l'émergence des normes, l'internormativité" in Jean-Guy Belley, ed., Le Droit Soluble: Contributions 
québécoises à l'étude de l'internormativité (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1996) 233. 
79
 Macdonald (Illuminating), supra note 44 at 1154; Roderick A. Macdonald & Jason MacLean, "No Toilets in 
Park" (2005) 50 McGill Law Journal 721. 
80
 One‘s ‗own law‘ remains within the relational understanding of autonomy as advanced by Nedelsky: (Rights), 
supra note 71. It is not used in the liberalist (Rawlsian) sense that every individual citizen has her own 
‗comprehensive doctrine‘ – their own views of the ‗good life‘ – of right and evil – and tolerates her fellow citizens‘ 
equally reasonable views: John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1999).  
81
 See infra 2.3.2. (―Street Law Through Shot/Reverse‖). 
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self.  The self, as Levinas reminds us, is not a substance; it is a process.82  Our selves-in-
process shift and vary through our interactions, our morphing locations along axes of race, 
class, gender, age, ethnicity, sexuality, culture, geography, and materialize in ―myriad nooks 
and crannies of everyday life‖.83 We are socio-spatial, self-monitoring, self-reflexive 
creatures, always in formation, always in the process of becoming.  As such, our normative 
commitments vary depending on our various configurations of self which are shaped and 
informed by our personal motivations, bonds to others, institutional affiliations, and identity 
markers (whether attributed to us by others or self-attributed).84  Each of these aspects of our 
selves, the plurality of identities by which we live are variably ascribed by ourselves and also 
prescribed by others.85   
As I elaborate in Chapters Two86 and Three87 individuals may feel bound to a web of 
multiple, sometimes conflicting legal regimes that reflect, reinforce, implement, and constitute 
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 Being is a continual presence; it is in being through the face-to-face encounter (the ―rupture of 
phenomenology‖) that we are get a sense of our responsibility to and for our ‗other‘: Levinas (Time), supra note 
16 at 104.  And consequently, of our ‗Other‘s‘ judgment: the ‗Other‘ presents herself ―from a dimension of 
height, a dimension of transcendence‖ whereby she can present herself ―as stranger without opposing me as 
obstacle of enemy:‖ Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority trans. by Alphonso Lingis 
(Pittsburghh Duquesne University Press, 1969).     
83
 Holstein & Gubrium, supra note 16 at 215.  
84
 Macdonald (Hypothèse) supra note 7 at 143.  Critiques of a coherent, fixed, core or authentic ‗self‘ abound.  
From various feminist perspectives, the boundaries between public and private, personal and the political, 
subject / object, and correspondingly of self / other have been blurred.  Kristeva transposes the classical 
psychoanalytic conception of the self into an explicitly gendered discursive frame of analysis: Julia Kristeva, 
Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980). 
Smith argues against the postmodernist approaches that found their critique on an individuated consciousness 
constituted wholly within discourse: Dorothy Smith, Writing the Social: Critique, Theory and Investigations 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999). To Butler, gender identity is ascribed and constituted through the 
cultural forms that articulate them: Judith Butler, Gender Troubles: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity 
(London: Routledge, 1990). On the agential self as ‗romanticized‘, see: Kenneth Gergen, The Saturated Self: 
Dilemmas of Identity in Contemporary Life (London: Sage, 1991). Finally, for a critical engagement with 
narrative theories and an emphasis on the performative and discursive features of the constitution of self: Derek 
Edwards, Discourse and Cognition (London: Sage, 1997). 
85
 Our ‗self‘ which is ―more properly articulated in the plural, as ‗selves‘‖ is a ―project of everyday life‖ or the 
network of stories we perform in our multiple social interactions and contexts: Holstein & Gubrium, supra note 
16 at 13.  
86
 Infra 2.3.2 (―Street Law Through Shot/Reverse‖). 
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shared and personal normative standards. These regimes may be attributed to various social 
groups to which we belong, whether families, clubs, communities, etc.  They may emerge 
from our own normative locations along axes of race, class, gender, age, ethnicity, sexuality, 
culture, geography which morph throughout our everyday lives.  They may also develop 
through our interaction with institutions, whether churches, prisons, schools, self-regulating 
bodies, corporations, etc.  Street law emerges through these myriad relationships: individuals 
in interaction are the irreducible site of street law.   
  Fifth, as I explore throughout this dissertation, in each of these configurations of self, 
we constitute law as interpretive legal agents (as agential subjects) rather than simply as its 
targets (as objectified subjects). Legal pluralism destabilizes the belief that there is a primary, 
eternal legal interpreter (such as the ‗judge‘) who can provide measured, objective and true 
interpretations of rules that exist beyond the individuals to whom they apply.  Rather, the 
assumption is that we all mediate, interpret, harness, and make law and consequently  
perform, embody, and enact plural legal subjectivities (such as the negotiator, the law-maker, 
and the interpreter).  We navigate our relationship to law, we make interpretive choices as to 
how we imagine or want to imagine law.  Moreover, our navigation through life is not simply 
informed by law; it informs law, and in many respects, even comprises it.88 
Finally, critical legal pluralism favours human creativity.  It is an optimistic view of 
human interactions that conceives law as a framework for self-directed behaviour and the 
pursuit of individual or shared purposes.  To this end, critical legal pluralism encourages a 
world-view of law (whether or not state-based) as flexible enough to accommodate multiple 
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 See: infra 3.5.1 (―Law and Film‖) and 3.5.2 (―Cinematic Law‖). 
88
 To the question, ‗What is the law‘, Macdonald answers ―whatever the person posing the question wants it to 
be‖: Macdonald (Illuminating), supra note 44 at 1140.  
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visions of the conditions that would further justice and alternative conceptions of the 
institutions through which those conditions may be fostered.89   As I argue through my 
discussion of the Korsakow System (Chapter Four), governance, including formally and 
textually enacted rules, can be facilitative and constitutive rather than command-based.  Law 
should point to abstract standards that help us recognize the responsibilities we share for 
(and to) each other. Law should suggest how we may attend to those duties with the 
understanding that people have the ―capacity to divine what is expected of them.‖90  This 
view begins with the assumption that people can live ethically, that they can and do show 
regard and care for each other.  And so it also invites individuals to take responsibility for the 
forms and outcomes of legal processes in order to ensure that institutions – though 
themselves a source of articulation, negotiation and experiences of normativity - exist in the 
periphery of their daily lives and are limited to the rare moments when people act egregiously 
or irresponsibly.91 
Taken together, these insights of critical legal pluralism suggest that the struggle to 
effect change (whether conceived in terms of values such as more meaningful relationships 
and justice for street-involved people or in terms of more direct aims such as the halting of 
regulative regimes that target the urban poor) must engage with law‘s plural, interpenetrating, 
interacting modes, forms, instruments and registers and correspondingly, the inter-subjective 
and agential possibilities that law can facilitate.     
 
                                                                
89
 Macdonald (Governance), supra note 56 at 24. 
90
 Ibid. 
91
 Ibid. 
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1.2 CONCEPTUAL MAP    
 
 Having discussed an ethos of critical legal pluralism which informs and gives shape to 
my research, I will now provide a conceptual map by way of a few conceptual signposts that 
surface and resurface throughout this dissertation.  I then move to my methodological 
approaches92 and various attempts at apprehending street law (Chapters Two, Three and 
Four).  My research began in four broad strokes through four concepts that I wanted to work 
through: street-involved people, the cinematic, governance, and street law.  Each of these is 
a symbolization of complex processes, interactions and practices which cannot be reduced to 
the words that I nonetheless use to describe them.    Consequently, what I provide below 
are definitions-in-process.  They have enabled me to structure my dissertation but their 
meanings have been un-iterated and re-iterated throughout the following chapters.  It is by 
sketching out these concepts in an attempt to transcend them that the broader inquiry of my 
dissertation will be conveyed.  Through these concepts, the story I hope to relay is that street 
law, which is constituted through, among other things, the governance of and by street-
involved people, can be symbolized cinematically.     
 
1.2.1 STREET-INVOLVED PEOPLE   
  
 The legal agents who are the focus of my research are people to whom I refer as 
―street-involved.‖  Defining, labeling and categorizing are ways in which we make sense of 
the world; inclusion and exclusion of information can fall toward binary oppositions (such as 
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 Infra. 1.3 (―Transdisciplinarity and Ambidexterity‖). 
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is and is not). Usually, street-involved people are defined in opposition to people who are not 
street-involved.  Alternatively, we can consider how all legal agents cross and disrupt the 
distinction between street and non-street through their actions, interactions, beliefs and 
relationships.  Many anti-poverty organizations are materially and spatially grounded on the 
street and are (at least to some degree) staffed by people who have at one point in their lives 
been street-involved. Interactions between ‗staff‘ and ‗clients‘ are therefore informed, but 
never entirely determined, by territorial boundaries such as being on (or off) the street.   
 Calgary‘s Youth Recovery Coalition, for instance, runs according to two potentially 
chaotic but nonetheless implicitly anti-definitional operational guidelines: a ‗no boundary‘ rule 
(literally and figuratively)93 and an unwritten policy that favours hiring youth who have lived on 
the street.94 These practices favour the possibility of shared appreciation despite each 
individual‘s complex normative lives, the matrix of competing desires, expectations, habits, 
and values that guide his or her behaviour. 
 Nevertheless, I use the term ―street-involved people‖ in ways that suggest that there 
exists an outside (or an opposite), namely people who are not street-involved.  Such binaries 
are always embedded in power relations; yet, I use this particular opposition for heuristic as 
well as pragmatic purposes.  In grappling with experiences from the perspective of being 
‗street-involved,‘ we can consider the taken-for-granted and very real differences that exist 
                                                                
93
 By ‗no boundary‘ organizers mean first that hugs are permitted and even encouraged and second, staff and 
volunteers will ‗cross the line‘ to help their constituents. Amanda (one of the founding members and volunteers) 
explained to me that ―if someone needs meth, we‘ll find it for them, whatever it takes.‖ (Interview with Amanda 
on file with author).  
94
 Amanda refers to herself as a ―veggie burger with bacon‖ as she embodies both being on the street (having 
lived from street-level income generation) and off the street (now a university student and projects coordinator 
at the Coalition). See also: Youth Recovery Coalition, "Who we are",  online:  
<http://www.youthrecoverycoalition.com/ >. Their guidelines suggest more meaningful ways to develop and 
sustain relationships organized around and in relation to other street users that blur the binary opposition 
between ‗people on the street‘ and people ‗from away‘ (Interview with Amanda, on file with author).  
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between those who do and do not generate income through interactions on the street.  
Difference, as Pierre Legrand reminds us, is ―polymorphous‖ and need not be interpreted in a 
―divisive and impoverishing‖ manner.95  Rather, it can be deployed as an affirmation of being; 
the act of ―differentiation‖ provides us with a ―vital capacity for action by enabling one to resist 
the erosion of boundaries between subjects, by allowing one to elude misrecognition or 
banishment, by permitting one to avoid violent confusions.‖96 
 With this conceptualization of difference in the foreground, a street-involved person for 
the purposes of this dissertation is an individual among the assemblage of people, who unlike 
people who are not street-involved, are homeless or precariously housed, and who engage in 
non–recognized, devalued, or prohibited income-generation and survival tactics on and 
through the ‗street.‘97  Contrary to Orwell‘s assessment that there is a ―sharp line between 
those who merely cadge and those who attempt to give some value for money,‖98 each 
person‘s approach to income generation and survival varies moment by moment, shifts with 
their narratives of selfhood, as anyone else‘s: fragmented, rhizomatic, situational, often 
inconsistent, and importantly, interactive.99  Street-involved people, in spite of the figure that 
                                                                
95
 Legrand is speaking in the context of comparative law and is critical of the quest for commonality founded on 
vague understandings of ―the ontic‖ (or factual, real) ―sameness of people:‖ Pierre Legrand, "The Same and the 
Different" in Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday, eds., Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 240 at 258. 
96
 Ibid. at 240. 
97
 The income-generating and otherwise life-sustaining activities span a broad range including entertaining and 
busking, asking for change, transactioning  around the sale of sex, holding doors, squeegeeing car windows, 
collecting empty cans and bottles, creating pavement art, engaging in licensed or unlicensed street trading and 
vending, and selling prescription and illegal drugs.  This work may be their only source of income but more often 
than not, it is an additional source of income (as paid employment or receipt of some form of social assistance 
is generally insufficient to cover their basic needs).  Others – usually people most in need of explicit and formal 
interventions by care workers because of addiction or other health concerns - engage in petty theft: Interviews 
with Eric, Karine, Marco, Michel, Richard, Samir (on file with author).   
98
 George Orwell, Down and Out in Paris and London (London: Penguin Books, 2003) at 171. 
99
 For a discussion on the narrative strategies we all employ, see: Jasmina Sermjin, Patrick Devlieger & Gerrit 
Loots, "The Narrative Construction of Self" (2008) 14:4 Qualitative Inquiry 632.  For an exploration of how 
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recurs in much popular culture and scholarship around homelessness, are not merely 
‗derelict‘ older white men.  Urban first nations‘ people at risk of, or currently experiencing, 
socio-economic marginalization, for instance, still have less access than their non-native 
counterparts to safe, stable, and long-term transition housing and related supports necessary 
to achieve more meaningful self-determinacy.100   Single women (including single women 
with children) and youth are the fastest growing segments of the street-community.101  Street-
involved women face unique challenges in terms of maintaining sexual and reproductive 
health, being at risk of physical and sexual violence, and childcare responsibilities.102 Street-
involvement is not, furthermore, merely an urban phenomenon: street-involved people also 
move in, out, within and through rural spaces.103   
 Moreover, given the trend in most urban centers to evict people from public spaces at 
the same time as the growth in the ‗shelter industry,‘104 many street-involved people do not 
necessarily inhabit  the street—at least, not in the Bourdieusian sense of acquiring 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
narrative operates in law, see: Martha Minow, "Stories in law" in Peter Brook & Paul Gewirtz, eds., Law's 
Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1996) 2. 
100
 The government of Canada launched the Urban Aboriginal Strategy in 1998 to address on-going socio-
economic disparity between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people in urban centers, and among other things, the 
disproportionate number of homeless first nations people in urban centers across the country: Government of 
Canada, Gathering Strength: Canada's Aboriginal Action Plan (Ottawa: 1997). According to Statistics Canada, 
in 2001, forty-nine percent of population identifying aboriginal resided in urban centers. Compared to non-
aboriginal counterparts, First Nations people in urban areas have lower levels of formal and accredited 
education, higher unemployment rates, and lower individual and family incomes.  Longitudinal research 
indicates that aboriginal people make up between twenty and fifty percent of the urban street-involved 
population:  Katherine Graham & Evelyn Peter, Aboriginal Communities and Urban Sustainability (Ottawa: 
Canadian Policy Research Networks, 2003).   
101
 Angela Cheung & Stephen Hwang, "Risk of Death Among Homeless Women: A Cohort Study and Review of 
the Literature" (2004) 170:8 Canadian Medical Association Journal 1243. 
102
 For instance, empirical research across jurisdictions in Canada has found that generally speaking women 
have lower rates of substance abuse than men, but have higher rates of depression.  Single women are more 
likely to have serious health problems than women accompanied by children: Ibid.    
103
 See generally: Cheryl Forchuk, et al., ―Gaining Ground, Losing Ground: The Paradoxes of Rural 
Homelessness‖ (2010) 42:2 Canadian Journal of Nursing Research 138.  
104
 I use this term to refer to what others may call the ‗shelter system,‘ or the assemblage of services and 
service providers that are funded by government, religious groups or other means to offer lodging to street-
involved people.   
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dispositions ―functioning on the practical level as categories of perception and 
assessment.‖105  While some street-involved people who ‗rough sleep‘ derive a certain status 
in relation to other street-involved people who opt for shelters, they do not necessarily live in 
and through the street as a way of legitimizing their status or for overtly political purposes.   
 These popular myths about street-involvement set aside, it remains that the everyday 
and everynight negotiations and life-sustaining tactics of street-involved people are explicitly 
and implicitly regulated. As a result, street-involved people experience judicialization106 and 
criminalization in ways that are generally uncommon for the vast majority of people whose 
race and class affords them access to more social power.107  Indeed, people who are not 
street-involved tend to experience ‗the law‘ and the formal, institutionalized criminal law 
especially, in ways that are more easily recognizable as ‗mediated‘ (through popular culture 
and news for instance).108   
                                                                
105
 Bourdieu develops his concept habitus as part of a theory of human action within fields of social constraint.  
Habitus is the system through which individuals struggle for social distinction; it is adopted through socialization, 
education, disposition, imitation, and evaluation; it is performed through the body, and especially through 
unconscious routines:  Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Cambridge: University Press, 1990) [hereinafer, 
Bourideu (Practice)]. I use it here in the sense that for people that I consider to be street-involved, living on the 
street is not an identity marker nor is it necessarily the achievement of a conscious decision. Consider also 
Henri Lefebvre who emphasizes rhythms, the diverse temporalities of the street as a social space, meaning that 
the street is not a space that is necessarily appropriated in political ways: Henri Lefebvre, Rhythmanalysis: 
Space, Time and Everyday Life (London: Continuum, 2004).  
106
 The term refers to the processes through which they are brought into the penal system but not necessarily 
by way of criminal regulation, but through provincial legislation regulating ‗safe streets‘ and by-laws regulating 
the solicitation of alms for instance.  
107
 There is a significant body of interdisciplinary work on the ‗criminalization‘ of street-involvement and 
homelessness, but a seminal text remains: Lorne Sossin, "The Criminalization and Administration of the 
Homeless" (1996) 22 New York University Review of Law & Social Change 623. More recently:  Diane Crocker 
& Val Marie Johnson, eds., Poverty, Regulation and Social Justice (Halfiax & Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing, 
2010). Unsurprisingly, it is a similar assemblage of people who make up incarcerated populations in Canada: 
Gillian Balfour & Elizabeth Comack, eds., Criminalizing Women (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2006); Michael 
Jackson, Justice Behind the Walls: Human Rights in Canadian Prisons (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre 2002).  
108
 I adopt Sarah Kember and Joanna Zylinska‘s view that mediation is not a ―translational or transparent layer 
… between independently existing entities‖ (such as the viewer and a film or a legal subject and the law); 
rather, it is a ―complex and hybrid process‖ which is both limiting and productive.  These processes usually 
occur simultaneously: Sarah Kember & Joanna Zylinska, "Creative Media Between Invention and Critique, Or 
What's Still at Stake in Performativity" (2010) 6 Culture Machine 1 at 2. 
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 For the purposes of this dissertation, street-involved people are members of an 
amorphous and heterogeneous group that nonetheless shares similar socio-cultural and 
economic challenges: extreme poverty, unemployment or lack of a living wage109, debt, little 
or insufficient access to required social programs, and unstable housing.110  
 Often these features of street-involvement are in direct relation to, or are at least 
compounded by, other features of their particular forms of racialization, intellectual 
disabilities, physical disabilities, abuse (whether physical, emotional, sexual or  economic), 
addiction and other chronic health concerns.111 Usually, these lived conditions are further 
exacerbated by or lead to increased experiences of marginalization, stress, and anxiety, and 
experiences of violence;112 these experiences stem in part from the complex network of 
                                                                
109
 Most street-involved people hold some form of employment – whether recognized work or not.  In fact, a 
recent study in Saskatoon found that 75% of  adult shelter users  held full-time employment but were still unable 
to make ends meet: Nicola S. Chopin & J. Stephen Wormith, Count of Saskatoon’s Homeless 
Population:Research Findings (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Community-University Institute for 
Social Research 2008).  
 
110
As noted earlier, street-involved people are not necessarily ‗homeless.‘  Some live in shared rental 
arrangements (that may or may not meet health and safety standards); others may squat or couch-surf 
(Interview with Yann on file with author). Of the street-involved people I have interviewed many have found that 
despite potential harassment by police, injury, exposure to extreme weather conditions, staying in temporary or 
transitional housing (such as hostels, rooming houses and emergency shelters) often renders them more 
vulnerable to: long term health concerns (high rates of tuberculosis, hepatitis B, HIV and AIDS); illness from 
mattresses with mould and bed bugs;  scrutiny and judgment by staff and volunteers for consumption of alcohol 
or drug use (often for men); patronizing and controlling practices by staff and volunteers (often for women); and 
general annoyances with  other shelter users (Interviews with France and Yann on file with author). That said 
there remain significant number of street-involved people who are without permanent shelter and who ‗rough 
sleep‘ (on benches, in alley ways) or who erect temporary shelters (out of cardboard and other material).  In 
Victoria (City) v. Adams (2008) B.C.L.R. 4
th
 116 (B.C.S.C.) at para 148, Justice Ross held that the municipal 
prohibition against erecting a temporary abode was overbroad and arbitrary and violated homeless people‘s 
right to life, liberty and security of the person (and violated section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms).  
111
 The Colour of Poverty Campaign, Understanding the Racialization of Poverty in Ontario (Toronto: BestStart  
2007). Stephen Hwang, Health Care Utilization Among Homeless People (Toronto: Centre for Research in 
Inner City Health, 2010). 
112
 A history of mental illness or the chronic use of prescription drugs, painkillers and illegal substances places 
people at greater risk of becoming street-involved. A familiar argument is that with the well-intentioned but 
poorly executed deinstitutionalization, mental health patients began in the 1960s and 1970s, the community and 
the help sector was relied upon to care for these vulnerable populations. The rapid flow of mental health 
patients out of hospitals and into the community, however, was accompanied by a slow growth of community 
mental health services.  With little access to resources and few long-term, holistic care models in place, many 
people with co-occurring mental health, substance use and stress-related concerns were left to their own 
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policies, practices, and decisions made by individuals advancing a view of risk and individual 
responsibility in relation to the question of poverty.113   
 
1.2.2 CINEMATIC  
 
 In this dissertation, I engage with the jurisgenerative capacities of street-involved 
people through conceptual apparatuses borrowed from film studies, which I refer to as 
―cinematic‖ concepts.  I outline below a few overlapping questions that occupy film theorists 
and filmmakers and which provide the foundation for my understanding of the cinematic 
artefact itself, its reception, its production, and the meanings it can generate.  
 First, ‗cinema‘ is one of the defining technological and aesthetic audiovisual forms of 
our current cultural moment.114  Within film studies,115 cinema is often used to refer to a set 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
devices: Patricia Sealy & Paul Whitehead, "Forty Years of Deinstitutionalization of Psychiatric Services in 
Canada: An Empirical Assessment" (2004) 9 Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 249.  Further, street-involved 
people experience stress and anxiety around meeting their daily survival needs and are at a higher risk of 
experiencing physical violence; these conditions in turn increase mental health problems and the use of coping 
substances:  Tim Riordan, Exploring the Circle: Mental illness, Homelessness and the Criminal Justice System 
in Canada (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2004).  Finally, experiences of violence – whether at the hand of 
relative strangers or at the hands of people with whom they form relationships - are higher among street-
involved people than for people who are permanently housed:  Margo Pierce, "Hate Wave: Attacking Homeless 
People", online: (2010) Streetvibes Newspaper:  http://streetvibes.wordpress.com/2010/07/01/hate-wave-
attacking-homeless-people/>.   
113
 I use risk here as discussed in Beck‘s works meaning ―the modern approach to foresee and control the 
future consequences of human action:‖ Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society (Malden, Polity Press:  1999) at 3.   
114
 As Rodowick argues, cinema is the ―mature audiovisual culture of the twentieth century:‖ D.N. Rodowick, 
The Virtual Life of Film (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007) at 189. 
115
 Film Studies is a diverse and contested area of inquiry and debate.  Film is shorthand for filmstrip, the base 
and emulsion layers that make up the material onto which light rays are focused and which is processed in 
chemicals to produce film images. See generally, The Oxford English Dictionary 2nd ed., s.v. ―cinema,‖ ―film,‖ 
―film strip‖ and ―movie.‖ Given the technological and aesthetic shift away from analogue to digital media, it may 
be more accurate to speak of communications, cultural and media studies and to engage with multiple 
cinematic spatio-temporal media in terms of their artistic, entertainment, and normative dimensions.  For a 
discussion of the ‗fate‘ of cinema studies, see: Rodowick, ibid.   
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of cultural, technological, aesthetic, and economic institutions,116 whereas film refers to both 
analog media and the ‗new‘ digital media that are ―imagined from the cinematic 
metaphor.‖117  Cinema, then, includes digital technologies, television, video, film, and other 
audiovisual cultural artifacts ―whose broad and indiscernible outlines we are only just 
beginning to distinguish.‖118   
 Second, film is not simply mimetic; it cannot be reduced to pure representation or 
reflection of social phenomena.  Film theorists have speculated about the relationship 
between art, ideology and social orders.  In contradistinction to earlier arguments that the 
film reel ‗captures the real,‘ others put forth an account of the camera as a vehicle for 
ideology.  Accordingly, in the hands of a particular filmmaker, film can convey meaning, 
guide and manage cognitive and emotional responses.  Put differently, filmmakers deploy 
rhetorical and cinematic techniques to summons worldviews into being and to encourage 
critical thought. In the 1970s, some leftist film theorists argued that film is essentially an 
ideological state apparatus and an instrument for subjugation through which spectators are 
                                                                
116
 Metz for instance draws a distinction between film, the signifying text and the object of film semiology and 
cinema, the multi-dimensional socio-cultural institution including the pre-, post-, and filmic events, such as the 
studio system, a film‘s circulation, and the physical space of the theatre: Christian Metz, Film Language:  A 
Semiotics of the Cinema (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974). 
117
As new media technologies (computer-generated images, digital cinematography, animation, and 
independently-generated sound) replace or at least displace chemical processing and optical printing, post-
production differentiates film from other more photographic or indexical media.  Indeed, few if any films today 
are produced without using animation and computer processing. For a critical discussion on filmic and digital 
media specificity in light of these technological shifts, see: Rodowick, supra note 114 at 12. Rodowick denies 
what he calls the myth that analog recording of the ‗real‘ world is dangerously being replaced by empty ―digital 
simulation‖ of lived reality. According to this story, the digital is coded as future-oriented with special-effects and 
spectacular representations whereas the analog conserves the present and expresses truthful and authentic 
experiences: Ibid. at 4. However, he argues that different processes allow for different kinds of symbolization as 
well as new concepts of materiality: ―Unlike analogical representation, which have as their basis a 
transformation of substance isomorphic with an originating image, virtual representations derive all their powers 
from numerical manipulation … the transformation of matter in the electronic and digital arts takes place on a 
different atomic register and in a different conceptual domain.  Whereas analog media record traces of events 
… digital media produce tokens of numbers: the constructive tools of Euclidian geometry are replaced by the 
computational tools of Cartesian geometry:‖ Ibid. at 9.  
118
 Ibid. at viii. Drawing on this definition, I use film, video and cinema interchangeably.  
45 
 
constituted and positioned in unified ways.119   Cinema can be considered an instrumental 
medium used by social actors who generate truth-claims by directing the gaze (first person) 
toward other social actors and phenomena (third person);120  for my purposes, however, film 
mediates in a different matter.   
 That is to say, cinema shapes and reflects the social world and invites a perspective 
that exists in relation to the first person (the ‗I‘/‘eye‘, the camera‘s gaze, the author‘s 
intention, the insider perspective), the second person (the ‗thou‘, the object of perception) 
and, importantly, the third person (the audience‘s reception, the outsider‘s perspective).  As 
medium, cinema provides and embodies a second and sometimes third order of perception.  
Through the experience of viewing, active audiences oscillate between subjective and 
objective perspectives, between conceding to, and critically reflecting upon, an image.121  
Audiences do not perceive what occurs in a film‘s world, according to Deleuze, ―without 
simultaneously being reflected in a transcendental subject which thinks it and in which it 
thinks itself.‖122   
 Film has the potential to create its own movements (rhythms which cannot be 
reduced to techniques or stagnant images) and temporalities (durations which are not 
limited to a specific frame, a kind of shot, or a moment in producing).123  Consequently, 
when we perceive cinematically then, we mediate at least two points of view on ourselves: 
                                                                
119
 Metz, supra note 116.  
120
 I will return to this point in Chapter Two in my discussion of Copwatch (―Shot/Reverse‖) and HomelessNation 
(―Tracking Shot‖).  
121
 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema One: The Movement-Image (London: Athlone, 1986) [hereinafter, Deleuze (Cinema 
One); Laura Marks, The Skin of the Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment and the Senses (Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 2000).  
122
 Ibid at p. 73.  
123
 Id.  
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first, a ―hither-and-thither of the spirit,‖ and second, a ―being with.‖124 Cinema, for my 
purposes, is a multimodal (analogue or digital for instance), spatio-temporal medium that 
circulates and constitutes images125 from a perspective that is neither subjective nor 
objective, nor propositional, but a ―free indirect subjective‖ with its own consciousness and 
self-consciousness.126  
 Finally, there is a well-worn debate between constructionist and realist film scholars 
about the ontology of film, or what gives cinema its cinematicity. More recent accounts in the 
shifting terrain of cinema studies have abandoned the quest to determine film‘s ontology, 
mainly because questions of media specificity neglect the normativities at play in designating 
aesthetic rules for truly ‗cinematic‘ film.127  Yet, the question of what is cinematic remains.  
 To Rancière, cinema, like any other art, is not something ―whose processes can be 
deduced from the specificity of its material and technical apparatuses‖; rather, like painting 
and literature, ―cinema is the name of an art whose meaning cuts across the borders 
between the arts.‖128 Working within Rancière‘s reading of Deleuze, and departing from it 
somewhat, cinematicity refers, for my purposes, to a mode of thought, a form of theorizing 
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 Ibid.  at 74. 
125
 By image I probably mean ‗image-based‘ because I am not equipped to respond to the ontological 
conundrum posed by Rodowick who claims that ‗new‘ media are forms ―without image in the sense that what 
appears on electronic and digital screens does not fully conform to the criteria by which in the past we have 
come to recognize something as a created, aesthetic image:‖ supra note 114 at 94.  
126
 Deleuze (Cinema One), supra note 121 at 74. 
127
 As Noel Carroll and Jinhee Choi note, the ‗ontologist‘ finds the kind of filmmaking she deems cinematic 
―inherent in the nature of cinema‖ because, she has in essence ―put it there.‖  Thus, a desire to discover film‘s 
specificities is no longer viewed as the best way to grapple with what is a ‗cinematic‘ film: Noel Carroll & Jinhee 
Choi, "Introduction to Part II" in Noel Carrol & Jinhee Choi, eds., Philosophy of Film and Motion Pictures: An 
Anthology (Victoria: Blackwell Publishing, 2006) 51 at 53. Rancière writes that the aesthetic regime follows a 
basic law, ―to graft one‘s art onto preexisting art and render its operations almost indiscernible from the prose of 
everyday stories and images‖; the mainstream film industry then is simply ―the most radical form of this law:" 
Jacques Rancière, Film Fables, trans. by Emiliano Battista (Oxford & New York: Berg Publishers, 2006) 
[hereinafter, Rancière (Film Fables)]. For a critical review of the debate around media specificity: Rodowick, 
supra note 114. 
128
 Rancière (Film Fables), ibid. at 4. 
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that imagines cinema to be neither pure artifact nor pure artifice but rather a creative force in 
itself generating thought. Cinematographic images are, therefore, two things at once.   
 Films are the cinematic artifact as well as the ―operations of an art that restores to the 
events of the world the power they had been deprived of by the opaque screen of the human 
brain.‖129  In accordance with this view, in this dissertation, the cinematic, such as in 
‗cinematic legal metaphors‘ or ‗cinematic street law,‘ refers to a mode of thinking, theorizing, 
and understanding our legal world-building in a cinematic register.   
 My aim is not to establish how my work in law is uniquely cinematic.  Rather, one of 
my main claims, as will become more evident with each subsequent chapter, is that we 
already can and already do think cinematically about law and legally about cinema.   I 
develop that claim by examining how we constitute ‗street law‘ – that is the governance of 
and by street-involved people – among other ways, cinematically and through our interaction 
with cinema.  Before moving to the concept of street law, however, I elaborate what I mean 
by ‗governance.‘ 
1.2.3 GOVERNANCE  
 
In governance studies,130 there are generally three overlapping conceptual frames for 
understanding how we govern and are governed:  direct governance, governance at a 
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  Ibid.  at 9. Note that Rancière is critical of what he conceives as the lack of political potential in Deleuze‘s 
focus on the ‗becoming imperceptible.‘ However, as Katherine Wolf argues, Deleuze‘s concept of the 
imperceptible may well be akin to Rancière‘s politics as it refers to that which must be perceived but cannot be 
due to the circumscription of the sense experience in the sensus communis: Katharine Wolfe, "From Aesthetics 
to Politics: Rancière, Kant and Deleuze", online: (2006) Contemporary Aesthetics   
<http://www.contempaesthetics.org/newvolume/pages/article.php?articleID=382>. 
130
 Attention to governance is considered a paradigmatic moment, a shift in critical socio-legal scholarship 
toward understanding how people are constituted and subjected through their everyday lives: Hunt 
(Constitutive), supra note 5.   
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distance and something in between.131  Direct governance refers to practices that structure 
the field of action and restrict discretionary exercise by law‘s subjects.  It is expressed visibly, 
formally and officially (especially through legislation and precedent); it takes the form of 
prohibitions or externalized commands.132 Resistance to such governance is often imagined 
in terms of formal and official law reform or through acts of civil disobedience.  Direct 
governance is not, however, inherently oppressive; it can be productive and relational, such 
as through the provision of services and resources by an external institution acting in 
response to the needs of individual legal subjects.133   
Governing at a distance is often used as shorthand for neo-liberal practices, 
processes and regimes by which political power, expertise, and self-governance intersect 
and are embodied in a form of internalized normative inculcation.134  Through their 
interactions with the state-based governance, individuals internalize rules, self-regulate, or 
constrain their behaviour – whether in line with or in resistance to the normative expectations 
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generated through expert knowledge.135 Formal law is merely one of many tactics deployed 
to arrange populations.136 The rules to which subjects adhere are accordingly of a general 
nature and ―do not appear to originate anywhere in particular.‖137  Subjects may engage in 
resistance to governance or ―counter-politics.‖138 However, they may also deploy more 
meaningful counter-tactics that are located within the realm of the ‗technologies of self.‘139 
Namely, they effect ―by their own means … operations on their own bodies and souls, 
thoughts, conduct,‖ transform themselves, and ultimately attain a measure of happiness.140  
The image of care of the self opens conceptual space to contemplate how we are governed 
as subjects of law, but also how we engage in the production of our own subjectivities 
through discourses and practices that are embedded in our daily lives.141  
Finally, mid-way governing occurs through entities that attempt to map and configure 
the actions of their  subjects but regulation occurs in personalized, individualized, visible, yet 
indirect ways.142  The governed subject is aware of the tactics relied upon by the governing 
body and so she will not internalize its normative expectations. As a result, the governing 
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body will deploy less explicit strategies to generate its desired outcomes.143  The concept of 
mid-way governing helps highlight that in any system of governance, there are always 
ruptures in formal, hierarchical relations.  
Taken together, these three approaches to governance – direct, at a distance, and 
mid-way – highlight how in any scheme of governance, there is a plurality of authoritative 
entities, operations and applications which are not limited to state bodies; hat each of these 
normative sites is embedded in, and circulates, a range of ideological perspectives; that 
these perspectives, which while not necessarily visible, nonetheless operate as an 
elaboration of norms and other means of organizing social power; that each of these 
perspectives also emerges, to a degree, from the plurality of legal identities embodied by the 
legal subjects that in turn navigate and constitute multiple and often conflicting governance 
schemes; that these normative subjects are produced through shifting power relations; and 
that almost every area of social life, including our most personal and our most broadly social 
relationships, engage questions of governance.    
While these understandings of governance inform my work, that I deploy in this 
dissertation moves beyond the realm of institutional governance and governable subjects‘ 
resistance to multiple modes of governance.144 Instead, I favour a view of governance as 
facilitative and which includes caring relationships between legal agents.  Governance is an 
on-going process of assessing and managing expectations and behaviours in ways that 
recognize and advance human agency.145  As social beings, we always enjoy a measure of 
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decision-making power, we are always capable of making choices – though they may at 
times be infinitesimal – which occur within various economic, political, cultural or otherwise 
normative contexts and within institutions and structures that may constrain or promote 
conditions of choice.  As human beings, Roderick Macdonald explains, we simultaneously 
perform and express our agency through self-governing behaviour as well as through our 
intentional or involuntary participation in governance structures ―that we share with others 
and that channel the occasions for exercising that human agency.‖146  
Most people will agree that interactions between strangers on the street require some 
form of governance. However, the ‗target‘ of governance (the dimension of everyday life that 
requires some form of regulation), the appropriate bodies for governing interactions on the 
street and the means by which we wish to achieve that governance will shift depending on 
individual and collective beliefs.  For our purposes, how and by what means street-involved 
people govern and are governed through their interactions with their interlocutors will 
necessarily be inflected by individual and collective beliefs about the material conditions of 
urban economic and social marginalization.  These in turn will also be influenced by the kinds 
of relationships we want to facilitate among human beings, namely, in regard to the 
maintenance of our sense of selves, the giving of ourselves, and our relations to our ‗others‘.     
My attempt in this dissertation is to further such a pragmatic and relational conception 
of governance.  I do look critically at direct governance, as others have before me, to call into 
question the current explicit and formal legal practices that are experienced by street-
involved people as oppressive. However, the ultimate aim of my research is not to develop a 
normative theory as ‗the solution‘ to oppressive regimes of governance directed at street-
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involved people.147 Rather, my approach to governance is more tentative. I invite street law 
constituents to consider what Tully calls ―the practices and problematisations in which we find 
ourselves‖148 when we interact with others on the street.  To this end, I do not propose to 
provide a ‗thick description‘ of formal and explicit governance as experienced by street-
involved people.149  I do describe, however, some of the modes in which street-involved 
people govern (and are governed). I also use the language and concepts of cinema to move 
away from inherited ways of describing street law (be they explicitly enacted or inherently 
repressive). I attempt to re-describe it in a vocabulary that engages with governances‘ 
facilitative and relational potential that reside in multiple forms and modes governance. This 
new vocabulary requires conceptualizing governance both of and by street-involved people.  
My understanding of governance is that it can be part of a broader project that helps affirm 
street-involved people‘s self-understanding and their interlocutors‘ self-understanding as 
legal subjects struggling within contingent conditions of governance.  Governance when 
conceptualized as facilitative can also help street-involved people and their interlocutors 
relate to one another as legal agents who can govern themselves differently than they 
currently do.150  
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1.2.4 STREET LAW  
 Street law consists of on-going processes of imagining and expressing interactions 
between people in a shared socio-spatial-temporal entity (the ‗street‘) as governed by 
rules.151  Street law occurs through interactions on the street between multiple legal agents 
embodying multiple, overlapping and sometimes competing subjectivities at once (e.g., 
pedestrians, consumers, public transportation officials, sanitation and construction workers, 
cyclists) and between legal agents and things (e.g., bank machines, parking meters, bus 
shelters, crosswalks, sidewalks, wheelchairs, baby carriages) as various street users 
navigate intersecting and sometimes conflicting orders of street law (e.g., normative 
frameworks regarding etiquette, the flow of pedestrian traffic, appropriate interactions).  
 Consequently, street law is not an autonomous body of rules and principles contained 
within a single institutional framework (such as the state); nor is its interpretation the sole 
province of institutional actors (such as the police).152  Rather, it is ―real law‖ as Reisman puts 
it: street law is ―found in all human relations, from the simplest, briefest encounter between 
two people to the most inclusive and permanent type of interaction.‖153 With this broader 
understanding of street law, I turn my attention to the mode of street law that is this 
dissertation‘s object of inquiry. My focus is on rule-governed interactions between street-
involved people and their interlocutors as one example of a plurality of rule-governed 
interactions that constitute what I call street law.  As rule-governed behaviour that is primarily 
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organized through face-to-face interactions, street law foregrounds questions of subjectivity, 
responsibility, and reciprocity.  Street law (broadly conceived) and for the purposes of this 
dissertation, the governance of and by street-involved people, engages questions of the gift.    
 Gift-giving has been, and continues to be, an integral part of human relations.154   Gift-
giving serves numerous functions that engage multiple normative sites (whether social, 
economic, religious, aesthetic or legal).  Gifts may stand in for non-tangible affective 
responses that are oriented towards others and are generally altruistic, such as respect, 
care, nurturing, friendship and love.155  They may also, whether consciously or not, be 
deployed in ways that manipulate, demean, and even destroy others.156   Gift exchanges can 
uphold bonds, a sense of belonging and loyalty between individuals, thereby constituting 
community (whether in the more idealistic sense or by generating connections necessary to 
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engage people in collective violence against ‗others‘).  They can also annihilate such bonds 
(when used excessively, or to manipulative ends).157  
 Theorizing gift relations stems back at least as far as themes brought up by 
Nietzsche,158 who in The Voluntary Beggar claims that there is an art to gift-giving and that 
indebtedness can make the receiver feel vengeful.159  However, it is with Mauss‘ reflection on 
the norms that govern pre-modern ‗giving and receiving,‘ and importantly, ‗giving in return,‘ 
that the exchange of gifts became a framework for theorizing complex socio-economic 
arrangements and, more recently, for generating guidelines for ethical relationships. 160  The 
norm of reciprocity, according to Mauss, is the governing principle of gift exchanges.  As a 
hybrid of generosity and self-interest, the concept often remains heavily weighted with 
assumptions about rational actors and a contractarian view of law.   To some of Mauss‘ anti-
utilitarian interlocutor, for a true gift to exist, there can never be reciprocity.  The gift relation 
dies the moment there is debt, gratitude, restitution or counter-gift. 161  
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 To others such as Cixous and Godbout, calculation and reciprocity are not central to 
the gift.  Gift-giving plays with freedom and obligation in ways that eschew common sense 
understandings of behaviour as either free (calculated, instrumental, rational) or as 
determined (stemming from unilateral obedience to externally imposed rules).  Instead, 
respect, dignity, forgiveness, love, and compassion are the values and aspects of human 
relationships most fostered through gifts. Accordingly, the gift exchange is an inter-subjective 
event and the norms that govern it are often implicit, uncertain, unarticulated and 
unarticulatable.162 It is this understanding of the complexities of how gift-giving is governed 
which I argue can be deployed to challenge orthodox understandings of street law.  
 Joe Hermer has suggested as much in relation to one particular interaction that is 
constitutive of street law: panhandling (the request for spare change from a relative 
stranger).163  He persuasively argues that imagining these street-level interactions as gift 
encounters is a means of ―testing the constitutional soundness of anti-begging legislation‖ 
and especially of exposing the normative and discriminatory application of such street law. 
The gift helps us understand how particular street-involved people are governed (for Hermer, 
‗beggars‘).164 Its richness as a conceptual framework, however, is that it also brings us 
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beyond the realm of street law as formal, written, and externally imposed on street-involved 
people.   
 Despite a well-founded assumption that explicit and formalized street law (such as 
municipal by-laws regulating pedestrians, provincial legislation regulating vehicular traffic, 
and criminal law provisions against vagrancy-type behaviour)165 are highly visible and 
palpable in the lives of street-involved people,166 that mode of street law should not, by virtue 
of its source alone (the State), be afforded more scrutiny than other sites, forms and 
instruments.167   
 Rather than a structure that exists entirely outside the street-involved community, 
street law is generated and develops as an on-going and open-ended process and is 
constituted through the interactions that occur between multiple (irreducibly plural) legal 
subjects/agents. The conceptualization of street law – as a matrix of gift interactions – 
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furthers the perspective that every street-user (whether or not they are street-involved) is a 
legal subject (―law-attending‖) and a legal agent (―law-creating‖).168  While institutionally 
empowered actors (police officers and judges for instance) constitute street law, so do street-
involved people and their other (more tacit, less explicit) everyday/everynight interlocutors.169   
Put differently, each of us is constituted and is constituting oneself as legal agent (some who 
apprehends, appraises, and instantiates street law) through our interactions on the street.170  
 Each of us constructs deploys and circulates discourses about these interactions; our 
engagement in these discursive moments is exemplified by a range of communicative 
activities and other iterations of those interactions: for example, having conversations, 
viewing cinematic depictions, listening to news reports, reading policy documents etc.   As a 
consequence, within each street-user there are multiple, shifting, complicated normative 
commitments that are interpreted, tested, reinforced, nuanced, adjusted and/or destabilized 
through interactions with other street users. No street law entrepreneur can ―switch on and off 
our basic (and plural) normative infrastructures such as language, cultural heritage, gender 
expectations, class background and ingrained notions of racial identity.‖171  
 Street-involved people may elicit a range of emotional and affective responses from 
their interlocutors. Each of these responses builds and assuages the tension between 
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repulsion and desire or law‘s regressive and productive potential.  Importantly, we can have 
completely divergent responses to the same kind of interaction in any given moment.  As 
Margaret Davies puts it, we respond to others ―on the basis of the intersecting demands of 
our own ethical beliefs, our location in a social field, prevailing discourses about right and 
wrong and any number of more practical considerations.‖172  For instance, to some street 
users (some of the time), the urban poor elicit affective responses stemming from fear of 
contagion (of disease, of poverty itself) disdain, distrust, disgust, and hatred.173 These 
(momentary perhaps) responses form the basis of many (fixed) intrusive and visible formal 
and official (state-based) regulation of interactions on the street.  Such regulation, as Wendy 
Brown notes, is different from governance: it is far more entangled in notions of disapproval 
and tolerance or conditional acceptance of behaviour which is considered undesirable or 
deviant. 174  As a result of such rigid responses to malleable and shifting affective responses, 
the capacities of other street law constituents (especially street-involved people) to resolve 
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administrative involvement; they distribute benefits, facilities and positions according to policy choices rather 
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normal behaviour:‖ Costas Douzinas, "Law and Justice in Postmodernity" in Steven Connor, ed., The 
Cambridge Companion to Postmodernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 196 at 197. 
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conflict, to represent, contest, uphold and generate law, and to promote conditions of 
reciprocity, agency, and care is devalued and even suppressed.    
 Rather than the ‗risk‘ frameworks through which we can perceive street-involved 
people as threats (such as those that feature prominently in formal, explicitly enacted written  
instruments of governance), gift theory holds potential to engage what Jacques Godbout calls 
the ―implicit and the unsaid‖ which ―reign supreme‖ in interactions between strangers on the 
street.175  
 Within the framework of gift, street-involved people may be considered as individuals 
who embody the symptoms of breakdown in gift relationships.  As noted above, while it is 
true that street-involvement is almost always a direct result of poverty, it is also profoundly 
associated with breakdown in heterogeneous close interpersonal relationships - whether 
through bereavement, loss of employment, abuse, or a lack of community support.  The 
reconstitution of each of these kinds of relationships requires attentive, fluid, and plural other-
regarding action toward street-involved people by their interlocutors who feel morally 
compelled to intervene.    
 Some of these responses will occur from what Nel Noddings refers to as natural caring 
- love, sympathy or compassion – whereas others will require ethical caring -more reasoned, 
deliberate acts that are required when these other  impulses fail – whether out of annoyance, 
exhaustion, or frustration.176   The affective responses that govern ethical care, such as guilt 
or shame, may be considered negative, yet as Elspeth Probyn has argued, they can also 
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 Godbout (Gifts), supra note 14 at 4-5. 
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 According to Noddings‘ care theory, ―ethical caring‖ is ―subordinate to natural caring – relationships that 
require no moral effort but are sustained out of love, sympathy, compassion, generosity, good humor, and 
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inspire us to ―feel proximity differently.‖177  These are the kinds of relationships that bend and 
stretch beyond the logic of contracts, of exchange, and of mutual obligation and bring us 
closer to the ethics of responsibility for one another. 
 
1.3 TRANSDISCIPLINARITY AND AMBIDEXTERITY  
  
 Having provided a philosophical framework and conceptual map for my dissertation, in 
the next subsections, I discuss the methodological question of transdisciplinarity and the 
ambidextrous research practices through which I appraise the sites, sights, and media of 
street law. 
1.3.1 TRANSDISCIPLINARITY  
 
Transdisciplinarity raises a vexing and somewhat tautological question of the 
‗discipline‘.  Disciplines are tools, methods, instances, procedures, concepts, and theories 
that strive to coherently account for social phenomena.178 At their least interesting, 
disciplinary frameworks can be institutionalized and self-sustaining systems, processes and 
practices that promote the conditions where experts claim explanatory authority in relation to 
aspects of the social world.179  Yet, as Rorty found, disciplines emerged from a desire to 
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 Elspeth Probyn, Blush: Faces of Shame (Minneapolis: University Press, 2005) at 34. As with Sedgwick, her 
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 Julie Thompson Klein, Interdisciplinarity: History, Theory and Practice (Detroit: Wayne State University 
Press, 1990). 
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 On how truth claims amount to specialized and privileged forms of power-knowledge, see: Michel Foucault, 
Discipline and Punish, trans. by A.M. Sheridan Smith (London: Penguin, 1977) [hereinafter, Foucault 
(Discipline)]; Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of the Law (London: Routledge, 1989). On the mutually 
62 
 
abandon confrontation for dialogue as ―the determinant‖ of our beliefs and representational 
conventions.180  Conversely, contemporary scholars in most disciplines have invited their 
colleagues to develop frameworks and modes of producing knowledge that challenge 
unyielding orthodoxies and established claims of authority.181 They invite a blurring of 
boundaries, a transdisciplinarity, and irreverence toward common sense assumptions.  
Transdisciplinary methods invite different ways of seeing, or what some might call moral 
perception, because their pursuits move beyond the modes of apprehending and organizing 
knowledge that stymie our imaginations, our affective responses, and ultimately our ethical 
judgment.182   
In his crosscutting of cinema and philosophy, Gilles Deleuze proposes that the ―the 
encounter‖ between disciplines does not take place simply when ―one begins to reflect on the 
other‖ but rather when ―one discipline realizes that it has to resolve, for itself and by its own 
means, a problem similar to one confronted by the other.‖183 Interdisciplinary practices should 
therefore begin from the premise that more meaningful knowledge is created when we 
acknowledge and still expand disciplinary boundaries, critically engage with established 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
constitutive relationship between disciplinarity and professionalism in English common law, see: Brian Abel-
Smith & Robert Stevens, Lawyers and the Courts: A Sociological Study of the English Legal System (London: 
Heinemann, 1967). 
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 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) 163. 
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 As Robert Cover writes, often the ―most profound determinants of our thought are those of which we are 
least conscious.‖ He goes on to say that when these dimensions of knowledge construction are socially 
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different and distinct epistemology:‖ Cover (Uses), supra note 66. 
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 For instance, Lawrence Blum‘s interdisciplinary project associates contemporary moral philosophy with a 
psychology of moral agency: Lawrence Blum, Moral Perception and Particularity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994). 
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Gilles Deleuze, "The Brain is the Screen: An Interview with Gilles Deleuze" in Gregory Flaxman, ed., The 
Brain is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000) 
365 at 367.  
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shared assumptions and ultimately recast and reformulate disciplines into something that 
‗belongs to no one.‘184  
 Despite anxieties expressed by some legal theorists about law‘s absorption, 
appropriation and rejection of or by other disciplines, law, like any other specialized 
knowledge, is not a closed, self-sufficient, or autonomous field.185 And yet, if we take it as 
true that interdisciplinary scholarship has become ―an expected part of a serious scholar‘s 
work‖ in law, or that it is ―more pervasive than ever‖ in law faculties, crossing disciplines is, 
for the most part, performed by maintaining intact the two source disciplines and drawing on 
other disciplines‘ methods and sources.186  Critical scholars developing approaches to law 
that are found within, and at the interstices of, other disciplines, urge that such explorations 
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 Roland Barthes, The Rustle of Language, trans. by Richard Howard (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
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 Teubner relies on the physiological/biological metaphor ‗autopoiesis‘ to describe how law receives non-legal 
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Theory (Edinburgh Edinburgh University Press, 1993) 157.  And, as Robert Van Krieken has argued, law‘s 
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186
 To Balkin, because of its desire to form professionals, its belief in a teachable set of skills, and its lack of 
methodology, law is a weak academic discipline and susceptible to encroachment by other disciplines; 
however, because of its close ties to the profession, law can never be entirely absorbed by another discipline:  
Jack M. Balkin, "Interdisciplinarity as Colonization" (1996) 53 Washington and Lee Law Review 949 at 950.  
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law.  He argues that by drawing on other disciplines, legal scholars, ―distance themselves ever further from the 
skills and concerns of practitioners:‖ Stephen M.  Feldman, "Transformation of an Academic Discipline: Law 
Professors in the Past and Future (or Toy Story Too), The Law Professors as Academics and Teachers" (2004) 
54:4 Journal of Legal Education 471 at 489. Feldman seems optimistic about transdisciplinarity in law and finds 
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should  transform, disrupt or undo initial categories, such as ‗law,‘ ‗film‘ and ‗society‘.187 Some 
point to a lack of scholarly effort in law to create interdisciplinary legal artifacts that are 
explicitly organized through other forms of knowledge.188  Scholarship should instead be 
produced from the starting point that any legal inquiry is already embedded in other 
theoretical frameworks and methods.   
More recently, legal scholars, whether through cross-textual explanation, critical 
comparison, or performance, suggest a new field of transdisciplinary practices in law.189  I 
locate my work in relation to these transdisciplinary projects.   For instance, my research is in 
close dialogue with other scholarship at the nexus of law and film.  As I elaborate in Chapter 
Three, there is a diverse and growing community of legal thinkers engaging with the 
doctrinal, pedagogical, jurisprudential, and epistemological relevance of film to law. Some 
map out how film practices are governed by explicit and formal law; others deploy film theory 
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to ‗read‘ particular films as legal texts; others grapple with how actors in institutional norm-
generating sites (such as courtrooms) deploy cinematic media; still others work through the 
‗cinematic law‘ (the generic or stylistic rules and formal qualities that demand sufficient 
predictability with the right amount of variations and contingency in order to maintain 
audience‘s interest). Some of this interdisciplinary work is instrumental in that it is motivated 
by the desire to transform one discipline (law) through knowledge from another ‗humanizing‘ 
discipline (film). Cinema, accordingly, provides the methods to cast a critical gaze upon law 
from some outside perspective.190  However, my ambidextrous approach both reflects and 
distinguishes itself from these other ways of engaging the law-film nexus.    
On one level, I do not assume law and film to be entirely separate disciplines. I am 
embedded in law and in film studies. I am guided by the theoretical signposts of each.  I 
deploy, consequently, legal and cinematic methods equally and interchangeably. 191  
The written and filmic articulations of my work, as I discuss below, are not two 
analogous ‗texts‘ telling the same story in a different register.  Rather, my attempt at learned 
dexterity is both rupturing and bonding: I begin from the view that law and film, as separate 
disciplines, are not simply ways of defining and defending modes of producing and circulating 
knowledge.  Both are permeable ―loci of creation, sensation, [and] substance‖.192 I also begin 
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from the view that the cinematic dimension of human experience already exists within law 
and the legal dimension of human experience already exists within film.193 I argue that it is 
different to look at a normative order through film‘s lens rather than through law‘s gaze.  Yet 
these sights are never entirely disconnected.  As a result, I explore how two socio-cultural 
symbolisms – film and law – interact, whether as conflicting, complementary, mutually 
constitutive, or alternative normative modes and sites. 
1.3.2 AMBIDEXTROUS PRACTICES  
 
There are challenges to what I call ambidextrous research, for my purposes in law and 
film, as charges of dilettantism or lack of rigor directed at scholars working at their nexus 
seem to indicate.194 Nevertheless, such scholarship can open up truly innovative and 
experimental possibilities.  Indeed, as Macdonald and Siebert argue, the more exact our 
notion of what law should look and feel like, ―the less we are able to see the tacit within 
formal texts or the implicit of informal law.‖195  Instead, ―[l]aw is lived when we choose to 
overcome convention and form‖ and quite simply ―pay attention‖196 to the world around us.  
At its best, then, ambidexterity permits us to look and look again, demands creativity and 
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allows for ambiguity in that exercise.  These spaces of creativity and ambiguity in turn can 
encourage collaboration and new modes of interaction— and ultimately, for my purposes, 
new models of law and new models of cinema.   
As a doctoral project located at the nexus of law and film, it seems appropriate that my 
dissertation be exists in two modalities for apprehending street law: the written and the 
cinematic.  I call this enterprise an ‗ambidextrous‘ research practice.197 I attempt to overcome 
the forms and conventions through which we imagine street law.  My approach raises two 
questions.  First, what is the significance of deploying two differently realized media?  
Second, how do they relate to one another?  
 
DIFFERENTLY REALIZED MEDIA   
 
 While not analogous texts, the two differently realized media I produce serve different 
purposes and engage differently with discursive and presentational modes of communication.  
Scholars have long grappled with the specificities of discursive (linguistic) and presentational 
(symbolic) forms of circulating information.  Langer most elaborately draws a distinction 
between linguistic and presentational forms.  According to her symbolic theory, the function 
of art is to represent the world in the non-discursive (presentational) mode rather than a 
discursive (linguistic) mode.  All art is intrinsically expressive (non-discursive constructed 
expressions) and no work of art (not even literature) is linguistic because art carries no 
―conventional references;‖ presentational forms have no ―conventional meaning.‖198   
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There are stories and concepts which may be more easily apprehended through 
linguistically oriented media while others may be more meaningfully apprehended through 
expressively oriented media.  In any event, neither form of circulating knowledge is mutually 
exclusive and they carry equal weight in communication processes.  We use different media 
– such as the written text or cinema – because each enables us to foreground some aspects 
of life and submerge others and thereby to tell different stories about the same phenomenon.  
In short, any symbolisms or symbols we use to instantiate law will combine linguistic and 
expressive attributes, though the scale may differ from utterance to utterance.199   
This understanding is significant to my critical legal pluralist hypothesis of street law. 
Macdonald makes the cogent remark that law‘s forms are not ―instrumentally normative‖ and 
therefore, there must be ―alternative linguistic vehicles for enacting legal rules.‖200 Further, as 
legal normativity is also expressed in non-linguistic forms, so too are there ―non-linguistic 
symbolic discourse designed to suggest new legal practices.‖201  Law is not only articulated 
linguistically; it takes on diverse and often fragmented symbolic modes; it is in itself, a 
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hypothesis about the world and how to behave justly within in it.202  Law requires multiple 
perspectives and understandings in order to unknot the complex of concerns that arise when 
we consider our responsibilities to each other.   
Multiple modes of communication converge in any artifacts; it remains, nonetheless, 
that certain forms of symbolization will be more effective for some purposes than for others.  
These two modes of communication are not placed in hierarchical order.  Scholars have 
argued against received ideas that words carry more meaning than images (which merely 
supply information) or, alternatively that images (which speak a universal language) carry 
more meaning than words.203 Paradigmatic legal and cinematic theories (positivism in law 
and psychoanalysis in film) continue nevertheless to oppose the symbolic order of language 
to the imaginary order of the visual.  
 While words and images can communicate things differently, to entirely extricate the 
textual from film or the cinematic from text would be to return to a reductive and mythological 
distinction between the analytic, rational and theoretical (and thereby reliable) written or 
spoken word,204 and the emotional, mediated, and intuitive (and thereby unreliable) image; or 
alternatively, the mechanical, indexical, and mimetic (and therefore truthful) audiovisual 
media and written texts are subject to the contingences of interpretation and are therefore 
                                                                
202
 Roderick A. Macdonald, "Triangulating Social Law Reform" in Ysolde Gendreau, ed., Dessiner la société par 
le droit / Mapping Society Through Law (Montreal: Les Éditions Thémis, 2004) 118. 
203
 Infra 2.1.1 (―Beyond Visuality‖). 
204
 Historically, the courts have been suspicious of film as potentially deceptive medium whose truth-claims 
require explicit and ‗live‘ authentication through testimony (the performance of memory).  See for instance: 
Philip Auslander, Liveness: Performance in a Mediatized Culture (London & New York: Routledge, 1999). 
Auslander argues against claims that performance is a site of resistance because it operates beyond mass 
reproduction.  To him, memory is a deep structure of legal language, both ―a policed site and mechanism of 
regulation‖ and performed testimony that will reveal information about the ethical character of the parties 
through face-to-face confrontation: at 154.  See also Schwartz‘ genealogy of the judicial decisions permitting 
visual evidence in the United States: Louis-George Schwartz, Mechanical Witness: A History of Motion Picture 
Evidence in U.S. Courts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
70 
 
unreliable.  A less suspicious version of such a distinction is that we turn to different forms to 
express complex meanings.  To Roland Barthes, for instance, the ‗photographic paradox‘ can 
be reduced to the impossibility of communicating the meaning of a photograph through 
language.205  To Blanchot, literature consists of ―trying to speak‖ when ―speaking becomes 
most difficult.‖206  
The written and cinematic perspectives that I offer are two ways, among several, to 
perceive street law and to understand transformative legal practices regarding the 
governance of and by street-involved people.  Each stands on its own as an attempt to 
embody the richness of its particular mode of communication and its media‘s forms, 
conventions, structures and rules.  On one level, whereas the written narrative names 
relationships and interactions that constitute street law, the cinematic iteration illustrates 
them. On another, the written narrative illustrates through metaphor and through references 
to film while the cinematic narrative names through the voices of the street-involved people 
and through titles and intertitles that can ―load‖ particular sequences with ―a culture, a moral, 
and imagination‖.207  
The written narrative is linear and carries a discursive role.  It does so through 
expressive elements (mainly metaphor). Some parts of the written monograph of my 
dissertation are organized through an interactionist view of metaphor to suggest contingent 
meanings about street law. The metaphoric register is an endeavour to foreground sites of 
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street law to which dominant discourses about the governance of and by street-involved 
people may be less attentive.208  Others draw directly on cinematic media as a source of law.  
The cinematic narrative is non-linear, has an expressive role, but includes discursive 
elements (mainly technical and definitional practices). The cinematic instantiation is guided 
by the critical legal pluralist hypothesis which reminds us that law is not only instantiated in 
linguistic precepts generated from the state (such as statutes and case law) but that it takes 
on diverse and sometimes fragmented symbolic forms.209  As normativity is not the exclusive 
domain of official written legal forms, the cinematic instantiation of my project is an attempt to 
gesture toward alternative conceptions and practices of governance of and by the street 
community.210 In short, like other modes of story-telling, the written narrative, which is 
organized through metaphor (Chapter Two), cinematic modes of story-telling (Chapter Three) 
and analogy (Chapter Four), wants to ‗show‘ (rather than ‗tell‘) some shared experiences of 
governance through street law.211 Correspondingly, like other modes of embodied media, the 
cinematic narrative aspires to engage vusers (viewers/users) to ‗feel‘ in order to ‗know‘ 
something about street law.212    
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Both written text and non-linear film are experimental and creative events and 
therefore have no ―prescriptive procedure to be applied mechanically.‖213 Both are an attempt 
at correcting the dominant modes of communication in law that marginalizes more embodied 
ways of knowing.214  Nevertheless, as written words and cinematic images can be 
incongruent with complex lived experiences, both symbolizations articulate the governance 
by and of street-involved people in partial and limited ways.  Consequently, each can 
highlight and aspire to transcend the other‘s partiality and limitations.    
 
TRANSPOSITIONS   
 
 There are at least two ways of thinking about the relation between the two modes 
through which I instantiate my research. First, these differently realized media (the text, the 
film) might be considered as separate and supplementary in the sense that one documents, 
while the other shapes, street law.  Accordingly, the written narrative could be considered a 
constative mode of representing street law, making truth-claims about it as an independent 
state of affairs.215 Correspondingly, the filmic narrative would be a performative mode, 
constituting street law through creativity and representation rather than truth-claims.216  
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Austin, ―Performative-Constative,‖ in Philosophy of Language, J. R. Searle, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1971) 13-22 at 13. 
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 Performative utterances do not simply report or describe. The performative enacts what it names. It is 
constitutive (rather than reflective) when it is uttered according to a particular procedure, by a person with the 
authority to make the utterance, and by someone who does so with sincerity of conduct and in the correct 
manner: J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980) at p. 57 [hereinafter, 
Austin (Words)] and (Performative), ibid at 14-15.  In advancing the claim that memory is a cultural not merely 
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In an alternate version of the same story, the filmic narrative, abiding by the precepts 
of non-interventionist documentary, could be a constative mode of representation: the 
camera eye would capture the interactions that constitute street law. Consequently, the 
written narrative would organize and construct street law through its representation.217  The 
distinct roles attributed to the constative and performative functions of communication, 
however, have long been collapsed.  J.L. Austin, drew, but ultimately rejected his own 
performative-constative distinction; he argues that all languages, all utterances have 
performative and constative dimensions.218  
 I prefer a second way to think about how these different media relate to one another: 
they are performatives (distinct types of utterance that connect words with actions) in 
dynamic relation to the other.  To speak of the dynamic rapport between these different 
modes of apprehending street law is not to deny that they serve different purposes.  Again, 
the distinction should not serve to normalize a hierarchical position of words to images (and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
an individual faculty, Connerton relies on performatives that are not limited to verbal or inscribed utterances.  
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Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989 ) at 5. Judith Butler 
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this conception of identity: Gillian Calder, "Embodied Law: Theatre of the Oppressed in the Law School 
Classroom" (2009) 1 Masks 1. 
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discipline and sobriety in relation to its playful and imaginative counter-part: art.  See Douzinas and Nead argue 
against this separation of art and law: Douzinas & Need, "Law and Aesthetics" in Douzinas & Nead, supra note 
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whereas these other disciplines are ―discourses of sobriety‖ that seldom make recourse to fiction and have their 
own claims to the ‗real,‘ documentary film can blur entertainment and knowledge in ways that open possibilities 
of new understandings. Bill Nichols, Representing Reality: Issues and Concepts in Documentary (Bloomington, 
Indiana: University Press, 1991).    
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 He calls these utterances speech acts, of which he distinguishes the meaningful, the conventional and the 
non-conventional: Austin (Words), supra note 216 at 150.  
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other related dichotomies like exterior and interior selves, intellect and emotion, mind and 
body, law and non-law).  These artifacts did not emerge and cannot exist entirely 
independent of each other.  The goal of my ambidextrous approach is not to compare two 
artifacts but to consider the relation that can occur at the encounter of these two differently 
realized, yet complementary, media that wrestle with the same social phenomenon.   
 Transposition is a more powerful metaphor than dialogue or intertextuality (the 
presence of utterances from other texts within a text); it  stands in for the unstable processes 
through which multiple media commingle (a written text and a film for my purposes) and do 
not have to be posited as separate  to be in a relationship. Transposition refers to how two 
sign systems are permutable and flexed into each other and how through our experiences of 
reading/viewing, subject positions shift as a result.  Consequently, it brings about new 
associations and denotations for readers/viewers.219  As will become more plain in Chapter 
Four (―Film as Law as Film‖), my aim is to perform a transposition of one symbolism of law, 
through and onto another, to generate new understandings about street law. 
1.4 BEYOND ESTABLISHED SHOTS  
 
 With these assumptions, concepts, and methods in mind, the next Chapter is my first 
of three case studies on street law‘s sites, sights and media that help us move us beyond 
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 Working with and from Bakhtin‘s notion of dialogism, Julia Kristeva develops the concept of transposition as 
the unstable and dynamic processes through which differently realized ‗sign systems‘ collide: Mikhail Bakhtin, 
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established understandings of street law.  Throughout the following chapters, I begin from the 
view that law is about human relationships as facilitated by rules that develop through our 
interactions with one another.  I do not grant official state-based street law a central place in 
my analysis.  My point is not that law, as more conventionally conceived, (namely, state-
based rules backed by threat of sanction that pre-exist the legal subject) is irrelevant to my 
broader project.  In fact, in my enquiry into street law, I often juxtapose the more standard 
and conventional perspectives of law with the pluralist critique of that understanding.   These 
two perspectives overlap and intersect but do not necessarily yield a synthesis.   
 We can think of law formally and explicitly.  Simultaneously, we can think of law 
symbolically, abstractly, culturally, and as the result of interactions between people.  
Nevertheless, neither positivist nor pluralist understandings can fully incorporate the other.  
Yet, it is in grappling with their mutual influence on one another that rich understandings may 
emerge: it is so because formal law can bear the markers of, and emerge from, informal law 
just as informal law can reproduce official and explicitly enacted legal forms.220  
 In the next chapter, I deploy concepts from cinema to think about the street law – 
whether formal, informal, explicit or implicit - in a metaphorical register.  This attempt is 
grounded in empirical research on street-involved people‘s various normative engagements 
and the multiple legalities they navigate.  
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CHAPTER TWO: CINEMATIC LEGAL METAPHORS 
 
Quand je pense à quelque chose, en fait je pense à autre chose toujours.221 
 
 In this chapter I use metaphors taken from cinema to imagine law as navigated, 
interpreted and constructed by street-involved people. 222  These sights of street law, I argue, 
are different from the perspectives instantiated in legislation designed to classify and regulate 
street-involved people.  They are also different from the perspectives instantiated in some 
critical leftist discourses which have emerged in response to such regulatory regimes.  
Cinematic legal metaphors provide insight into other modes of interactions and the normative 
commitments from which they are informed.  To emphasize these normative sites may, I 
argue, displace skeptical and instrumentalist views of street law for other instantiations.  
These alternative ways of symbolizing relationships may hold the potential to sustain or 
further conditions of agency and autonomy for street-involved people.223   
 No analytic provides a complete view of the complexity by which human beings 
psychically, physically, and socially negotiate the relations of power, shared commitments, 
and personal expectations which I refer to as street law.  I turn to cinema to apprehend street 
law from multiple vantage points and sometimes even, as Godard suggests, from 
somewhere else entirely.  In this chapter, I develop metaphors that imagine street law from 
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 Following Nedelsky, agency and autonomy include other psycho-social states, such as self-determination, 
comprehension, confidence, dignity, efficacy, respect and some degree of peace and security from oppressive 
power.‖ Jennifer Nedelsky, "Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts, and Possibilities" (1989) 1:7 Yale 
Journal of Law and Feminism 7 at 12 [hereinafter, Nedelsky (Autonomy)]. 
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various perspectives by drawing on the vocabulary and concepts from ‗elsewhere:‘ cinema 
studies. I develop four perceptual frames that I call cinematic legal metaphors.   
 In Part One, I explain the interactionist view of metaphor that informs my 
understanding of cinema as a meaningful media/medium of street law.  In the first instance, I 
argue that each metaphor functions in two ways simultaneously to provide new sights of 
street law: providing a perspective on the externally imposed and formally instantiated rules 
that attempt to govern street-involved people‘s uses of urban spaces and providing a 
perspective of the ways in which street-law is constituted through informal interactions and 
implicit values that inform interactions between street-involved people and their interlocutors.  
Importantly, even though I argue that these metaphors provide new sights, they cannot, by 
their very cinemacity, be limited to the visual register.  Indeed, as I elaborate, it is by virtue of 
what makes them cinematic that they invite embodied responses to the oppressive 
governance of street-involved people while opening possibility for more ethical perception of 
the ways in which all street users are governed by their interactions with street-involved 
people.  
  In the second instance, I maintain that cinema has always had an intricate connection 
with the city.  I also agree with recent scholarly attention to what Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulas 
calls ―lawscapes‖224 – the myriad normative orders that comprise cities.  Consequently, 
cinematic legal metaphors provide a meaningful alternative symbolic mode through which to 
grapple with law that is specific to particular normative sites - urban spaces and especially 
the city street. 
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In Part Two, I consider a cluster of metaphors taken collectively as ‗revanchist‘225 
symbolizations of how legal subjects are governed through law in city spaces.  Metaphors 
such as the city as panoptic, punitive, divided, and beyond the realm of justice reflect and 
constitute urban spaces as a conflict zone between different rights bearers (such as the 
propertied and the unpropertied, the watchers and the watched, the panhandler and her 
other, the street and the non-street community). I go on to discuss how these 
conceptualizations have been used pragmatically by anti-poverty activists in Montreal to call 
out oppressive interactions between street-involved people and official state actors, 
practices, and policies.  
In Part Three, I present four alternative metaphors for grappling with street law in 
the city of Montreal: Aerial Viewpoint, Shot/Reverse sequence, Close-up and Tracking Shot.  
I aver that these cinematic metaphors concurrently support and suggest alternative 
perspectives to the revanchist framing of the relationship between law and the city circulated 
by some anti-poverty activists.  Namely, an Aerial Viewpoint of the city of Montreal and a 
Shot/Reverse sequence between street-involved people and formal legal actors both work 
well to highlight how street law can be an externally wielded force directed at the most 
vulnerable members of society.  Unlike revanchist metaphors of those relationships, however 
(which have a regulatory force of their own and one that often reinforces law‘s ‗subjects‘ as 
passive victims of dominant interests), the cinematic legal metaphors I deploy can also be 
recast to invite attention to a plurality of street law‘s administrators, interpreters and agents.  
Similarly, interactions between street-involved people and their interlocutors, perceived 
through a Close-up may favour law‘s objectifying gaze or open the possibility of more ethical 
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perceptions. While I argue that these three perspectives (Aerial Viewpoint, Shot/Reverse 
sequence, and Close-up) are necessary for a more nuanced understanding of street law, it is 
ultimately the Tracking Shot which holds the most potential for ethically perceiving the 
normative expectations, commitments and interpretations that street-involved people and 
their interlocutors reflect, embody, reinforce, and create in their multiple networks of 
interactions on the street.    
2.1 METAPHORS FOR APPREHENDING LAW   
 
 In developing the four cinematic legal metaphors for street law, I work within an 
interactionist understanding of metaphor that consists of two parts.  The topic (or the target) 
is that about which something is said.  The vehicle (or the source) is the concept used to 
convey meaning about the topic or target.226 The tension that exists between source and 
target or the constellation of meanings that are produced when cinema is understood as a 
source of law can only arise because there are sufficient similarities that already exist 
between these two modes of symbolization. The points of contact between law and cinema 
make up a considerable body of scholarship in the broad, diverse and rapidly growing field of 
often referred to as ‗law and film.‘227    
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 The cinematic metaphors are, as I elaborate, rich enough to encourage critical 
engagement with law, and, as the wealth of research at the nexus of law and film indicates, 
they are also ―sufficiently transparent to be reasonably uncontroversial.‖228 Further, as I note 
in Chapter One, the cinematicity of my cinematic legal metaphors is not limited to the formal 
features that distinguish film from other media. Instead, it is a mode of thinking and of 
generating new modes of perception.  Similarly, the legality of my cinematic legal metaphors 
is not limited to rules enacted by a centralized state, to institutionally enshrined legal texts, or 
to judicial renderings. Instead, law is one of the ways human beings symbolize and embody 
how to ethically relate to one another.  Accordingly, I can identify the topic ‗street law‘ through 
the ‗cinematic‘ vehicle as way of generating new modes of perceptions about human 
relationships.   
 Thinking about street law in the metaphoric register permits me to imagine new sights 
of street law.  I can perceive from ―the perspective of the rules operating on a collection of 
individuals‖ and foreground the perspective of the subject/agent ―who finds herself already 
within the practice‖229 simultaneously.  Each metaphor is intended to explicitly and implicitly 
stretch and bend taken-for-granted assumptions that inform and shape affective responses 
and moral judgments of street-involved people that emerge in the contemporary paradigmatic 
instances of ‗anti-vagrancy‘ legislation.  I use cinema‘s concepts to confront the limits of the 
dominant legal modes of understanding of street-involved people, their normative 
expectations and their competences in forging their own lives. Second, each metaphor is 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
2006); Ruth Buchanan & Rebecca Johnson, "Strange Encounters: Exploring Law and Film in the Affective 
Register" (2009) 46 Studies in Law, Politics, and Society 33 [hereinafter, Buchanan & Johnson (Strange)]. 
228
 Max Black, "More About Metaphor" in Andrew Ortony, ed., Metaphor and Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993) 19 at 20. 
229
 Paul W Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law: Reconstructing Legal Scholarship (Chicago & London: University 
Chicago Press, 1999) at 45.  
81 
 
also a device through which I grapple with how agency and autonomy is articulated and 
performed by street-involved people despite the existence of these latter modes and 
instruments of street law. Cinema‘s concepts, are accordingly, positioned in this chapter as a 
way to provoke perspectives of street law as a human endeavour to symbolize meaningful 
relationships.  
The cinematic legal metaphors I develop here serve these two functions for at least 
two reasons. First, they provide conceptual modes of apprehending street law that move us 
beyond one sensory register (the visual, and occasionally the aural/oral) to a more embodied 
(and hopefully moral) perception of our relationships to one and other.  Second, given 
cinema‘s intricate connection with the city, cinematic legal metaphors also provide an 
alternative symbolic mode of grappling with governance that is specific to urban space (here 
the street).   
2.1.1 BEYOND VISUALITY    
 
In this subsection I discuss how, in the face of popular and disciplinary associations 
that both law and film have in relation to sight (and more recently to sound), the cinematic 
legal metaphors I develop stretch beyond the realm of one sensory register. I argue that 
cinema has the potential to occasion and enhance embodied and therefore (potentially) 
moral perception of street law and its constituents. 
 In legal scholarship, there is increased recognition that the ‗common sense‘ which 
undergirds legal thought and practice is culturally shaped through categorizations.230  
Contrary to many dominant tropes relied upon in such categorizations (the Cartesian 
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mind/body divide or the objectivity/subjectivity dyad and the corresponding faculties of reason 
and feeling), law is fundamentally embodied231 and affective.232  Briefly put, law is the messy 
stuff of human existence.233   
 Yet, in conventional understandings, if law‘s affective life and its corporeality is 
acknowledged, it is through the visual register (and, more recently the oral/aural register).  
Legal principles, categories, concepts are fields that are full of visual metaphors: we observe 
black letter law, read the body of a statute, attempt to square precedents; justice should be 
blind.234 The use of visual legal metaphors often remains embedded in orthodox beliefs and 
practices about law that tend to prioritize sight as the locus of recognition, critique and 
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understanding.235 Namely, law is assumed to value features often attributed to sight, 
especially objectivity, universality, and determinacy.236  These features are in turn presumed 
to be in hierarchical relation to those values attributed to sound, smell, taste, and touch, 
namely polyphony, singularity and indeterminacy.237  
 Still within the visual realm, according to a familiar story, law and other disciplines 
have recently moved away from the model of ‗reading‘ texts to explore new ways of 
‗seeing.‘238  The rhetorical or ‗linguistic turn‘ taught us to attend to the ways in which legal 
meanings are constituted rather than discovered, unveiled, or unearthed.  This insight gave 
us a heightened awareness of how legal language or verbal modes of representation are 
inextricable from other modes of knowing.  It also warned against notions of mimesis and the 
related belief in objective, mechanical reproduction of reality.  The ‗visual turn‘ demands 
attention to the ways in which legal information is processed through concepts as enshrined 
in written texts as well as through percepts or sense-datum.239  As Jay puts it, while ‗texts‘ 
were the ―master metaphor for post objectivist interpretations of many different phenomena,‖ 
today we prefer ―models of spectatorship and visuality, which refuse to be described entirely 
in linguistic terms.‖240 Indeed, legal scholars writing at the nexus of law and film have pushed 
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us to consider how law both constitutes and is constituted through the visual. To some, there 
is a danger that such ―image-based‖ modes of performing justice will effectively dispense 
with ―actual facts and applicable case law.‖241  To others, films invite us to see, hear and feel 
injustices and how the formal law inadequately addresses harms in actuality.242 
 Like scholars in other disciplines, legal thinkers have also begun to interrogate how 
prioritizing sights and vision (ocularcentricism) obscures other modes of knowing.243 This is 
not to say, however, that all visual metaphors hold no potential to advance critical legal 
understandings.  To be sure, thinking about law as a ‗map of misreading‘, of legal subjectivity 
as ‗intersectional‘, and normativity as ‗soluble‘ has furthered two  legal pluralist projects: 
unhinging our conception of law from the State and highlighting the variegated sites and 
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modes of law.244   Moreover, there has been a move to recognize law‘s orality/aurality -- legal 
metaphors and practices organized around ‗dialogue‘ and ‗voice‘ suggest.  
 Within a discipline still (despite the ‗visual turn‘) so very invested in the authority of the 
written word, indigenous, critical race, feminist legal scholars, as well as people  working at 
the intersection of law and the humanities, have pointed to the problematic relations between 
legal texts, power and authoritative knowledge.245  Reading and interpreting the written word 
is considered insufficient and often incongruent with the complexities of our lived 
experiences.  Some scholars appraise and promote legal methodologies, concepts, and 
principles that acknowledge and draw on aural metaphors.  For instance, by listening to 
marginal ‗voices‘ and telling ‗stories‘ based in epistemological proximity, we can  highlight the 
ontological difference between the lived reality of marginalized groups and how it is 
symbolized in formal legal processes and practices.246   
                                                                
244
 Boaventura de Sousa Santos suggests three topoi or sites of subjectivity that hold the promise of a ‗new 
conception‘ of law: Boaventura de Sousa Santos, "Three Metaphors for a New Conception of Law: The Frontier, 
The Baroque, and the South" (1995) 29:4 Law and Society Review 569. Crenshaw extends the intersection 
metaphor to complexify entrenched understandings of legal subjectivity and the legal constitution of subjectivity: 
Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: a Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist theory and Antiracist politics" (1989) University of Chicago Legal Forum 
139. Belley suggests métaphore chimique for law (soluble law, or how normativity is diluted in global social 
regulation), "Une métaphore chimique pour le droit" in Belley, supra note 78 at 233.  
245
 On the tensions between First Nations‘ and Western (Euro-Canadian) conceptions of law as informed by a 
history of colonialism and imperialism, see: John Burrows, "Listening for a Change: The Courts and Oral 
Tradition" (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1; Jo-Anne Fiske, "From Customary Law to Oral Traditions: 
Discursive Formation of Plural Legalisms in Northern British Columbia, 1857-1993" (1997/1998) 115/116 BC 
Studies 267. For a discussion of aural/oral metaphors‘ impact on American jurisprudence, see: Hibbitts, supra 
note 234. 
246
 Early feminist standpoint approaches that emerged in the 1980s offered a method to center the voices of 
women (‗silenced‘ by masculinist meta-narratives) and a means for naming oppressions of women from their 
analyses, points of view and experienced in their day-to-day and night-to-night.  Some scholars have since 
noted, ‗standpoint‘ theories postulate a feminist or woman’s – point of view which overlooked other 
commitments, expectations and experiences: Patricia Hill Collins, "Toward an Afrocentric Feminist 
Epistemology", Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment (New 
York & London: Routledge, 1991) 201; Smith, supra note 83; Nedelsky (Embodied), supra note 231. Sandra 
Harding also questions postmodern epistemologies that promote fractured identities to the point where political 
mobilization is impossible: The Science Question in Feminism (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 
1986). In later work, Harding develops a postmodern standpoint theory that ―pulls away from its modernist 
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 Here too, if we limit our understanding to law‘s orality/aurality (and especially how law 
silences certain voices) we may occlude how law engages our full range of perceptual, 
sensory, and imaginative human experiences.  As others have suggested, we should direct 
our interest to how we are constituted by and how we constitute law intersensorily247 and 
consider multisensory organizing concepts in law248 in order to get at the ―body that lives and 
feels through‖ it.249  
 I suggest in the next subsection why cinematic metaphors are a rich conceptual 
resource for apprehending street law.  Cinema is a perceptual medium but it is not limited to 
the audiovisual registers.  It is embodied and it generates (the possibility of) moral perception 
both of street law‘s subjects (and the moments of subjugation to certain modes and 
instruments of street law) and street law‘s agents (and the moments of generation of certain 
modes and instruments of street law).250   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
origins‖, navigating the essentialist/relativist divide in interesting ways. She maintains her rejection of a singular 
feminist standpoint while suggesting an objective location where research should begin to avoid relativist 
insights – women‘s experiences: Sandra Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from 
Women's Lives (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1991) at 134. 
247
 David Howes, "Introduction: Empire of the Senses" in Howes, supra note 49 at 1.    
248
 Roderick A. Macdonald provides a pluralist alternative to conventional legal metaphors: law as multiplicity: 
(Multiplicity), supra note 24. He also discusses the nuances of the harmonization, transplantation and viral 
metaphors in international law without ascribing symbolism to these metaphors but rather reflecting ―on how 
effectively‖ they ―capture the mode of norm migration at issue‖: Roderick A. Macdonald, "Three Metaphors of 
Norm Migration in International Context" (2009) 34:3 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 603 at 607.   Finally, 
he explores offices‘ political dimensions through multiple conceptual registers including the sensual registers of 
touch, smell, taste, sight, hearing and intuition: Macdonald & Widell, supra note 188.  
249
 Goodrich, supra note 233 at 259.  
250
  The distinction here between legal subjects and legal agents lies in their ability to interpret law ―in their own 
way:‖ Macdonald & MacLean, supra note 79 at 783. On the shifts in the meanings of ‗subject‘ in relation to 
‗object‘ as well as in relation to ‗subjectivity,‘ see: Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and 
Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).   
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CINEMA AS EMBODIED PERCEPTION   
  
 Perception, as Teresa de Lauretis notes, is not simply about sight or cognition. 251 It is 
about memory, desire, pain; it is a signifying practice.252 It cannot be divorced from a process 
of enunciation that engages the lived history of the viewing subject.253 Film is a process of 
enunciation that extends beyond natural perception – whether biological or cognitive – to 
embodied, moral, normative perception of socio-cultural percepts such as poverty, 
homelessness, violence and injustice.  To Vivian Sobchack, the camera, the screen and the 
film‘s body mediate embodied engagement with and in the social world.254 The embodied 
perception of the camera involves the spectator actively, positing herself as an entity 
meaningfully engaged in a relation to her environment: ―cinema is a sensuous object‖ but 
through our interactions with it, through our ―presence‖ it becomes ―a sensing, sensual, 
sense-making subject.‖255  Cinema engages what Laura Marks refers to as our ―haptic 
visuality,‖ or the way in which all senses are interrelated and we see through touch, feel and 
taste as much as through sight and sound.256 These film scholars, accordingly, ask us to 
think about what films do (how we respond to them) rather than just what they mean (how we 
                                                                
251
 Teresa de Lauretis, The Practice of Love: Lesbian Sexuality and Perverse Desire (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1994). 
252
 Cinema, which is directly implicated in the production of meanings and values, is, as a result, also a 
signifying process: Teresa de Lauretis, Alice Doesn’t: Feminism, Semiotics and Cinema (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1984) at 37. 
253
 Ibid.  
254
 Vivian Sobchack, The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1991) [hereinafter, Sobchack (Address)]. 
255
 Ibid. at 2. Cataldi calls this mode of engagement is like ―inhabiting a spectacle:‖ Sue Cataldi, Emotion, Depth 
and Flesh: A Study of Sensitive Space: Reflections on Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy of Embodiment (Albany, NY: 
State University of New York, 1993). See also: Anne Rutherford, "Cinema and Embodied Affect" (2003) 3:25 
Senses of Cinema 1 at 2-4.  
256
 Laura Marks argues that none of our senses are entirely autonomous and defines haptic visuality as a 
familiarity with the world that the individual viewer knows through senses related to vision: supra note 121.    
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interpret them).257  Put differently, thinking cinematically about street law means to perceive 
(to describe, to experience it) rather than only to rationalize judgments (to interpret it).258  The 
radical potentiality of cinema is also that it presents multiple alternatives to the view that our 
capacity for judgment is rooted in practical reasons (that it is a product of our cognitive 
capacities which operate in a coherent, systematic and hierarchically ordered way).  To 
Deleuze, these alternative perspectives are possible because of cinema‘s time-image which 
permits multiple and simultaneous pasts, presents and futures to co-exist.259   
 The moral perception inspired by cinema‘s techniques can play a fundamental role in 
the nature of our deliberations, our judgments and the actions that ensue.260   Cinematic 
(embodied, moral) perception allows us to engage with the laws of morality261 and is a 
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 Vivian Sobchack, "In Conversation with Scott Bukatman" (2009) 2:1 Journal of e-Media Studies at 2. 
258
 Of course, what films do is never separate from what they mean. Whether or not individual viewers are 
aware that they are engaging in interpretive acts, what feels like a knee-jerk response is part of the interpretive 
processes at play when experiencing a film.  Conversely, viewers‘ active engagement and the frameworks 
through which they interpret films will, in various ways, facilitate or guide particular responses.  Further still, 
when viewers are aware of these embodied responses and endeavour to interpret beyond them, they remain 
conscious of the reality that they constitute another mode of embodied response which is in turn generated or 
facilitate through interpretation.  
259
 Deleuze‘s philosophical approach to cinema distinguishes between movement-image and time-image. 
Movement-image, often associated with classical Hollywood cinema, is exemplified by a continuum of time and 
space, a linear movement through space with a starting point and a destination, with an action and 
corresponding reaction. Temporality follows the law of the ‗sensory-motor schema‘ and even where linear 
causality is disrupted (through flashback sequences for instance), moments are always reintegrated into the 
discernible lines of past, present and future.  Movement-images are structured by closed frames, the logical 
progression of images, and continuous juxtapositions. Time-image emerges from the post-war new cinema and 
is exemplified by its rupture with the laws of succession, and synchronicity between visual and aural elements.  
The time-image breaks from the sensory-motor schema. Rather than focusing on reasonable progressions, 
time-image emphasizes the experience of the image itself, its opsign (pure optical), sonsigns (pure sound) and 
tactisigns (pure tactility): Deleuze (Cinema One), supra note 121; Cinema Two: the Time-Image (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1989).  
260
Margaret Holland, "Touching the Weights: Moral Perception and Attention" (1998) 38 International 
Philosophical Quarterly 299 at 301.  
261
 Moral perception, which is rooted in classical virtue ethics, is often counter-posed with modern principle-
based moral theories; this is not to say that the two modes are either in opposition or mutually exclusive.  For an 
overview of various perspectivists‘ concepts, see: Bridget Joy Clarke, The Lens of the Character: Aristotle, 
Murdoch and the Idea of Moral Perception (Thesis, University of Pittsburgh Philosophy, 2003) [unpublished]. 
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condition to ethical reasoning, interpretation and judgment.262  In relation to street-involved 
people, the possibility of moral perception is all the more imperative given that,  for many of 
their interlocutors, the material conditions that ground their reality is experienced in a 
mediated way – whether through popular culture, formal and written legal texts, or the 
discourses of the help industry.263  And yet, mediation in this sense does not assume that 
‗we‘ are ever separate from that which we perceive.  Mediation does not have to be an 
intermediary between two autonomous entities (the street-involved person and her other) but 
can be a métissage, a hybrid process that can reinforce and blur boundaries as it constrains 
and facilitates relationships.264    
 The attempt to conceptualize street law through cinema‘s concepts can permit guttural 
and emotionally painful responses to injustices; it can also remind us that street law is not a 
one-way projection of power and authority emerging from law-giver and imposed on its 
subject.  Rather, it is a fluid and constant process of interaction between individuals.  Like 
cinema‘s spectators, law is never entirely imposed, nor is it passively imbibed by street-
                                                                
262
 Revisiting Plato‘s ethics: Iris Murdoch, "Vision and Choice in Morality" (1956) 30 Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 44. Revisiting Aristotle‘s ethics: Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: 
University Press, 2001). On the role of emotion and especially of empathy in moral perception: Arne Johan 
Vetlesen, Perception, Empathy, and Judgment: An Inquiry Into the Preconditions of Moral Performance 
(Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press, 1994). Blum, supra note 182.  
263
 For instance, whereas bureaucratic management and police presence remains, for many street-involved 
people, aspects of their daily negotiations, formally expressed and explicit law is generally ―marginal‖ rather 
than constitutive of non-street-involved people‘s lives: Macaulay, supra note 28. 
264
 Two concepts need unpacking.  First, I use mediation, following Kember and Zylinska, as a heuristic device 
for ―understanding and articulating our being in the technological world, our emergence and ways of intra-acting 
with it, but also the acts and processes of temporarily stabilizing the world into media, agents, relations and 
networks:‖ supra note108 at 3. Sobchack‘s existential phenomenology of mediation develops ways of 
discerning how our vision engages with ―film‘s body.‖ Rather than watching a film and concentrating merely on 
the signs, we can instead watch the film‘s body in order to feel the movements within and through the film as a 
material event which we experience through viewing: Sobchack (Address), supra note 252. Second, I use 
mélange and hybridity following Nancy‘s assertion that ―to essentialize the mélange is to have already dissolved 
it;‖ a metissage takes on, or at least ―seems to take on‖ multiple roles and function that do not come together 
finally and identify with one another, but rather, inhabit a space of ―neither the one nor the other, nor … between 
the two:‖ (Being), supra note 5 at 150. 
90 
 
involved people.265  As the cinematic legal metaphors I develop below will foreground, street-
involved people reconfigure urban space according to their normative expectations of what 
care they require; they negotiate relations with official legal apparatuses and institutions; they 
deploy and respond to multiple conceptual structures that govern their interactions in more 
immediate ways; they lead complex normative lives and navigate a matrix of competing 
desires, expectations, habits, and values; they develop new connections and informal 
networks through momentary interactions with others; they collaborate and constitute long-
term relationships based  on shared understandings of what it means to be street-involved.   
 
 
APPREHENDING STREET LAW IN THE METAPHORIC REGISTER   
 
 The cinematic legal metaphors I propose vary in scale and technique but also in the 
epistemological biases they emulate or endorse:266 the Aerial Viewpoint, the Shot/Reverse 
Sequence, the Close-up and the Tracking Shot are four superimposed, potentially conflicting 
spatio-temporarily crystallized ways of imagining street law. By their very abstract and 
abstracting nature, they cannot provide a unified, linear, coherent, or determinate story about 
street law.   
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 Christine Gledhill, "Pleasurable Negotiations" in E. Deidre Pribram, ed., Female Spectators: Looking at Film 
and Television (London: Verso, 1988) 64 at 66.  
266
 The cinematic metaphors are not simply intended to position viewing subjects in a particular perspective but 
they nonetheless will incorporate epistemological assumptions of particular positions.  For instance social-
scientific legal pluralism may best be embodied through the Shot/Reverse sequence, leftist pragmatism through 
the Aerial Viewpoint, relational feminism in Close-up and critical legal pluralism as a Tracking Shot.  I have 
limited my work to four cinematic metaphors but there is any number of perspectival modes available. Using 
different optical and aural and kinetic effects -- a variation in lighting, pitch, angle, depth of field, camera 
movement, composition, eye line, film speed etc. – could elicit different questions about street law. On 
perspective as more than scale and for an inquiry into the processes and practices through which particular 
viewpoints (and thereby subjectivities) are produced, see: Ruth Buchanan, "Border Crossings: NAFTA, 
Regulatory Restructuring, and the Politics of Place" (1995) 2 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 371; and 
Rosemary Coombe, "Finding and Losing Oneself in the Topoi: Placing and Displacing the Postmodern Subject 
in Law" (1995) 29 Law and Society Review 599. 
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 Because our normative commitments, our legal consciousness, and the legal 
institutions we navigate are fluid, contingent, and often contradictory, the way we perceive 
street law can likewise be so. To this end, I consider these metaphors as on-going, 
simultaneous and incomplete modes of apprehending what counts as street law and who 
counts as its generators, enforcers, and embodiment.  Each of the four metaphors I suggest 
is selective in its object of attention, and has its own priorities in highlighting particular 
modes, sites, and instruments of street law and necessarily neglects, distorts or obscures 
others.267 Each is in constant flux and has demanded on-going re-evaluation and re-
negotiation according to my shifting normative expectations about street law (which have 
been appraised and reinterpreted throughout my interactions with street-involved people) and 
in terms of my past perceptions and associations (according to my shifting understanding of 
my own normative commitments as an interlocutor to street-involved people).268 
Consequently, just as formal legal texts are always contingent and rarely the most 
respectful and evocative way to articulate meanings about our interactions with strangers, 
cinematic metaphors are partial stories that give us some insight into some aspects of street 
law, but never one universally satisfying picture. Like any framing device, they conceal, 
highlight, clean-up, demean, defend, challenge, include and exclude other accounts of the 
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 Ways of seeing, as Kenneth Burke long ago pointed out, are always also ways of ―not seeing‖: Kenneth 
Burke, Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose (New York: New Republic, 1935). 
268
 Throughout this project I have developed metaphors only to abandon them as uninteresting or dead, as 
closer to simile than metaphor, or as less meaningful for my understanding of street law. And sadly, time and 
space constraints have led me to also abandon metaphors I still believe to be very powerful ways of 
apprehending street law and to which I will return. I would have liked, for instance, to develop the transdiegetic 
sound.  Diegetic sound refers to that which stems from the film‘s universe and is a part of the character‘s natural 
world. Extra-diegetic sound stems from an external source, characters are oblivious to it, and it is conventionally 
understood to elicit particular responses from audiences. Transdiegetic sound suggests the world beyond it but 
simultaneously constitutes the diegetic world, defines what is in one field of action and what is beyond it 
simultaneously.  It is both outside and within the frame.   
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same event.269  The purpose, then, is not to provide a correct reading of street law.  But I can 
attempt to achieve some semblance of what Stanley Cavell refers to as ―completeness,‖ not 
in the sense of ―providing all interpretations‖ but rather in ―seeing one through.‖270 Despite the 
innumerable perspectives on street law, my project aims to see through four interpretations.  
These engender more complex and ethical responses to the governance of and by street-
involved people than those found in formal, written, externally imposed laws. This is not to 
say that I embrace absolute relativism:271 these metaphors are more than merely four 
vantage points taken from any number of vantage points from which to observe street law.  
They are in competition for ontological and epistemological legitimacy with other (usually 
orthodox and often written) ways of symbolizing street law. Nevertheless, I favour metaphors 
that will engage in an exploration of the limits of dominant conceptions of street law and even 
suggest conditions that might foster new relationships among all street users.  
Because I discuss street-involvement in terms of its urban instantiations (though it is not, 
as I note in Chapter One, merely an urban question), I briefly discuss below why cinema 
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 Consider some variations on the framing theme. Goffman argues for multiple, related and often partially 
incompatible methods of analyzing discourse and suggesting a way to examine how we organize experience 
according to two primary frameworks: the natural, which is devoid of wilful agency and which does not emerge 
from intentionality and the social, which requires explicit effort of intelligence and agency): Erving Goffman, 
Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (New York: Harper & Row, 1974). To Derrida, the 
frame is a parergon (par, outside and ergon, the work).  It is a supplement that can neither exist entirely outside 
or inside the work, relating to the work "without being a part of it and yet without being absolutely extrinsic to it":  
Jacques Derrida, The Truth in Painting, trans. by Geoff Bennington & Ian McLeod (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1978) at 55.  Finally, Haraway argues against the ―passive camera obscura‖ and instead for the 
―wonderfully detailed, active, partial‖ ways of organizing the world: supra note 240 at 584. 
270
Stanley Cavell, Pursuits of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1981) at 37 (italics in original).  Others urge that we move away entirely from ‗interpretation‘.  
To Kristeva it represents appropriation and thus an ―act of desire and murder:‖ Julia Kristeva, "Within the 
Microcosm of the 'Talking Cure'" in Joseph Smith & William Kerrigan, ed., Interpreting Lacan Psychiatry and 
Humanities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983) 33 at 33. 
271
 Here I dismiss relativism, in the sense of a claim that truth merely depends on any particular perspective and 
that all contradictory views hold equal weight, while acknowledging that we can never acquire absolute or 
perfect knowledge.  Truth, that is, may exist whether or not we can assimilate it.   
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provides a novative conceptual grip when grappling with the intricate connection between law 
and the city.          
2.1.2  LAW, CINEMA, CITY   
 
The embodied perception that cinematic metaphors provide encourage different 
thinking about the interactions between street-involved people and their interlocutors; this 
thinking also invites questions about the law–city relation.  There has always been an 
―intricate connection‖ between the cinema and the city.272 City spaces in films can function as 
stages or backdrops, as defining characteristics of a particular genre, or can themselves take 
on the role of protagonist.273  Film provides views, new views or impossible views of urban 
spaces and the bodies that move through and constitute them. The moving camera has 
served as mapping device, illuminating aspects of embodied, architectural, and social urban 
forms, bringing spectators to otherwise unknowable places– such as Brazil‘s favelas or the 
tenements of  war-torn Italy.274  They can also juxtapose, obfuscate or affirm the relation 
between the individual and urban identity according to a director‘s aesthetic impulses and 
through the camera‘s own movements and oscillations through space.275   
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 The mutually determinative and constitutive relation between the cinematic form and the historical and 
material development of the city guides many explorations at the nexus of film, media, and urban studies.  
Several emphasize the allegorical quality of cinematic cities and especially the relationships between 
representation, ontology and geography:  Mark Shiel, "Cinema and the City in History and Theory" in Mark Shiel 
& Tony Fitzmaurice, eds., Cinema and the City: Film and Urban Societies in a Global Context (Oxford and 
Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2001) 1. David Clarke, ed., The Cinematic City (London: Routledge, 1997); Fredric 
Jameson, The Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World System (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1992).  
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 Larry Ford, "Sunshine and Shadow: Lighting and Color in the Depiction of Cities on Film" in Suart C Aitken & 
Leo E. Zonn, eds., Place, Power, Situation, and Spectacle: A Geography of Film (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman 
& Littlefield Inc., 1994) 119. Compare: H. Roach, The Music Box (1932) in which Laurel and Hardy push a piano 
up a hillside and Josef von Sternberg, Underworld (1927) in which the metropolis is itself a corrupting influence 
and Fritz Lang, Metropolis (1926) in which the city is a villain. 
274
 See: Fernando Meirelles & Katia Lund, City of God (2002) ; Roberto Rossellini, Rome, Open City (1945)      
275
 Stephen Barber, Projected Cities: Cinema and Urban Space (London: Reaktion Books, 2002) at 8. 
94 
 
 Indeed, film has always represented shifts in city life; it also provides new perceptual 
(though ―never innocent‖) frameworks through which the city can be articulated.276  Films can 
also enunciate the city‘s past and its future, its inhabitants‘ fears, desires, sensations.277  
They can leave traces of conflicts, displacement practices, and vanished neighbourhoods.  
They can work as archives and vehicles for visual memories and nostalgia.278  For instance, 
the different between mobility and immobility – a fundamental trope in discussions around 
urban poverty – is also embedded in the discourses that distinguish between the experience 
of living a city cinematically and living a city architecturally.279 Namely, whereas architecture 
imposes history and materiality on its passive contemplators, cinema embodies the 
fragmented and fragmentary ―destabilizing impulses within city life.‖280 Moreover, many 
contemporary instantiations of cinematic cities possess ―an itinerant dimension‖ – moving 
across, over and under urban terrain and through discarded edifices and ruined tenements; 
mixing and distorting sounds; and providing glimpses into the hidden aspects, the 
subterranean and subaltern of urban life.281 
Because of its material, embodied and imaginative relation to urban spaces, cinema 
can provide a conceptual and perceptual framework for governance  that brings us beyond 
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 To Dimenberg, ―representing the metropolis‖ is always ―motivated by cultural needs and ambitions:‖  
Edward Dimendberg, Film Noir and the Spaces of Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
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 In Film Noir for instance, the city is isolating and shadowy as is reflected in its characters struggle with 
psychological drama and moral ambiguity. It is often juxtaposed with the countryside: whereas the urban 
represents pessimism, its ‗other‘ suggests the possibility of redemption. Noir is often considered in terms of 
some of these recurring themes but it may best be qualified as a critical attitude of ‗nonconformity‘ rather than a 
‗genre‘ proper: David Bordwell, Janet Staiger & Kristin Thompson, The Classical Hollywood Cinema: Film Style 
and Mode of Production to 1960 (London: Routledge, 1985). 
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 Barber, supra note 275 at 61. 
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 Ackbar Abbas, "Cinema, the City, and the Cinematic" in Linda Krause & Patrice Petro, eds., Global Cities 
(New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2003) 142.  
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 Ibid., at 64. Cited in: Will Straw, "Spectacles of Waste" in Alexandra Boutros & Will Straw, eds., Circulation 
and the City (Montreal: McGill / Queens, 2010) 191. 
281
 Barber, supra note 275 at 107. 
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what I consider to be the dominant metaphors for conceptualizing ‗the city.‘282  There has 
also always been an intricate connection between law and the city. Law, like cinema, is one 
of the ways in which cities are symbolically and materially constructed.  And like cinema, 
while legal rules give shape to and constitute the ‗city,‘283 how we live in and through the city 
constitutes and shapes law first.284  Certainly, as the Aerial Viewpoint (discussed below) 
makes most explicit, we cannot understand law without attending to its traces in urban space; 
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 There are multiple theoretical models (each thick with normative expectations about the nature of space, 
place, subjectivity, aesthetics, and difference) for grappling with the question ‗what is a (good) city?‘ Standard 
conceptual framings include metaphors such as the city as garden, narrative, market, theatre, text, spectacle, 
jungle, laboratory, organism, global village and system; as bounded semi-autonomous jurisdictions and 
administrative units materially partitioned by urban planners and managers and with formally prescribed 
authority (e.g., over zoning, telecommunications systems, sanitation, land-use and transportation) as 
instantiated in written rules (legislation) as provided for instance under section 92(8) of the Constitution Act as 
creatures of the province;  or as an entity in relation to its ‗other‘ – whether the country, the suburb, or the 
ghetto.  For my purposes, cities take multiple historical, material and aesthetic configurations; they are forms of 
human settlements and interactions; they are spaces of movements and flows, rhythms, and the circulation of 
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overview of some of the philosophical works on the nature of cities, see: Sharon Meagher, ed., Philosophy and 
the City: Classic to Contemporary Writings (New York: SUNY Press, 2008). My view of the city is draws upon 
various work including: Nicholas Blomley, David Delaney & Richard Ford, The Legal Geographies Reader 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2001); Lefebvre, supra note 103; Doreen Massey, Space, Place and Gender (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1994); Evelyne Ruppert, The Moral Economy of Cities: Shaping Good Citizens 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006); Boutros & Straw, supra note 280; and Young (Justice), supra note 
14.  
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 Gerald Frug has been writing at the intersection of urban studies and law for over three decades.  His early 
work on the city and the liberalist dualities through which it is constituted (e.g., self/community, state/civil 
society) continues to be highly relevant to rights-based analyses of local governments: ―The City as a Legal 
Concept‖ (1980) 93 Harvard Law Review 1057.  For more recent work that builds from his, see: Kenneth Stahl, 
―The Suburb as a Legal Concept: The Problem of Organization and the Rate of Municipalities in American Law‖ 
(2008) 29:3 Cardozo Law Review 1193. In City Making: Building Communities without Building Walls 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), Frug documents government politics around urban life (zoning, 
revitalization/redevelopment, land use, and service-provision such as education and health which are all 
embedded in legal rules) constitute urban arrangements that reinforce divisions between privileged and 
impoverished urban dwellers.  See also: Gerald Frug & David Barron, City Bound: How States Stifle Urban 
Innovation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008). In the Canadian context and the ways in which it is the 
provincial government, rather than the municipal government, that retains the status of ‗real authority‘ in terms 
of planning law: Ron Levi & Mariana Valverde, ―Freedom of the City? Canadian Cities and the Quest for 
Governmental Status‖ (2006) 44:3 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 409.   
284
 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, supra note 52 at 1. 
96 
 
consequently, epistemological questions about how we relate to one another in city spaces 
requires that we also contemplate the ―legal edifices‖ of the contemporary city. 285  
In the remainder of this chapter, I will first elaborate how ‗revanchist‘ metaphors 
constitute city spaces as a conflict zone between different rights bearers (such as the 
propertied and the unpropertied, the watchers and the watched, the panhandler and her 
other, the street and the non-street community).  Building on the insight that cinematic 
metaphors are an especially rich resource for developing embodied perception of urban 
interactions as governed by rules, I will then develop four cinematic metaphors that suggest 
alternative ways of symbolizing the governance of and by street-involved people.  
2.2 THE REVANCHIST CITY 
 
Governance (in the sense of interventions, social services, regulation and 
infrastructure) operates most directly at the local/municipal level.  Consequently, ‗the city‘ in 
the West has been theorized as a ―strategic site‖ for critically re-evaluating trends that are 
―reconfiguring the social order.‖286  According to some scholars and activists, the city is a 
social and symbolic form through which questions of social justice are materialized.  In some 
of these accounts, there are recurring metaphors for how particular bodies are governed in, 
through, and by the city, and especially in relation to the complex interplay between law, 
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 Pierre Bourdieu, "The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field" (1987) 38 Hastings Law 
Journal 839. 
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 Saskia Sassen, "Cities as Strategic Sites" (2005) 39:2 Sociology 352 at 352. 
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urban space and poverty. On this view, for street-involved people, the city is panoptic,287 
punitive,288 divided,289 and beyond the realm of justice.290   
‗Revanchism‘ has, it seems, become the ―obligatory point of passage‖ in critical 
scholarship around urban poverty and street-involvement.291 In most of its versions, ‗the city‘ 
and ‗the law‘ are mutually constitutive vertical structures that observe and regulate subjects 
through the production of space.  In the revanchist city, economic interests (the business 
community that sustains metropolitan life), the State (bureaucratic actors enacting and 
enforcing legislation) and popular media work in conjunction to target street-involved people.  
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 Foucault treats the Panopticon as the central metaphor for the disciplinary society where subjects, under 
weight of ‗the gaze,‘ will interiorize self-regulating behaviour, becoming their own ―overseer:‖ (Discipline) supra 
note 179 at 155; and "The Eye of Power" in Colin Gordon, ed., Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and 
Other Writings 1972-1977 (New York: Pantheon, 1980) 146.   
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of poverty: Mike Davis, City of Quartz (London: Vintage, 1990).  
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the desire of the new middle-class to experience urbanity; instead, it is part of broader political and economic 
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particular spaces: Smith (Revanchism), supra note 22. On the embourgeoisement and aestheticization of 
traditionally industrial working-class, working poor and immigrant spaces by the ‗new middle class,‘ see: David 
Ley, The New Middle Class and the Remaking of the Central City (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
Similarly, Jon Caulfield finds that the new middle class migrate to these spaces in order to inhabit places that 
have historical depth and that bare traces of earlier uses: Jon Caulfield, City Form and Everyday Life: Toronto's 
Gentrification and Critical Social Practice (Toronto: University Press, 1994). Frug has shown how legal rules 
have been deployed to that effect: supra note 283.  
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 Writing at the intersection of law and geography, Don Mitchell argues that homelessness is the ―bellwether of 
urban justice.‖ He traces the practices that deny street community any ―individuality‖ or ―humanity.‖ Essentially, 
city planners and urban entrepreneurs develop public-private coalitions backed by legal instruments and 
policing tactics designed to reclaim dilapidated areas and ‗exterminate‘ homeless populations.  The city is thus 
beyond postmodern; it is ―post-justice:‖ "Postmodern Geographical Praxis? The Postmodern Impulse and the 
War Against the Homeless in the Post-Justice City" in Claudio Minca, ed., Postmodern Geography: Theory and  
Praxis (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001) 57.  
291
 Geoffrey DeVerteuil, Jon May & Jurgen von Mahs, "Complexity not Collapse: Recasting the Geographies of 
Homelessness in a 'Punitive' Age" (2009) 33:5 Progress in Human Geography 646. They borrow the expression 
from Kevin Hetherington who argues against paradigmatic articulations of complex social problems in urban 
studies: Kevin Hetherington, "Moderns as Ancients: Time, Space and the Discourse of Improvement", 
TimeSpace: Geographies of Temporality (London: Routledge, 2001) 49.  
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Their collective aim is to evict unwanted bodies from sight.292 In such conditions, living on or 
from the street is practically impossible, in no small part due to police harassment and  
ticketing for ‗public nuisance,‘ ‗quality of life‘ and ‗public disorder‘ offences.293   
The cityscape is re-imagined by urban planners to funnel these same bodies into 
zones of crime, decay, pollution and disorder: enclaves that contain as well as provide 
services to people living in poverty.294  Correspondingly, privatized and semi-privatized zones 
of tolerance, interaction and circulation such as cultural corridors for entertainment, tourism 
and consumption attract citizens who also inhabit gentrified or otherwise residential zones of 
sophistication, decency, class, safety.295   
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 To some, this argument extends to ‗alternative‘ or ‗community‘ police practices, protocols and individual 
values that encourage officers to direct the street community to social services rather than charge them with an 
offence: (Interview with Serge Lareault).  However, without providing police officers with the socio-psychological 
tools necessary to assess the services to which individuals would best be directed, these interventions have as 
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pénalisation et la judiciarisation des personnes itinérantes au Québec : des pratiques coûteuses, inéfficaces, et 
contre-productives dans la prévention de l'itinérance et la réinsertion des personnes itinérantes (Québec: 
Commission Parlementaire sur l'Itinérance, 2008) [hereinafter Sylvestre (Pénalisation)]. While a more cynical 
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‗undesirables‘ off the streets and out of sight, individual officers who hold to the view that street-involvement is a 
‗lifestyle choice‘ usually avoid more social interventions and use their discretionary power to ―Ticket [street-
involved people] out of the public space: (Interview with Eric ‗Roach‘ Denis).  
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 I elaborate this tendency in my discussion of anti-panhandling legislation when I consider street law through 
the ―Close-up.‖  
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 In most Western cities, these zones are inhabited by people who are disproportionately poor and racialized 
in particular ways; they are overcrowded; often located near hazardous industries and dumping grounds: See 
generally: Loic Wacquant, "'A Black City Within a White:' Revisiting America's Dark Ghetto" (1998) 2:1 Black 
Renaissance - Renaissance Noire 141. In Montreal, these neighbourhoods also tend to  offer less access to 
services such as supermarkets, parks, and libraries: Philippe Apparicio & Anne-Marie Seguin, "Measuring the 
Accessibility of Services and Facilities for Residents of Public Housing in Montreal" (2006) 43:1 Urban Studies 
187. On the emergence of urban ―ghettos‖ for the service-dependent groups including people with physical and 
intellectual disabilities, people who have experienced criminalization, and people with addiction concerns in the 
United States, see: Michael Dear & Jennifer Wolch, Landscapes of Despair: From Deinstitutionalization to 
Homelessness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). Finally, there are a number of critical scholars 
who have discussed how strategies of exclusion operate in Canada.  For instance, Joe Hermer explains how 
‗civic sanitation‘ operates in the city of Oshawa Ontario through the enactment of a nuisance by-law that 
constitutes and targets ‗the loiterer:‘ "Keeping Oshawa Beautiful: Policing the Loiterer in Public Nuisance 
Bylaws" (1997) 12 Canadian Journal of Law and Society / Revue canadienne droit et société 171.   
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 On the suburb as the erosion of diverse communities and as a safe, ―functionally separated‖ and ―internally 
homogenous environment‖ for the middle class, see: Richard Sennett, The Uses of Disorder (New York: Knopf, 
1970) at 2 [hereinafter, Sennett (Disorder)].   
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 The panoptic, divided, punitive or post-justice cities are abstract and metonymic ways 
of imagining governance in and through the city: they stand in for abstract notions about the 
regulation of street-involved people.  They also suggest something about the structural, 
social, and material conditions that street-involved people negotiate daily and nightly.   I have 
found that in Montreal, the revanchist conception of the law-city nexus has been deployed as 
a mode of expressing and responding to direct governance of street-involved people.  The 
clusters of metaphors that make up the revanchist city have been used to name the 
oppressive versions of formal, explicit, and hierarchical state-based regulation. These 
metaphors remain relevant to the street community and their collaborators in Montreal who 
pragmatically advance them in ways that confront street law in its ‗vertical register.‘296 
 Namely, responses and resistance to law occur through the deployment of rights 
discourse (and especially the ‗right‘ to the city), legislative reform and policy analysis (official 
recognition of discrimination against street-involved people), and direct intervention in the 
municipal court system (with the assistance of ‗mobile‘ legal clinics).297 These initiatives have 
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 Davies (Flat), supra note 25. 
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 Other jurisdictions have used test case constitutional litigation (rather than municipal venues) to varying 
degrees of success.  In Federated Anti-Poverty Groups of B.C. v. British Columbia, [1991] B.C.J. No. 3047 
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section 15 of the Charter. In at least two cases anti-poverty activists challenged provincial laws regulating 
loitering and panhandling as falling ―in pith and substance‖ under federal jurisdiction: R. v. Jarvis, Warrington 
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Given TDP‘s mandate and structure, the decision has effectively forced the affiliation to stop providing a vital 
service to street-involved people in Ottawa. The group is currently challenging the Law Society of Upper 
Canada‘s decision: Ticket Defence Program, "The LSUC Denies Access to Justice for Ottawa's Homeless", 
online: (2008)   <http://www.flora.org/legal/tickets/TDP_Press_Release_2008-11-17.pdf>. 
100 
 
without doubt worked to further the needs, expectations, and interests of the street 
community who remain at the margins of explicit, formal and written law.    
A great number of these projects stem from the Réseau d’aide aux personnes seules et 
itinérantes de Montréal (RAPSIM),298 which has also lobbied in response to efforts by city 
planners and administrators to produce ―historic/touristic‖ cityscapes299 with, in theory, plenty 
of ―people places.‖300 According to RAPSIM, state and economic interests collude through 
practices around the symbolic, economic and material ‗urban renewal‘ and ‗revitalization‘ of 
commercial and residential neighbourhoods ‗in decline.‘ These interests are materialized 
through practices such as: the recent closure of most parks and public spaces in all boroughs 
between the hours of midnight and 6:00 am;301 the additional ordinances passed by 
individual boroughs such as Ville-Marie‘s (which bans dogs from particular parks where 
‗punk‘ youth tend to congregate);302 the eviction of the Festival d’expression de la rue 
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 RAPSIM is a coalition of over 90 non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations working with street-
involved people: RAPSIM, "Le Réseau d'aide aux personnes seules et itinérantes de Montréal", online: (2010)   
<http://www.rapsim.org/fr/default.aspx?sortcode=1.0>. 
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 The strategies are considered part of attempts to render Montreal better able to relate to and compete with 
other urban agglomerations around the globe through marketing strategies and image-making.  On the touristic-
historic city model as an ideological instrument deployed to create a particular vision of the city and three 
dichotomies inherent to the concept touristic-historic city (namely, localism/globalism, national/vernacular, and 
residents/tourists), see: Gregory Ashworth & John Turnbridge, "Whose Touristic-Historic City?" in Alan Lew, 
Colin Michael Hall & Allan Williams, eds., A Companion to Tourism (London: Blackwell, 2004) 210-222.   
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 To Marcus and Francis, people-oriented places can apply to any feature of the urban landscape including 
parks, plazas, housing complexes, subway stations, university campuses and childcare facilities; they provide 
performance-based design recommendations that focus on relationships between the way spaces are designed 
and how they are used: Clare Cooper Marcus & Carolyn Francis, People Places: Design Guidelines for Urban 
Open Spaces (Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 1998).  
301
 Règlement sur les parcs (R.R.V.M., c.P-3), sections 3 and 30.  The city‘s Ordonnance numéro 8 includes 46 
exemptions to the closure rule, many of which are located near metro stations (e.g., Square Victoria and Place 
d‘Youville).  
302
 Règlement sur le contrôle des chiens et autres animaux (no. C-10) bans dogs from public spaces such as 
Émilie-Gamelin Park and Viger square.  
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(designed to be a bridge between street youth and the broader community) from its regular 
venue at a centrally located (‗public‘) university.303 
  These discriminatory practices, according to RAPSIM and its allies are not the 
unfortunate outcome of the city officials‘ earnest attempt to deploy its jurisdiction over 
incivilities.  Rather, they result from a deliberate attempt to assuage the concerns of resident 
and business associations lobbying for greater police presence through ‗pas dans ma cour‘ 
(‗Not In My Back Yard‘) responses to creating or sustaining already existing social services 
for street-involved people in ‗revitalized‘ parts of the downtown core.304  The result is a 
shrinking of the access to ‗open‘ spaces by street-involved people, effectively denying their 
‗droit de cité‘ (right to the city).305 
In large part from the pressure and the on-going campaigns by RAPSIM and the 
Réseau Solidarité Itinérance du Québec (RSIQ), Québec held its first public consultation on 
homelessness in 2008. The Commission de la santé et des services sociaux (Commission 
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 The Festival d’expression de la Rue (FFR) is organised by the Collectif d’intervention par les pairs (formally 
street-involved youth) in conjunction with over fifty community groups. The specific goals are to favour better 
communication, more meaningful interaction, and deeper comprehension between street youth and the broader 
population.  It is three days of music, performance art, workshops, and information-sharing that foster conditions 
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développement urbain du Faubourg St-Laurent and the Société de développement commercial du Village have 
deployed ‗Not-in-My-Back-Yard‘ (NIMBY) discourses and lobbied for greater police presence in their 
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and panhandling. However, according to one report, NIMBY strategies tend to be aimed at the service-providers 
(the organizations servicing street-involved people are being harassed) rather than at individual street-involved 
people: Anabelle Nicoud, « Refuge des jeunes: un déménagement controversé » La presse (8 juin 2010) online 
: http://www.cyberpresse.ca  
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 RAPSIM, Pour une politique en itinérance: Une nécessité pour Montréal ! (Montreal: RAPSIM, 2008). See 
especially « Axe 1 : Droit de cité.»   
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de la santé) released its report in November 2009 and unanimously recommended that the 
provincial government adopt an official policy on homelessness.306  Almost concurrently, after 
a lengthy, broad-based and inclusive consultation and inquiry, the Commission des droits de 
la personne et des droits de la jeunesse (Commission des droits) determined that street-
involved people experience and continue to be ―at risk of social profiling.‖307    
The Commission des droits was particularly concerned with how police norms, 
policies, practices and standards regarding the ‗uses‘ of public space make the street 
community ―designated targets for ...  monitoring and surveillance.‖308  It also found that 
street-involved people in Montreal receive an inordinate number of tickets for municipal 
offences.  While making up less than one percent of the city‘s population, they nevertheless 
accounted for almost 32 percent of all tickets issued by police under municipal by-laws in 
2004.  Of these, most were for minor offences such consuming alcohol or being intoxicated in 
a public place (despite municipal by-laws permitting the consumption of wine or liquor in 
some parks as part of a ‗meal‘), interfering with the flow of traffic, and loitering.309  Numbers 
increase dramatically during Montreal‘s lucrative festival season, when people who generate 
income from and through the street are most likely to be noticed by police or other street 
users. A substantial number of tickets were issued for behaviour near subway stations: 
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 Commission de la santé et des services sociaux, Rapport sur l'itinérance au Québec : Agissons ensemble 
(Québec: Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec, 2009).  
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 Christine Campbell & Paul Eid, La judiciarisation des personnes itinérantes à Montréal : un profilage social 
(Quebec: Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse, 2009) at 51.  
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 Ibid.  at 59.The Commission‘s findings were based in part on testimony from street-involved people, service 
providers, city council, the Mayor of the Ville-Marie borough (which passed contentious regulations that were 
directly at issue during the consultation), police, and researchers. Céline Bellot and Marie-Eve Sylvestre‘s 
qualitative and quantitative data were relied upon: Céline Bellot et al., Judiciarisation et criminalisation des 
populations itinérantes à Montréal (Montreal: Réseau d'aide au personnes seules et itinérante de Montréal, 
2005) [hereinafter, Bellot et al, (Judiciarisation)]; and Sylvestre (Pénalisation), supra note 292. 
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 According to Bellot, fifty-eight percent of tickets were issued under the Règlement concernant la paix et 
l’ordre sur le domaine public (R.R.V.M. c.P-1): Ibid. 
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attempting to impede the flow of traffic, jumping or attempting to jump the turnstile, sleeping 
or lying down on a bench.310 The number of these tickets issued increased dramatically in the 
winter months, when street-involved people were more likely to seek shelter.311 A smaller 
(though now increasing) number of tickets are related to behaviour such as smoking in public 
places.312  
The Commission des droits also determined that of the individuals getting tickets, a 
small number of street-involved people (namely, those who are chronically street-involved 
and struggling with alcoholism or other addictions) received the largest proportion. This latter 
group was also comprised of the people most likely to be engaging in visible forms of income 
generation (panhandling, squeegeeing and street-level sex work).313 Unsurprisingly, these 
same people tended to receive dramatically less tickets for loitering and similar offences if 
they found or were provided with long-term social housing.314   
Finally, the Commission des droits recognized that street-involved people frequently 
served prison sentences315 until the intense lobbying efforts by RAPSIM and the RSIQ 
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 Sections 324 and 366 of Quebec‘s Code of Civil Procedure R.S.Q. c. C-21-1 empower police to issue a 
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effectively forced the city of Montreal to implement a moratorium on prison terms for unpaid 
fines.316  
   To be sure, the Montreal anti-poverty community has deployed revanchist discourses 
instrumentally and strategically to highlight how formal law is used to hierarchically order 
space in the city to the exclusion of street-involved people.  The revanchist symbolizations so 
clearly emphasize the more manifest, overt modes of what we conventionally understand to 
be street law, but they may not get at its more latent aspects. The instrumental symbolisms 
that emphasize street-involved people‘s containment in or exclusion from public space, for 
example, do not fully grapple with: the more routinized and mundane modes of governance 
in and through city spaces; the paradoxical and inconsistent normative commitments of the 
individuals charged by the state to administer formal norms; the multiple normative universes 
that comprise the moments of interaction between street-involved people and their 
interlocutors; and the ways in which multiple street users constitute street law.  
  My argument is that there may be other ways of expressing street law (which I 
elaborate shortly) is not, however, a dismissal of more revanchist symbolizations.  True, they 
may miss moments of injustice just as they reveal moments of oppression.  They may also 
miss as many creative possibilities as they reveal the power of certain symbolizations of 
street law.  All representation holds coercive and violent as well as constructive and life-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
75% of tickets issued to street-involved people resulted in a prison term for unpaid fines: Ibid. at 3.  My 
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affirming potentials.317 Pure cynicism about our dominant modes of governing and being 
governed in urban spaces may, as Zizek has pointed out, reinforce the very ideology and 
received beliefs that it seeks to dismantle; close attention that stems from scorn and disgust 
can become obsession and thereby a kind of homage.318  I suggest four cinematic legal 
metaphors for street law with the aspiration that they both foreground injustice and retain the 
optimism that the critical legal pluralist ethos furthers: law is a framework for self-directed 
behaviour and the pursuit of individual or shared purposes. 
2.3 CINEMATIC LEGAL METAPHORS OF, FOR, AND AS STREET LAW   
 
In this section, I argue that four metaphors can help us apprehend different spatio-
temporal-psycho-social matrices of street law: Aerial Viewpoint, Shot/Reverse sequence, 
Close-up, and Tracking Shot.  As noted earlier, like any other descriptive exercise, my choice 
of metaphor is ―normatively charged.‖ 319  Here, I construct conceptual devices aimed at 
iterating and irritating power relations that render street-involved people more vulnerable to 
unjust modes of governance.  While any claim to generate alternative understandings can be 
used in ways that further marginalize already vulnerable groups, these metaphors work 
against constituting street-involved people through a narrow account of autonomy.320 Instead, 
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the four cinematic legal metaphors I propose are intended to show how street-involved 
people‘s individual agency can be conceived in terms of our relational autonomy and how 
their agential normative selves are materially and socially embedded, while always keeping 
in focus the relations and structures that advance (or hinder) the conditions that make such 
autonomy and agency possible.   
 2.3.1 STREET LAW IN AERIAL VIEWPOINT  
 
The anti-poverty community in Montreal has mobilized in response official law 
enforcement‘s discriminatory practices which effectively force street-involved people out of 
shared urban spaces.  An Aerial Viewpoint of Montreal would likely confirm that street-
involved people have been shepherded out of commercial, aesthetic, and touristic zones, to 
either more remote neighbourhoods or to zones of decay or/and those marked as spaces of 
‗service-provision‘.  It would also provide, as I argue below, a better sense as to how, where, 
and when street-involved people circulate, generate income, and access services in 
Montreal. I argue that these movements through urban space are primarily governed through 
decentralized rather than centralized social norms.321  This spatialized street law should, as a 
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Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar, eds., Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the 
Social Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Within the legal context: Nedelsky (Autonomy), supra note 
223.     
321
 For two insightful surveys on how these decentralized norms shape governance of street-involved people by 
police in Montreal, see: Bellot et al., (Judiciarisation), supra note 305; and Sylvestre (Pénalisation), supra note 
289. Others have shown how Toronto‘s attempt to address homelessness by creating more shelters was 
unsuccessful, in part, because of the ways in which zoning law is designed to govern uses but actually governs 
things and people simultaneously:  Mariana Valverde, "Taking 'land use' seriously: toward an ontology of 
municipal law" (2005) 9 Law Text Culture 34; Prashan Ranasinghe & Mariana Valverde, "Governing 
Homelessness Through Land-use: A Sociolegal Study of the Toronto Shelter Zoning By-Law" (2006) 31:3 
Canadian Journal of Sociology 325.  
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consequence, also be attended to when imagining the governance of and by street-involved 
people that can further their conditions of autonomy and agency.  
 
THE AERIAL VIEWPOINT  
 
As noted earlier, cinema interacts with the city by providing new views of the city; one 
of these framing devices is the Aerial Viewpoint.  Technically it is filmed in an exterior 
location from far above – whether from an airplane or the top of a building – and permits a 
‗bird‘s eye view‘ of a cityscape; figuratively, it is often used to convey relations of power and 
practices of regulation.  At first blush then, the Aerial Viewpoint orders, plans, and captures 
the same meaning as the revanchist metaphors for the regulation of bodies through the 
definition of spatial territory.  As film scholar Edward Dimenberg explains: 
From law enforcement observations of neighborhoods to the use of satellite images to 
plan the future location of shopping centers, the aerial view of urban space facilitated 
its oversight, management and planning, thus suggesting a new sense of the city and 
its ‗truth.‘322   
 
When used as a static viewpoint from above, the Aerial Viewpoint does work as a 
cartographic exercise in that it conveys fixed points of reference.  Consider the Montreal 
police services‘ attempt to make Montreal legible as a series of neighbourhoods each with 
their own regulatory objectives and targeted subjects.323 As Bourdieu reminds us, ―the power 
to impose and inculcate a vision of divisions, that is, the power to make visible and explicit 
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 Dimendberg, supra note 276 at 47.   
323
 Service de Police de la Ville de Montreal (SPVM), "Redrawing the Police Map", online: (2010)   
<http://www.spvm.qc.ca/en/pdq/2_3_1_revision_carte_policiere.asp>. Sylvestre has compiled a taxonomy of 
police priorities in particular city spaces, including « présence dérangeante de mendiants et itinérants » 
(annoying presence of vagrants), prostitution, graffiti and incivilities in sectors 20, 21, 22 and 38 (which 
comprise Montreal‘s primary shopping, commercial and entertainment districts, such as Old Montreal and the 
Plateau Mont Royal): Sylvestre (Pénalisation), supra note 292. 
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social divisions that are implicit is political power par excellence. 324 His conceptualization of 
the aerial viewpoint obscures how it might also provide insight into the ways material spaces 
are layered with imagined and experienced space.325  Namely, individuals‘ material lives are 
constituted through relationships, experiences, habits, and self-reflection.   
 The perspective from above and from away is not always or necessarily detached from 
the lived space of our urban environments.  Instead, the aerial perspective may enable what 
Franco Moretti in another context calls a ―distant reading.‖ The intentional abstraction of 
details can suggest something about the patterns and networks of governance that street-
involved people navigate and generate. According to Moretti, distance is ―not an obstacle‖ to 
knowledge about phenomena but a ―specific form of knowledge‖ with ―fewer elements‖ and 
consequently provides ―a sharper sense of their overall connections.‖  A distant reading of 
Montreal through the aerial viewpoint permits a perception of street-involvement as everyday 
routines or ―small phenomena‖ which can be perceived ―from afar.‖326  In what follows I 
suggest how creating distance can actually expand and deepen some critical connections 
that have already been made around the relation between governance and poverty. As 
details (or specificities) that would make objects and subjects recognizable are minimized, 
this model works to emphasize broader patterns that occur in street-involved peoples‘ 
relationships to their physical environment.  Taking a distance in this way permits us to think 
about networks of regulation as they operate horizontally rather than always already relying 
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 Pierre Bourdieu, "Social Space and Symbolic Power" (1989) 7:1 Sociological Theory 14 at 23. 
325
 For scholarship arguing against a positivist view of space, see: Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). Edward Soja, Postmetropolis: Critical Studies of Cities and Regions (Oxford: 
Blackwell 2000). Whereas Lefebvre displaces the distinction between pure form (empty / imagined space) and 
impure content (lived time / everyday practices), Soja adds that all cities are hybrid forms with shifting realities.  
326
 Will Straw, "The Circulatory Turn" in Michael Longrod, Barbara Crow & Kim Sawchuk, eds., Sampling the 
Spectrum (Toronto: University Press, 2009) 17 at 20 [hereinafter, Straw (Circulatory)]. 
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on a vertical expression of social power; this latter symbolization of law can at times fail to 
consider subjects‘ expressions of agency.327    
 
STREET LAW FROM A DISTANCE    
 
Imagining street law through the aerial viewpoint, we can consider the jurisgenerative 
sites of the city of Montreal in spatial and geographical terms that take us beyond simply 
mapping the ‗cartographies of homelessness‘328 or understanding street-involvement in terms 
of overlapping or conflicting zones of occupation (or non-occupation from the perspective of 
the street community).329  
Without doubt, there are public spaces that street-involved people attempt to explicitly 
reclaim for their purposes such as city bus stops, benches, subway corridors and parks. The 
aerial viewpoint can give us a sense of such ‗placemaking‘ tactics330 in which street-involved 
people engage and through which they not only disrupt spatial order imagined through 
design and legislation but re-imagine and re-appropriate city spaces from which they have 
been ‗expulsed‘.  Without overly romanticizing such practices, for some street-involved 
people, they are explicitly political. Denis Munger, for instance, has spent decades creating 
public art in Montreal‘s downtown from found garbage; he has a ‗circuit‘ of about twelve 
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See Davies‘ discussion of horizontal (pluralist) hypotheses of law as opposed to vertical (positivist) accounts: 
Davies (Flat), supra note 25. 
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 In the United States, Google Map and the National Alliance to End Homelessness inaugurated its 
cartography of homelessness project based on statistics reported in local media and on a centralized website: 
National Alliance to End Homelessness, "Counts Media Map", online: (2009)   
<<http://www.endhomelessness.org/section/data/interactivemaps/2009countsmap>.  >. Each American city is 
already required to conduct a one-day ‗count‘ of the homeless population: Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, "Continuum of Care", online:   <<http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page/portal/HUD>.  >.  Compare this 
approach to Marc Spooner‘s, an education professor at the University of Regina who has created a map for 
homeless people in that city, suggesting trajectories through the ―patchwork supports‖ in Regina:  Evan 
Thornton, "Living on the Street?  Unfortunately There's a Map for That", online: (2010) Spacing Ottawa   
<http://spacingottawa.ca/2010/02/25/living-on-the-street-unfortunately-theres-a-map-for-that/>. 
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 This conception of street law will be considered in greater detail through the Shot/Reverse sequence. 
330
Susan Ruddick, Young and Homeless in Hollywood: Mapping Social Identities (New York: Routledge, 1996).  
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locations where he creates and displays his installation pieces.331  Despite being arrested for 
disturbing the peace, he continues to display his art in public venues with the hope that 
people will breathe new life into found objects.332    
The Aerial Viewpoint, conversely, enables perception of the other ―nodal points‖ 
street-involved people move through; these points are ―connected by the movement of 
people between them.‖333  This perspective offers a glimpse into the rhythms of the day-to-
day and night-to-night negotiations of street-involved people through multiple and 
simultaneous spatio-temporal matrices by highlighting how street-involved people ‗spend‘ 
their time moving from place to place.  Rather than bringing to light the shrinking public 
space, the Aerial Viewpoint permits a glimpse at the ever-expanding quasi-public and private 
zones of poverty.  Through a mapping of these rhythms, it becomes clearer that street-
involved people find themselves embedded in power relations that are not limited to, or 
necessarily dominated by, the formal, state-based, explicit and canonical expression of law. 
Unlike disciplinary metaphors for the city and how we govern and are governed through 
space, imagining governance as an Aerial Viewpoint moves us to think about how the street 
community not only responds to punitive regulation, but also navigates a mosaic of legal 
orders.   
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 His work is ‗tolerated‘ by city workers who usually take down the installations before the weekends:   McLeod 
Tremblay, "Gangs de rues", online: (2009) 15:31 Métro   <http://zepeintre.blogspot.com/2009/05/gang-de-
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 Interview with Denis Munger (on file with author). Munger who holds a B.A. in architecture from the 
University of Montreal also ran as an independent candidate for city councilor. Part of his platform included 
creating low-income housing units and transforming an incinerator (at the Brébeuf and St-Grégoire intersection) 
into a garbage recycling centre: Ibid.  
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 Caroline Knowles, "Burger King, Dunkin Donuts and Community Mental Health Care" (2000) 6:3 Health & 
Place 213; and Hwang, supra note 111. 
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The Aerial Viewpoint is especially useful as way of perceiving the less ‗visible‘ aspect 
of street-involvement.  Conceptualizing the ways in which street-involved people circulate 
within and relate to lived space as a series of encounters, possible connections, and rhythms 
permits us to perceive a number of things. First, we can pinpoint instrumental and 
constitutive ‗centralizing‘ spaces that are not as directly connected to the formal (criminal) 
law.334 These are spaces where contractual norms and unofficial enforcement mechanisms 
are constantly renegotiated through hierarchically ordered interactions that loop back to 
street-involvement:  collection agencies, pawnshops and payday lending businesses which 
increasingly make up part of the informal ―economy of addiction.‖335   
Second, it provokes interrogation of the production of representational spaces of 
‗accommodation‘ and ‗targeted‘ services: administrative agencies that provide ‗work 
programs,‘336 drop-in centers, missions, churches, youth hostels, food banks, detox centers, 
mobile food units, hospitals and other emergency health facilities.337 Governance is 
distributed exogenously and endogenously through and within these ‗help‘ spaces, which are 
part of the symbolic processes that embed homelessness into the social fabric.   These other 
normative sites – shelters, soup kitchens, mobile health clinics etc. - while not necessarily 
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 Blomley reminds us that even when we ―decenter law … we find that the reproduction of some powerfully 
centralizing processes.‖  He focuses on the oppressive property relations in Vancouver‘s downtown East side: 
(Gentrification), supra note 51 at 192. 
335
 Will Straw explains that in Vancouver compact disks are integrated into this economy as they can be stolen, 
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marked by recognizable state symbolism must be attended to when grappling with street law.  
As Marianne Constable has put it, to point out that positive law ―is but one possibility for law‖ 
will neither bring about ‗justice‘ or ‗community;‘  however,  to  ―forget all other possibilities will 
certainly foreclose‖ the possibility of either.338  The regulation of street-involved people is 
often more effective through the help sector than through the police.  Indeed, street-involved 
people may more easily, in some cases, navigate regulation by official legal actors.339 
Moreover, it is often the more implicit and informal governance of shelter staff (who can 
engage in intrusive and judgmental risk assessments and case-management approaches) 
that most directly concern street-involved people: alcohol and drug bans, curfews, and 
people being turned away from spaces because of their companion animals.340    
Third, while it is true that people move in and out of their family homes, women‘s 
shelters, transition houses, rooming houses, and motels, the mobilities of street-involved 
people, are far more complex than what the discursive label and subjectivity ―street-involved‖ 
(and consequently service-reliant) permits.  The Aerial viewpoint can give insight into how 
individuals constitute spaces that attest to the complex normative lives and the competing 
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Marianne Constable, The Law of the Other: The Mixed Jury and Changing Conceptions of Citizenship, Law, 
and Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).  
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  For instance, people who sell the magazine l‘Itinéraire are rendered almost ‗immune‘ to police harassment 
(interview with Serge Lerault).  However, they often endure similar harassing behaviour from some service-
providers (interview with France). It is primarily for this reason that l‘Itinéraire‘s mandate is one of non-
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 This point should not be taken as a pure cynicism and a blanket dismissal of the manifold actors who 
engage in compassionate, caring, and respectful interactions every day with street-involved people.  My point is 
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that guide interactions between street-involved people and service providers will be grappled with more fully in 
the next section, ―The Close Up.‖‘ For a similar reading of interactions between shelter staff and street-involved 
people, see: Lisa Hoffman and Brian Coffey, ―Dignity and indignation: How people experiencing homelessness 
view services and providers‖ (2008) 45:2 The Social Science Journal 207.   
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desires, expectations, habits and values each individual holds in every aspect of their  
―human spatiality‖ whether physical, mental or social,341 whether affordable permanent and 
social housing342, community coffee shops343, methadone maintenance services,344 green 
spaces345 or shared kitchens.346   
Each jurisgenerative site – whether instrumental, representational, or interactive - has 
many normative depths of field, taking multiple forms, and deploying multiple instruments.  
Each has its own rules, terms of use, entry conditions, jurisdictions and experts. But each is 
also in continual interaction and flux, always contesting, appropriating, and influencing each 
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 Soja refers to these fields as the trialectics of spatiality – which are ―real and imagined, concrete and 
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 Méta d’Âme is a day center which works with methadone patients and people addicted to heroin within a 
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neighbours.  It is organized within a peer-to-peer (―pour les pairs, par les pairs‖) framework and is the only 
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heroine or its derivatives:   Méta d‘Ame, "Pour les pairs, par les pairs", online: (2010)   <http://metadame.org/>. 
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Lareault).  
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See for instance the Dining Co-op which sadly has recently had to shut its doors: Montreal Urban Community 
Sustainability:  online:   <http://www.mucs.ca/>. 
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other‘s rules, decision-making processes, traditions, and institutions. In thinking about the 
associations between these multiple normative sites, we may be better positioned to 
stimulate new thinking about oppressive power relations. Looking at some of the patterns 
and rhythms of street life also gives us a sense of what services, relationships and 
interactions would further their conditions of agency from basic amenities like 24-hour open 
access to clean public washrooms, storage space and places to make and share meals, to 
more supportive preventive models of care such as wet-shelters and safe-injection sites, to 
spaces that can be lived and experienced in ways that engage people as complex, creative, 
spatial and normative beings.  Getting a different picture of their everyday patterns can 
provide insight into how to foster conditions of agency for the street-community based on the 
relations of care that already exist; it also provides insight into how street-involved people 
produce and live in cityscapes that generate more meaningful services and long-term 
relationships.  
In looking at the city from above, it becomes a complex of normative sites.  In and 
through social practices that endlessly irritate or re-imagine those norms we constitute the 
conditions for possible self-transformation. While it is impossible to map out with any 
certainty the trajectories of the interactions of street-involved people (as a heterogeneous mix 
with multiple and conflicting desires, needs and normative expectations), we can, 
nevertheless, develop a sense of the tendencies, flows, and rhythms of their interactions.347 
These tendencies, flows and rhythms, I propose, can be apprehended through the Aerial 
Viewpoint.   
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 Macdonald (Emergence) supra note 8 at 22.    
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Conceptualizing street law from the ‗bird‘s eye view‘ is, as noted, but one, necessarily 
partial, scale.  On one level, when we think about the movements of people and objects in 
space we must always remember that there is always ―more at stake in the placement of 
people‖ and the street-involved poor especially ―than the location of lamp-stands.‖348  The 
attention to detail, to singularity that Blomley prefers we attend to is perhaps better 
apprehended, as I will explain later, when we consider governance of and by the street-
involved people through the Close-up.  On another level, to emphasize the flows of street-
involved people may also reinforce the view that they are migrants.349 Accordingly, their 
movements through particular urban space will be perceived as ‗shallow‘ as opposed to 
shop-owners‘ more rooted connection (through reputation, lease, land ownership, and 
established relationships with institutional law enforcement officials).    
It is for this reason that I believe the Shot/Reverse sequence, as I will explain below, is 
a complementary cinematic code to the Aerial Viewpoint.  I believe it best captures some of 
the ways in which street-involved people assert their authority and legitimacy as integral and 
constitutive parts of the city‘s fabric.  
 
2.3.2 STREET LAW THROUGH SHOT/REVERSE    
 
The Aerial Viewpoint can draw attention to exogenous rules and practices that restrict 
movement in city spaces as well as the ways in which street-involved people nonetheless 
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engage their material, social, and representational fields of human spatiality.  The 
Shot/Reverse is the cinematic code I rely on in order to imagine relationships between street-
involved people and particular interlocutors – the police – in ways that position them as 
judges.  This relation is conventionally discussed in terms of surveillance and counter-
surveillance.  I use the Shot/Reverse to reconceptualize it in the aspirational realm of 
dialogue and inter-subjective possibility.  
 Surveillance - according to the expanding field devoted to its study - is a network of 
dynamic processes that occurs in situations of interaction whereby personal data is collected 
for the purposes of management of populations through governance, regulation and 
control.350  A fundamental concern for anti-surveillance scholars and activists is how (formal, 
official) law‘s gaze is used to regulate particular populations, including street-involved people.  
The Panopticon has often been the dystopic visual metaphor relied on for knowing and 
experiencing current configuration of power in the global north.  Law‘s ubiquity is embodied 
through its technologies of observation that in turn constitute self-regulating subjects: by way 
of its normalizing gaze, law delimits acceptable and unacceptable ways of being. These 
practices are often justified as a response to citizens‘ fear of terrorism, crime, and disorder; 
as part of downtown revitalization projects; or to meet growing demand for new modes of 
reality-type entertainment.  Some surveillance scholars direct their attention to the ways in 
which the gaze is always bi-directional (rather than unidirectional) and that populations 
subjected to (formal, official) law‘s gaze always contest its claim to power and domination.351   
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 For a survey of the field, see: Gary Marx, "Desperately Seeking Surveillance Studies: Players in Search of a 
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One of these resistance tactics is the counter-gaze or counter-surveillance.  Paradoxically, 
like other revanchist metaphors, the panoptical gaze – and even the resistance embodied by 
legal subjects - remains a symbolization that obscures any possibility of social actors as 
agents.  Consequently, other scholars express agnosticism toward imagining governance in 
urban spaces in terms of an omniscient gaze.352 They tend to promote a more ambivalent 
understanding of the dynamic, imperceptible, and mundane patterns of surveillant 
interactions and the assemblages and networks of surveillance that flow over our 
contemporary social body.353 
Further, as Rancière comments, transformative politics is contingent upon our ability 
to express dissent as well as our need to promote dialogue.354  Rancière aligns the study of 
cinematic modes of thought with conceptions of agency and autonomy.355  Building on his 
insight and on that of critical surveillance scholarship generally, I argue that one way to 
understand how modes of governance and regulation generate acquiescence to oppressive 
behaviour (such as police brutality) is through cinematic forms that rely on conflict and 
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Richard Ericson, "The Politics of Sight  / Site: Locating cameras in Vancouver's Public Spaces", Surveillance 
and Governance: Crime Control and Beyond (Bingley, BD: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2008) 35.  
353
 These practices occur within a broader context of acquiesced surveillance (e.g., web browser ‗cookies‘, 
wireless internet connections, welfare system/revenue services, personal identification numbers) and our 
collective awareness and large scale embracing of a certain ‗surveillance aesthetic‘ (e.g. consumer profiles, 
bank machines) and shifting social norms around privacy and disclosure (e.g. cell phones, social networking 
media, on-line interfaces and platforms, and avatars). See generally: Ric Simmons, "Why 2007 is not Like 1984: 
A Broader Perspective on Technology‘s Effect on Privacy and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence" (2007) 97 
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 531.  
354
 Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible (London: Continuum, 2006) 
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 This interpretation of Rancière‘s project is elaborated in: Tom Conley, "Cinema and its Discontents: Jacques 
Rancière and Film Theory" (2005) 34:3 SubStance 96. 
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contradiction.356  I rely less on the panopticism/post-panopticism as the conceptual frame for 
relationships between street-involved people and the social actors who have come to stand 
in as one of the primary symbols of surveillance society: the police.  Rather, I use the 
Shot/Reverse sequence from film theory as a way to understand how Rancière‘s dual 
aspirations - critique and dialogue – constitute interactions between street-involved people 
and police.   
 
THE SHOT/REVERSE SEQUENCE 
 
A conventional Shot/Reverse sequence will switch between complementary spaces; it 
often features two characters in face-to-face interaction, and usually in conversation. It 
generally consists of spectators being presented someone who is watching; there is a cut 
and the spectator then sees what the watcher is looking at. If a Shot/Reverse sequence 
abides by the postulates of continuity (or ‗invisible‘) editing - which is founded on a desire to 
minimize the audiences‘ awareness of shot transitions, fragmentation or any other cinematic 
technique in order to maintain the story‘s flow -  the camera shows each figure in 
succession.357 Correspondingly, the spectator makes spatial and temporal connections 
between characters (that they share a space and are looking at each other).  According to 
one view, through the Shot/Reverse interaction, the viewer becomes a mediator between two 
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perspectives, ‗suturing‘ competing claims into a seamless whole.358  The conventional 
understanding of the Shot/Reverse has been called a technique that maintains the 
―omnipresence of classical narration.‖359   To be more precise, it draws on viewers‘ prior 
knowledge of cinematic conventions about how a particular story will unfold.  As such, it may 
―reinforce habitual expectations‖ (common sense assumptions) rather than alter our ―normal 
viewing activities‖ (everyday practices).360 This may be true, but I argue that the 
Shot/Reverse does nevertheless work as a dialogic mode.   
Filmmakers often use the Shot/Reverse structure to facilitate the feeling of a 
conversation between two actors on the screen. I rely on these somewhat conflicting 
readings of the meanings generated through the Shot/Reverse sequence to use it as 
metaphor for street law.  In the first subsection, I show how the Shot/Reverse can be used as 
a way of understanding surveillance and counter-surveillance in ways that order and sustain 
conflicting discourses. I discuss Copwatch‘s counter-surveillance tactics: individuals who 
‗watch the watchers‘ in order to resist formal law‘s authority to define who is a legal subject 
and who is a legal agent.    
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 Bordwell, et al, supra note 277 at 31. The Shot/Reverse pattern is considered mainstay of a somewhat 
narrow set of editing possibilities that have historically been deployed in dominant Western filmmaking that 
ensure narrative continuity:‖ Bordwell & Thompson, supra note 541 at 276. 
360
 Consider the analogy with relationships between police and the street-community.  In Winnipeg, while the 
city has recently reaffirmed a by-law against particular forms of panhandling. Anti-surveillance activists assert 
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In the second subsection, I explain how the Shot/Reverse sequence can be used to 
think about street law in terms of its potentiality for self-reflection and self-transformation. As 
Silverman notes, its operations permit the viewing agent to proclaim: ―yes, that‘s me‖ and 
―that‘s what I see.‖361  Through its processes of ascribing a view to an actor who is then 
revealed in the next shot, it helps us imagine another function of governance: creating 
conditions for self-transformation by re-evaluating how we believe our ‗others‘ see us.   
 
REVERSE SHOT AS CRITIQUE   
 
 The Shot/Reverse structure can help us imagine and understand the normative 
disagreements between street-involved people and their interlocutors and, for our purposes, 
the police.   
Over the last few decades, collectives and affiliations have emerged in every major 
Canadian urban centre to counter police harassment and other forms of brutality directed at 
particular populations (including street-involved people) by ‗cop watching.’362  Copwatch‘s 
overarching goal is to ―end police brutality, police impunity and police misconduct.‖363 This 
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 Kaja Silverman, "On Suture" in Leo Braudy & Marshall Coeh, eds., Film Theory and Criticism (Oxford: 
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 Copwatch is an informal network of self-governing volunteer collectives. It first emerged in the United States 
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a watch over police officers in predominantly African-American neighbourhoods.  They would intervene if 
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They also provide support to people who have experienced violence at the hands of police 
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watch » which they define as «  l‘action d‘observer la police dans l‘exercice de l‘abus de ses fonctions: » 
Collectif opposé à la brutalité policière, online:   <http://repertoire.crac-kebec.org/?q=cobp>. 
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aim is achieved by engaging in community legal education with, for and by people who are 
targeted by police; lobbying efforts and advocacy; publishing newsletters; and engage in 
policies. In spite of these other efforts, the primary function of Copwatch remains foot 
patrolling neighbourhoods; the targeted focus is the behaviour of individual institutional law 
enforcement officers; the instruments used to achieve this regulatory aim are video cameras 
or camera phones used to collect footage of police engaging in their duties; and the desired 
outcome is to ―empower folks to become copwatchers ... to watch the police on their own.‖364 
Members of Copwatch have been instrumental in reconfiguring case law on bystanders:   
filming police interventions directly addresses some of the needs and expectations of the 
street community.  In a number of jurisdictions, despite on-going detentions and arrests for 
filming police,365 charges of interference have been dropped, copwatchers acquitted, and 
police officers reprimanded.366   
Imagined within the Shot/Reverse framework, when members of Copwatch perceive 
police through their camera as part of a larger counter-surveillance project, they are 
attempting to upset the objective/subjective, surveillance/resistance dyad.   They perform a 
synoptic gaze, as the people acting for and on behalf of targeted groups in order to enact 
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 For instance, in Quebec City, a man was forced to spend a night in a holding cell for having taken pictures of 
police while they intervened in a brawl outside a bar: Jean-François Néron, "Périlleux de photographier des 
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judgment by the ‗many‘ over the ‗few.‘367 Copwatchers directly confront formal law‘s gaze 
which bestows the status of ‗watcher‘ on state-based bureaucratic actors.  They return the 
gaze directed at street-involved people and other marginalized groups and redirect it toward 
institutional actors.     
In this sense, their counter-gaze is within the orbit of the empirical-positivist legal 
pluralist project of ethnographically recording and ultimately transforming the interplay within 
and between legalities.  Their practices are intended as resistance to state-articulated law by 
confronting it with an alternative normative regime and through localized modes of social 
regulation.368  
Their aim is normative: to create the conditions in which police will be accountable 
when they transgress the shared values and expectations of interactions on the street.  If 
individual officers believe that they are constantly being watched and will be objects of 
judgment, they may internalize Copwatch‘s gaze, incorporate that self-monitoring in their 
daily practices, and ultimately transform the ways in which they relate to the street 
community.  Further, taking on the identity of copwatcher, individuals emerge as experts who 
reject or at least displace state law‘s authority over city spaces, over their community and 
over themselves.   
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As in the Shot/Reverse, the model of governance endorsed by Copwatch is one that 
functions to both complement and complicate the relation between the ‗observer‘ and 
‗observed.‘  Copwatch performs its alternative normative regime to the police‘s through its 
own methods of dispute resolution: empowering individual members of the community to 
evaluate and judge acceptable and non-acceptable behaviour in public spaces.  The 
perception of each member of Copwatch may be organized by positioning herself as ‗not the 
other‘, when the actions of actors amount to misuse of the power conferred to them by the 
state. And yet, because ―eliminating police brutality is not the same thing as eliminating 
police,‖369 the ultimate goal is that these shared values and expectations will coincide with 
those of the individuals empowered by the state to regulate public space. 370  
The broader impact of such tactics is ultimately contingent upon the normative 
universe of the individual target rather than the person attempting to enforce a particular 
norm.  For instance, one Montreal copwatcher found that her experience filming officers has 
varied from being greeted with a wave and a smile to being charged and arrested for an 
obstruction offence.371  As a result, when limited to a confrontational mode, the Reverse shot 
or the counter-gaze that Copwatch performs holds limited potential as a critical pluralist 
hypothesis of street law.  Namely, it does not take into consideration whether individual 
police officers – with complex lives, shifting commitments that vary with their own location 
along vectors such as race, class, gender and sexuality, their prior normative intentions, their 
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aspirations and commitments, and the varying degrees to which they are dependent on their 
employment - may actually reflect the normative expectations of individual members.  
Further, as laudable and necessary as it is to halt or dismantle relations of violence, 
and to attend to vulnerable groups who are scarred by oppressive interactions with police, 
counter-surveillance misses the point that often, the most flagrant gestures of violence are 
marked by the lack of agency of the person who enacts them.372  For instance, while I was 
unable to secure an official interview with any member of the Montreal police force,373 other 
research indicates that police officers are exposed to a host of health and safety risks 
(including assault and homicide) and that the dynamics of many of their daily interactions put 
enormous stress on their interpersonal relationships.374   
Finally, ‗returning the gaze‘, as effected by some copwatchers, may reinforce and 
reinscribe the regulation, and the values that inform it – domination, confrontation and 
suspicion - that anti-poverty, new media and other activist groups attempt to destabilize and 
dissimulate. In the end, it seems that the belief that recasting the gaze will deter police 
brutality and other injustices may actually reinforce the panoptical and synoptical norms of 
                                                                
372
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surveillance anti-poverty activists want to uproot: skepticism and violence.  At its most plain, 
the democratization of surveillance may simply mean more surveillance for everyone.375  
The question then becomes what conditions would enable or further police officers‘ - 
as individuals who serve a social function (enforcement) and who respond to society‘s 
expectation that they will fulfill that function – ability to perceive and respond to street-
involved people as the complex, caring, judicious, compassionate, and responsible legal 
agents society needs them to be.  Put differently, how can we create environments in which 
police may interpret interactions such that they can exploit a broad range of governance 
instruments, re-imagine their profession as mediating deferring to the expertise of those most 
affected by street law‘s exigencies, and perform their role as part of a long-standing tradition 
of dialogue (rather than exogenously imposed rules and constraints) and resolution (rather 
than the conflict between two normative orders).  Only when we take police in a counter shot 
that also grants them full humanity (with the ability and often the desire to perceive street-
involved people also as complex, caring, competent, and responsible legal agents who 
deserve to be treated with dignity) will interactions between these multiple generators of 
street law resemble relationships organized around values other that confrontation.   
To return to an earlier point, in the context of multiple normative assertions, the 
fundamental issue, it seems, is less whether or not a community can make normative claims.  
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Rather, the concern should be whether other communities, other jurisdictions will defer to 
their judgment, endorse it, and render it as though it were their own.376 It is in this respect 
that Copwatch – often considered a fringe anarchist group that may not represent shared 
normative commitments - loses much of its transformative potential.  Other endeavours by 
communities who, by virtue of their collaborative nature, broader demographics, and plurality 
of governance objectives, may, as I discuss below, hold a more radical potential.   
 
REVERSE SHOT AS INTER-SUBJECTIVE DIALOGUE  
 
 
Another related mode of Shot/Reverse is performed through the Rapport d’abus et de 
discrimination (RADIS) which aims to have street-involved people document cases of police 
violence. The pilot project emerged from RAPSIM‘s mobile clinic which was designed to 
officially intervene in the judicialization of street-involved people at the level of the municipal 
courts.377 The Clinique Droits Devant (CDD) provides legal information and support for 
individuals who wish to contest tickets relating to the use of public space.378  Clinique Droits 
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Devant organizers are clear that in an ideal scenario, few if, any street-involved people would 
ever be forced to navigate the formal judicial sphere for matters relating to basic sustenance 
and survival.  
The ultimate normative aim for RAPSIM, CDD and RADIS, then, is broader structural 
changes in terms of an entrenched right to social housing, a national policy on homelessness 
and the reattribution of full citizenship to street-involved people.379  In the interim, the clinic 
functions both to further such idealist aims through more pragmatic interventions.  To this 
latter end, through the clinic, the RADIS project emerged in response to widespread 
complaints of police misconduct and abuse and the perception among street-involved people 
that formal and officially recognized regulatory bodies380 were either unwilling, or unable, to 
hold police accountable for misconduct. 381 Moreover, according to RAPSIM, features of the 
formal administrative process make it practically inaccessible for street-involved people: it is 
time-consuming, has stringent deadlines, is non-anonymous (and leaves complainants 
vulnerable to backlash from other officers) and is organized around a mediation process that 
(for all intents and purposes) forces a victim to confront an aggressor.  As a result, street-
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involved people will often tolerate police misconduct and in fact consider it an intrinsic aspect 
of their current situation.382   
RADIS‘ objectives are threefold. First, it monitors and documents the actions of 
individual state-empowered regulatory agents. Working within the definition of discrimination 
and abuse as written in Quebec‘s police code of ethics,383 individuals fill out reports regarding 
their experiences of police misconduct, including verbal aggression, the refusal to file a 
complaint, intimidation, illegal searches, and sexual assault. Researchers will develop a 
taxonomy  of these offenses to generate quantitative data of the same nature that led to the 
findings of the Commission des droits -- that police have been, and continue to engage in, 
social profiling.  For this purpose, its second goal is to effect substantive policy changes.  Its 
third aim is to render police accountability more accessible and to generate conditions in 
which the street community may eventually develop new relationships with official legal 
actors.   
What the project does achieve is a sense among street-involved people that they are 
actively engaged in a formal legal process, which for the most part, they consider foreign, 
inaccessible and ineffectual.  When individuals actually participate in decisions that affect 
them directly, Nedelsky notes, they are ―less likely to relinquish their autonomy as they 
accept the benefits or control of the state.‖384 Specifically, while the project relies on the 
official police definitions of misconduct, it also invites street-involved people to evaluate, 
refine, expand or reject those official definitions that go against their conceptualization of 
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respectful relationships between multiple street-users. It also provides a venue through which 
street-involved people can feel that they are the appropriate authority on what constitutes a 
breach of those norms. RADIS is a means through which street-involved people can engage 
in agential practices and autonomous actions in ways that are not merely ‗in response to‘ 
formal regulation by the state.  Insofar as they develop a sense of confidence by following 
their own values despite discriminatory police practices, and in addition to the new relations 
that may be developed with other official state-based legal agents (such as clerks, lawyers, 
and judges), street-involved people are legal agents.385  
In building an archive of oppressive interactions, street-involved people‘s direct 
engagement with formalized legal structures may well rescue their everyday realities from the 
common sense ‗habits of mind‘ that individualize (blame) rather than singularize (morally 
perceive) the complexities and contradictions inherent to their life situations.386   Street law is 
imagined then in terms of conditions in which street-involved people not only returning law‘s 
gaze (in counter shot).  They recast the shot entirely.  They assess the representation of 
themselves that the official legal system and its institutionally empowered actors prescribe.  
They interpret it. They embody and appropriate their identity as legal agents.387   
Then again, there is no guarantee that such bureaucratic performances will promote 
street-involved people‘s autonomy; they can transgress and reaffirm normative identities that 
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continually crisscross, reinforce or invalidate one another.388 That is to say, street-involved 
people may emulate legal agents and leave traces of their life histories (through for instance 
the paper trail they leave within the municipal courts) in a system that they experience as 
oppressive while never fully embodying the socio-cultural ideals of that formal and 
institutionalized normative order.  To Butler such agential formations ―take place only upon 
the acceptance of guilt‖ which is self-attributed and submissive of formal and official law‘s 
demand for conformity.389  Put otherwise, the transgressive performance of alternative legal 
identities (as rights bearers, as advocates and as legal experts, for instance) for street-
involved people can only emerge once they have submitted to formal law‘s authority.  
 That being said, RADIS does more than assist people in adopting the form and 
processes of formal institutionalized law.  It fosters conditions in which they can appropriate 
oppressive forms and processes, turn them on their heads, and use them to their own 
purposes in ways that enable them to construct new modes of legal consciousness and 
different images of themselves.  
 
BEYOND POLICE SURVEILLANCE  
 
Copwatch and RAPSIM both engage in counter-surveillance tactics primarily directed 
at state-based legal actors and especially the police.  Street-involved people experience and 
engage in governance of multiple natures and magnitudes and, conversely, in ways that are 
far more invidious and even mundane than overt police practices in the public space.  Law‘s 
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gaze is not limited to state-sanctioned power.  Indeed, who is permitted ‗to look‘ is not only 
regulated by individual police and judges: it is governed through the heuristics of gender, 
race, and class.390  Critical engagement with surveillance must, as a result, acknowledge 
how these vectors inform interactions in multiple normative (and surveillant) orders.   
Surveillance interweaves and is distributed through chains of institutions.  Importantly, 
different actors engage in multiple interactions in and through these institutions -- whether 
these are cooperative, managerial, representational, literal, interpersonal, or ritualistic.   The 
relationship between governance, surveillance and street-involved people must be 
understood as situational, contextual and historical.  Otherwise it will not account for the 
multiple ways, and vantage points from which, surveillance is not only contested, but 
generated, appropriated, and diffused.391  Sadly, even RADIS, as interesting as it is as an 
alternative normative structure, intervenes far less into these other dialectics of surveillance 
that do not involve state or quasi-state (such as private security) actors.  Consequently, as 
noted above, the resistant legal agencies RAPSIM encourages street-involved people to 
perform may be limited.  These new subjectivities emulate those of formal legal actors: 
‗responsible‘ and ‗active‘ litigants within a hegemonic structure.   
This critique aside, it cannot be overstated that the alternative legal performances and 
enunciations performed by street-involved people can have an impact on legal 
consciousness.  Nevertheless, the Close-up, as I argue below, may provide ways of 
symbolizing the more implicit, informal modes of performances and thereby edge us into 
more meaningful alternative modes of governance.       
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2.3.3 STREET LAW AS CLOSE-UP  
 
According to some scholars and activists, our current urban space is one that is 
marked as beyond the exercise or aspiration for justice.  The ―problem lying on our sidewalk‖ 
in the post-justice city is addressed by formal and bureaucratic legal regulation of street-
involved people, especially through the application of legislation that penalizes certain ways 
of being in public spaces.392   
Panhandling - the paradigmatic face-to-face interaction between street-involved 
people and their interlocutors – is explicitly regulated in the post-justice city through 
legislation.  In Quebec393 and in Canada394  there are provincial and municipal laws that 
restrict how, when, and where panhandling can occur.  Some of the shared understandings 
within critical socio-legal scholarship include: first, formal laws against panhandling reinforce 
dominant class and race interests; second, they are veiled attempts at reinstating federal 
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street-involved people.  For instance, a judge refused to find an accused guilty of loitering because his request 
for spare change had a clear purpose (rather than being ‗idle activity‘) R. v. Longston 96-131 Province of 
Quebec, District of Montreal, C.M.M: 194-161-311. The challenge for anti-poverty scholars and activists in 
Montreal has been to establish how the formal law produces and affirms the identity ‗panhandler‘ and especially 
‗aggressive panhandler‘ without explicitly targeting street-involved people requesting donations. See, for 
instance: Bellot et al., (Judiciarisation), supra note 308.   
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 Calgary, Edmonton, Halifax, Hamilton, Kingston, Oshawa, Ottawa, Saskatoon, Sudbury, Quebec City, 
Winnipeg, Vancouver and Victoria have implemented by-laws against panhandling on or near city streets and 
especially ‗obstructive‘ solicitation.  Ontario and British Columbia have also enacted similar provincial 
legislation.  Consequently, federal criminal law may not be the most visible form of official law but it is often 
discursively-wielded as a threat by formal and informal legal actors (interview with Yann on file with author).  
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vagrancy laws;395 third, the formal legal apparatus serves to reinforce the validity and the 
enforcement of these discriminatory rules.396 
As a result, the creation of new ‗status‘ offences‘ in provincial and municipal law 
(specifically panhandling but also loitering, jaywalking or sleeping in public places) and the 
selective enforcement of such legislation are used in ways that judicialize and criminalize 
street-involved people.  Anti-panhandling legislation, then, is one of the most powerful 
symbolizations of governance in the post-justice city.   When challenging such legislation, 
anti-poverty groups tend to deploy rights discourse: anti-panhandling laws offend the rights 
and freedoms enshrined in the Charter and international documents and protocols that 
express similar values.397   
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 See: Ledwith, supra note 161; Munroe, supra note 161.  While the federal provisions regulating vagrancy were 
struck down in 1972, loitering remains an offence under the Criminal Code of Canada:  Heywood, supra note 
161. Anti-loitering and other vagrancy type laws are used (according to some instrumentalist leftist critiques) 
against particular populations (poor people, radicalized people, new Canadians for instance) and in ways that 
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Canada (Halifax: Fernwood, 2006).  
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 The Ontario Court of Appeal and British Columbia Supreme Court have upheld such legislation was 
challenged as ultra vires but ultimately upheld as constitutional: Banks, supra note 297 (panhandling was 
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and Federated, supra note 297 (non-obstructive panhandling is a means of providing basic sustenance and falls 
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than the conduct under its valid jurisdiction over the regulation of movement and traffic on the streets). Indeed, 
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from the view that law is compartmentalized, and discrete.  Litigation challenging such laws‘ validity is often 
framed within a discourse of jurisdictional transgressions, the doctrine of ultra vires.  For instance in Banks, 
applicants argued that Ontario‘s Safe Streets Act (1999) S.O. 1999 c. 8  is ultra vires the province as it 
reinstates vagrancy offences (and is therefore in conflict with federal jurisdiction over criminal law).  Davina 
Cooper argues against projects that reinforce boundaries on institutional activity through the legal concept ultra 
vires.  It normalizes, she argues, ―the need for and capacity to achieve a division of political power.‖  The 
doctrine should be set aside as a political mechanism or mode of bottom-up resistance, accordingly, in favour of 
practices that permit ―governing out of order.‖‘ These may destabilize entrenched hierarchies (between upper 
and lower courts for instance) based on the principles of political realities, responsibility, clarity, and innovation: 
Cooper (Out of Order), supra note 131 at 163-65.  
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 In Federated, panhandling was held to be a means through which street-involved people ―engage with the 
rest of society about their plight:‖ ibid at p. 151.  Panhandling was, as a consequence, protected speech.  
However because the by-law did not impose a complete restriction on the message individual panhandlers were 
attempting to deliver (but rather only imposed restrictions on when and how the request for alms might occur), 
the prohibition did not amount to a violation to s. 2 of the Charter: at para 180. In terms of equality rights, 
poverty is not considered an immutable characteristic that would engage section 15 of the Charter.  Others 
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Insightful and important as this work has been on questions of institutionalized power 
and other hierarchies embedded in the regulation of the panhandling event, it has at times 
also reproduced – sometimes for purely pragmatic purposes - a conventional, instrumentalist 
view of law.  Law is, according to this view, reified as state-imposed or judicially-enacted and 
either instantiated in written text or embodied in the actions of police officers.  It is something 
wielded against the poor (by people with social, economic and cultural capital); it is therefore 
beyond their grasp.  Law is not, consequently, a series of processes and knowledges that 
street-involved people may themselves also already generate.398   
While I take seriously Patricia Williams‘ caution against dismissing the work of anti-
poverty scholars and activists as equivalent to a fool‘s errand,399  above I have turned to the 
Aerial Viewpoint to help us visualize how such pragmatic approaches to law may fail to 
consider the other normative sites through which we govern and are governed in all our 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
have tried, with rare success, to rely on criminal defenses or justifications (e.g., necessity, mental illness or 
duress): R. v. Creighton [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3 (poverty and homelessness do not meet the requirements of the 
necessity defense).  Still others look to international law for guidelines on how to address political, social and 
economic inequality in which street-involvement is embedded: Margo Young et al., eds., Poverty Rights, Social 
Citizenship and Legal Activism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007).  
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 There is, of course, considerable critical engagement with ‗rights discourse‘ or the reliance on particular 
conceptualizations of rights. Patricia Williams succinctly recounts the critique of rights theory that emerged from 
Critical Legal Studies: rights are indeterminate, contradictory, reified and of limited value as decisive in social 
behaviour. This now familiar view of rights is, to Williams, very different for racialized people, for whom 
―relationships are frequently dominated by historical patterns of physical and psychic dispossession‖; 
entrenched rights therefore remain of fundamental importance to ―blacks, other minorities, and the poor‖: 
Patricia Williams, "Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights" (1978) 22 Harvard Civil 
Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 410 [hereinafter, Williams (Alchemical)]. Martha Minow makes a claim for an 
interpretive framework that grounds rights in a process of communication and the construction of meaning 
instead of in abstract or enduring foundational propositions: Martha  Minow, "Interpreting Rights: An Essay for 
Robert Cover" (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 1860.  Jennifer Nedelsky proposes a radicalized inter-subjective 
conception of rights (rights as relationships or a ―dialogue of democratic accountability‖) as an alternative to the 
view that rights are a trump on state power: (Rights), supra note 71.  For other attempts at imagining ―post 
liberal conceptions of rights‖, see generally:  Austin Sarat & Thomas Kearns, Identities, Politics and Rights 
(Anne Arbour: University of Michigan Press 1995) at xv. Finally, Wendy Brown has succinctly charted out ―the 
conundrums of rights‖ as a means of articulating inequality and oppression in liberal States: "Suffering the 
Paradoxes of Rights " in Wendy Brown & Janet Halley, eds., Left Legalism / Left Critique (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2002) 420. 
399
 Such an attitude, she argues, ―gives the courthouse scenario a cast not just of subservience but of futility" 
and is ―locked‖ in a ―refutation of formalist legal scholarship:‖ Williams (Alchemical), ibid at 413. 
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dynamic life spheres.  I have also turned to the Shot/Reverse to reframe modes of 
governance that are informed by confrontation in terms of relationships and the often 
conflicting normative expectations and commitments we embody as individuals navigating 
institutions.  Here, I rely on the Close-up to consider how an encounter between two human 
beings on the street - the communicative event called panhandling - engages our ‗own laws,‘ 
in Nedelsky‘s terms.400  I argue that the moral frameworks and personal values (as inflected, 
circumscribed, and constituted through discourses) that we draw on during our moments of 
interaction facilitate and burden the ways in which we relate to one another.  These 
conceptual and affective structures also enable us to constitute a self with which we can 
live.401   
To say that we constitute street law through our interactions is not to deny that for 
people who panhandle, the limited version of ‗street law‘ (the application of governance 
instruments such as the criminal, provincial and municipal laws as enforced by police and 
other state authorities) is an acutely felt visible and permanent force that can and is deployed 
to demobilize and marginalize street-involved people.  This, to me, is without doubt.  The 
figure of the vagrant has been imagined and re-imagined over centuries in legislation as 
transient, as tramp, and, more recently, as panhandler.402  The symbolization and visual 
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 In her critical engagement with the liberal conception of ‗autonomy‘, Jennifer Nedelsky argues that it is not a 
quality that ―one can simply posit about human beings‖ but rather, being autonomous requires the ability to 
―develop and sustain the capacity for finding our own law‖ and therefore the relationships and personal 
practices that may ―foster that capacity:‖ (Autonomy), supra note 223 at 7. 
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 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989) at 3.  
402
 The figure of the ‗aggressive panhandler‘ has been formally embedded and instantiated in legislation geared 
toward ―obstructive solicitation.‖ This is not to argue that the figure of the aggressive panhandler was created 
through legislation.  Nevertheless, it raises the question of the mutually constitutive relation between the formal 
instantiation and the meaning attached to the daily negotiations by people who are referred to, represented as, 
or identify with the word ‗panhandler‘.  Indeed, as noted earlier, while in Montreal no legislation explicitly 
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image of the vagrant stands in for the harm of disorder, incivility, and threat of the stranger to 
the safety of citizens. When institutionalized into a formal anti-panhandling rule system, such 
symbols work (as suggested by the post-justice metaphor for the city) in ways that particular 
people are regulated and excluded.  As street-involved people, their exclusion is not only 
from the sedentary (propertied, housed) community. They are denied access and uses of 
public spaces; they are often denied the possibility of even being in public.403  
To symbolize street law and its ‗subjects‘ through explicit, written norms emanating 
directly from the political State is but one way of establishing a legal identity subjected to 
regulation404 Here we can think of the panhandler or the aggressive panhandler depending 
on the text‘s limits and exigencies.405 Anti-panhandling legislation is a discursive practice that 
enacts and produces that which it describes and names.406 It is a performative: a ritual 
constituted through repetition which can never be ―fully determined‖ a priori but which occurs 
nonetheless within structures informing the ―shape‖ of its production.407  These structures are 
in turn informed by a multitude of discursive formations that circulate about and around 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
regulates panhandling, without doubt, particular individuals who engage in requests for spare change are 
targeted by police for such activities.   
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 See generally: Janet Mosher, "The Shrinking of the Public and Private Spaces of the Poor" in Joe Hermer & 
Janet Mosher, eds., Disorderly People: Law and the Politics of Exclusion in Ontario (Halifax: Fernwood Press, 
2002) 41; and Prashan Ranasinghe & Mariana Valverde, ―Governing Homelessness Through Land-use: A 
Sociolegal Study of the Toronto Shelter Zoning By-Law" (2006) 31:3 Canadian Journal of Sociology 325. 
404
 Compare such legislation to another written instrument of governance, the personal identification number.  
To Mohr, it establishes a subject to be monitored, but also, and ―more significantly,‖ constitutes the identity of 
the ―acting subject‖ who is empowered to engage in contracts.  The signature, while similar to the PIN in that it 
also ascribes identity, includes the active intervention of the human hand, the learned, repetitive act of signing 
one‘s name.  While the artifact (one‘s name written by hand) itself is always different, there exist enough 
similarities in each expression to establish one‘s identity with legal certainty: Mohr, supra note 331 at 39.  
405
 Some provincial legislation and municipal by-laws limit when and where any requests for change may occur 
(constituting the legal person ‗panhandler‘) while others add limitations on to how it may occur (constituting the 
legal person ‗aggressive panhandler‘). Most legislation has been amended to include an exception that 
solicitation will be exempt from regulation where it has been authorized pursuant to the relevant Charities Act.  
See for instance: City of Winnipeg By-Law No. 6555/95, The Panhandling By-law (26 January 1995), s. 2.  
406
 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive LImits of 'Sex' (New York: Routledge, 1993) at 13. 
407
 Ibid. 
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street-involvement, of which few emerge from the street community itself or through direct 
engagement with the people most affected by vagrancy-type legislation. Such documents are 
symbolic as well as a material entities: they represent as they archive particular legal 
subjects.408  
On de Certeau‘s view, law disciplines by ‗writing on‘ our bodies through such 
formalized instantiations (in addition to the more overt instruments ―from the police bludgeon 
to the dock‖).409  To this end, human flesh becomes a ‗body‘ ―by means of tools:‖ discourse 
and definitional practices.410  But as Elizabeth Grosz elaborates, through certain modes of 
―engraving,‖ the body becomes a text producing ―networks of meaning and social 
significance … as meaningful and functional ‗subjects‘ within social ensembles.‖411  The 
relation between body and subjectivity is accordingly more multilateral than de Certeau‘s 
analysis suggests; similarly, his view of law as limited to the workings of the criminal law 
ignores the ―manifestation of law in everyday dealings between citizens.‖412 
The normative expectations and commitments organized through legislative 
symbolizations are not merely imposed ideological categories.413  The two people involved in 
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 On how other physical objects (such as identity documents and the data they contain) also constitute legal 
identities, see: Mohr, supra note 331. 
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 Michel de Certeau, "Tools for Body Writing" (1988) 21/22 Intervention 7 at 9. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1994) at 117. 
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 Mohr, supra note 331 at 38.  
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 On discourse generally, see: Sara Mills, Discourse: the New Critical Idiom (New York: Routledge, 1997); 
Smith, supra note 83. ‗Discourse‘ supports a range of definitions and functions but is most commonly 
associated with speech (to dialogue) and narratology (the principles governing how a story is told).  Pêcheux‘s 
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de discours (Paris: Dunod, 1969). I use discourse here as a social phenomenon, as a system of thought and 
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‗truths‘ through relations of power-knowledge. Foucault‘s historical method is premised on the view that systems 
of thought and knowledge (discursive formations) are governed by conventions that stretch beyond those of 
grammar or logic.  Discourses operate through the rules and structures that produce particular utterances or 
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the panhandling moment both rely on, respond to, reconfigure and deploy discourses and 
negotiate discursive constraints through their interaction.  Therefore, to the extent that the 
institutionalized criminal law and penal law remain highly sensed in street-involved peoples‘ 
lives, they should not be, merely by reference to their source, mode or form alone (state-
based, explicitly enacted, written documents), be granted more critical attention than other 
aspects, sites, or instruments of street law. 
During the panhandling encounter, the possibility of a (potentially asymmetrical) 
relationship opens up, one which requires both individuals to negotiate how to manage their 
identity and to assess their normative commitments to the ‗other‘ with whom each person 
finds him- or herself in face to face interactions. The shifting agreements that can proliferate 
through interactions between two people can confront the official / formal law which desires a 
written text to assign identifiable bodies to particular roles and responsibilities.414 
I suggest that we consider street law - as generated through interactions between 
multiple street users - through the Close-up rather than through the legal identities encrypted 
in formal, written norms emanating from the State.  Through the Close-up, we can begin from 
the view that in the panhandling moment, more often than not, the interacting subjects 
adhere to different normative references than those instantiated in anti-panhandling 
legislation.  The Close-up permits us to advance the perception of both agents of the 
panhandling moment as singular beings in a momentary and perhaps on-going relationship 
without resorting to tired stereotypes that continue to cast the social and economic features 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
texts, the modes of conceptions that structure how we think and what we believe in particular contexts: Michel 
Foucault, Archeology of Knowledge trans. by A.M. Sheridan Smith (London: Tavistock Publications Ltd., 1972).  
414
Bruno Latour, The Making of Law: An Ethnography of the Conseil d’État trans. by Marina Brilman & Alain 
Pottage (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010) at 294. See also: Mohr, supra note 331. 
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of street-involvement (e.g. under-employment and lack of access to housing) as individual 
pathologies whether cast as moral frailty, bad lifestyle choices, or markers of deviance.415  
 
THE CLOSE-UP   
 
Formally, the Close-up emphasizes details; it subordinates space and exteriority to 
time and affect.416 Consequently, in established film theory, a Close-up of the human face 
can be read as a text that suggests something about the character‘s ‗interiority,‘ her 
subjectivity.417 As a technique that inspires us to turn our mind to personal experiences and 
emotions, it can enhance ―our ability to learn what fosters and constitutes autonomy.‖418   The 
Close-up nevertheless has been critiqued as a mode of voyeurism and objectification and 
violence.419  According to one view, unlike other cinematographic techniques, the Close-up 
cares little for the rules of perspectival realism and is one of the most obvious cinematic 
techniques designed especially for the spectator.420  The proximity afforded by the Close-up 
can, for instance, be critical in establishing how those who are located along certain vectors 
of class and race privilege are ―apart‖ from their ‗others.‘421   
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 For a historical analysis of how such stereotypes frame the figure of the ‗tramp‘ in the United States, see: 
Tim Cresswell, The Tramp in America (London: Reaktion Books, 2001).  
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While it can encourage certain forms of objectification, the Close-up can also 
encourage the kind of attention to detail and singularity that can generate greater 
identification and intimacy.  To Deleuze, the Close-up, of the face especially, is the ―affection-
image.‖422  It summons affective responses.  As a ―type of image and component of all 
images,‖ the Close-up allows spectators to see what is usually not seen: it ―expresses in a 
free way all kinds of tiny local movements which the rest of the body usually keeps 
hidden.‖423  As conventionally a tight shot, often of someone‘s face, the Close-up allows the 
camera to take an intense pause, to linger more closely and for a longer duration than what 
is normatively appropriate in relations between strangers.424  
Accordingly, objectification, such as that afforded through the Close-up, can advance 
meaningful communication; we should not ask ourselves whether the Close-up objectifies.  
We should ask ourselves how it does so, and, to what effect.425 The Close-up stands in for 
the perspective of the panhandler‘s other, the ‗askee,‘ the person of who a donation is 
requested. I suggest that rather than relying on externally imposed definitions of panhandlers 
as instantiated in written legislation, the Close-up permits the askee to consider her own 
normative expectations of that relationship based on her interactions with her ‗askor‘.  
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 Deleuze works from Eisenstein‘s view that Close-ups summon affective readings of film. Deleuze (Cinema 
One), supra note 121 at 87.  
423
 Ibid.  at 88. 
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 SYMBOLIZING THE PANHANDLING MOMENT AS CLOSE-UP  
   
 Despite claims that in their current configuration, cities are no longer constituted in 
ways that make ―contiguity and face-to-face contact‖ as paramount as in the constitution of 
the ‗modern‘ city,426 panhandling persists as a face-to-face communicative event that occurs 
in shared urban spaces.427 People who work the panhandle whether cyclically, more 
systematically or for survival, reach out to other urban subjects, often of different normative 
positioning (or who are perceived as such) and request by gesture, speech, or text spare 
change for personal use.  
 The panhandling interaction most frequently occurs in places that bear both the 
markers of circulation and mobility and correspondingly those of immobility and stagnation: 
the roadway, the sidewalk, and near subway stations.428  It is an encounter that is informed 
by street-involved people‘s specific temporal and spatial frameworks, woven into individuals‘ 
daily routines of circulating through the city and the institutional and administrative networks 
that may organize their time.  The norm against aggressive panhandling as instantiated in the 
formal and official law is the social norm most commonly articulated by street-involved people 
during interviews. There is also a shared understanding that such behaviour on the part of 
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Akhil Gupta & James Ferguson, "Beyond ‗Culture‘": Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference" (1992) 7:1 
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 Bauman makes a metaphorical distinction between tourists (mobile and economically secure) and the 
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Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).  On 
the tension implicit in the relationship ―of stasis to mobility‖ in urban communications, see: Straw (Circulatory), 
supra note 326.  
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street-involved people (i.e. requests for change that may elicit fear or unease from their 
clientele) are rare and often provoked by violent speech or acts from their interlocutors.429 
Finally, people panhandle for complex reasons embedded in personal circumstance and 
conditions of personal agency; for example, it may be—and often is-- a temporary income-
generating activity.430   
 While people tend to disagree as to the ‗causes‘ of panhandling, it seems that 
irrespective of one‘s particular ideologies or belief structures, there is a general norm that, at 
the very least, it is undesirable to live in a society where begging is a person‘s only possible 
mode of sustenance.431  The panhandling moment is always mediated by our beliefs, fears 
and desires in regard to the ‗other.‘  Consequently, to answer the question, how can we strive 
for street law that facilitates conditions in which panhandling is no longer a necessary option 
for the most vulnerable citizens, we must first be able to view the panhandler not as a figure 
but as a singular human being.    
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That is, a person who receives a request for change is invited, though perhaps only 
momentarily, into a relationship with the person making the request.  At its best, this 
interaction involves enough proximity to foster conditions of mutual recognition by both social 
actors: each requesting to be truly seen in their singularity.432 According to the street-involved 
people I have interviewed, panhandling is an important form of social interaction for 
themselves and for their clients.  To this end, I agree with Hermer‘s notion of the panhandling 
moment as a ―gift encounter‖ that summons a sentiment of reciprocity between the askor and 
the askee.433  At its worst, panhandling may be a violent confrontation that may produce new 
modalities of racism, classism, and xenophobia.434  The panhandling moment is a normative 
event which inspires questions around the tensions between social hierarchy, objective 
structures, and social forms on the one hand, and individual autonomy, subjectivity and 
creativity, on the other.   
Whether or not the askee believes giving change is a beneficent act (in ethical 
theory‘s sense of an action intended to benefit and promote the well-being of another) or a 
moral obligation performed for non-obligatory reasons depends on how the interaction falls 
within a matrix of possible relations: as a supererogatory act (going beyond what is required 
of us as moral agents); a strict obligation (founded upon the norms of morality) or a loose 
obligation (based on personal expectations of other human beings).435  
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Ultimately, whether or not she gives spare change will depend on her assessment of 
her interlocutor. The moral judgment of the askor by the askee will be, in part, conditioned by 
history: panhandling and other modes of street level income generation tend to increase 
during times of economic and social upheaval.  They are also conditioned by discursive 
productions of panhandlers that circulate in socio-cultural artifacts, news, and popular 
culture: images of deserving or undeserving poor, of victims of circumstance, or of 
aggressive confidence men,436 of entrepreneurs, and of people marked with immobility and 
deviance.437   Each person to whom a request for spare change is made enacts a moral 
judgment of the person from whom she receives the request.  The Close-up‘s attention to the 
lives of street-involved people, its embodied proximity, and its attention to the singular, 
unique conditions of the askor, can cultivate the kind of evaluation that moral perception 
requires. To Sousa Santos, for instance, being in the ‗near‘ can render the familiar, unfamiliar 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Hume‘s moral-sentiment theory, benevolence is the fundamental principle of human nature: David Hume, 1751, 
An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Tom L. Beauchamp (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998. To Mill, beneficence is measured according to its utility (the greatest good being the foundation of 
morality): John Stuart Mill, Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, J.M. Robson, ed., (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1969).  Kant who is less concerned with beneficence but nonetheless supports it as an aspect of 
leading a moral life: Immanuel Kant, Ethical Philosophy, second edition, James W. Ellington, trans., 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1994).  
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Rancière, The Philosopher and His Poor (Duke University Press, 2004) (philosophy); Patrick Greaney, Untimely 
Beggar (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008) (Mallarme‘s poetry).  To these works, I add Chapter 
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and at the same time, the unknown, known.  It can thus effect a ‗re-enchantment of the 
world.‘438   
The Close-up asks that we see a number of difficult social phenomena: that there are  
‗chronically‘ and ‗invisible‘ homeless people in urban spaces; that people with mental, 
physical and emotional health concerns are left without long-term supports; that every year 
across Quebec and elsewhere in Canada, homeless people die from exposure to extreme 
weather conditions;439 that street-involved women negotiate multiple violences daily – 
whether physical, sexual, or verbal violence directed at them personally or the emotional and 
symbolic violence of having their children taken from them by state authorities; that people 
who live with experiences of institutional or inter-personal oppression and who rely on alcohol 
and other substances to cope with these experience (often in ways that result in harm to 
themselves rather than to others) are the targets of criminal and penal sanctions; that the 
poor and working poor are caught in cycles of crushing debt loads; and that families are torn 
apart by child and welfare decision-making practices that remain embedded in racist and 
colonial mindsets. In short, the Close-up demands that we see street-involvement in terms of 
the breakdown in caring relationships.   
While an askee‘s response to a request for change may vary according to spatio-temporal 
contexts, it is ultimately her assessment of the person with whom she is engaging that will 
lead her to act -- whether out of a desire to alleviate the conditions that make panhandling 
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for man" Free Press online: <http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/local/Security-sought-care-for-
man39255907.html>>. 
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that person‘s most viable life-sustaining option or out of a sense of outrage that she is being 
asked to attend to the needs of another.440  During the askee‘s close assessment of her 
other, she will also be ethically confronted by who it is she believes herself to be.  This 
assessment is equally informed and configured by ideologically- inflected discursive 
productions of herself as ‗panhandler‘s other‘ (through figures such as the hard-working 
taxpayer, the cosmopolites, the flaneurs, the upwardly mobile, and the citizen), encrypted 
with emotions that range from fear, annoyance, discomfiture, through indifference and shame 
to generosity, and empathy.  Ultimately, whether or not she will be compelled to assume 
responsibility for her other and to act on the implicit belief that the well-being of the askor is 
―a precious thing‖ is contingent on her ability to let go of stereotypes and to emotionally 
engage with another human being.441   
To do so, she must first see her interlocutor not as a figure but as an individual toward 
whom indifference is not an ethical option.  Imagining the individual who panhandles as 
though in Close-up goes against practices that formulate particular legal identities and in so 
doing render street-involved people objects of law rather than its agents.  Whereas such 
formal and official processes enable the stakeholders responsible for particular legislative 
enactments to constitute themselves in relation to the ‗panhandler,‘ the Close-up invites her 
to constitute herself  in relation to her moral judgment of the other, thereby drawing attention 
to, rather than reinforcing, the underlying assumptions relied upon in making that judgment.   
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 Jeremy Waldron, "Homelessness and Community" (2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 371 at 379-
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 To Bauman, who draws heavily on Levinas, when we achieve this perception of the other, we take a moral 
stance to endeavour to enhance the other‘s well-being: Zygmunt Bauman, Alone Again: Ethics After Certainty 
(London: Demos, 1994) at 18. 
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The Close-up helps express some of the conceptual structures that govern 
interactions on the street in much more immediate and everyday ways than anti-panhandling 
legislation and their application. Such categories of thought range from the powerful to the 
empowering: fear, a desire to help, a willingness to respect another‘s agential practices - It 
also indicates that when we turn to implicit modes of governing street interactions (rather 
than the external, officially enacted norms), it becomes more evident that any desire to 
reduce suffering and express disapproval of oppressive relations between street users 
cannot be symbolized through municipal and provincial legislative provisions against 
panhandling.442   
Any broad restriction on panhandling (whether as a type of survival and otherwise 
income-generating behaviour) is inimical to the face-to-face practices that already exist 
between street users: those which are built upon notions of proximity, singularity and 
interactions.  The street law that is produced in and through the panhandling event engages 
communicative, economic and moral dimensions of social life.  Like the gift, its regulation 
does not require formal, written symbolizations.  Rather, it requires creating conditions in 
which street users can more meaningfully interact. Given that street-involvement— and 
panhandling by association— stems primarily from the breakdown of relationships, it also 
requires generating conditions in which new modes of communication, new relationships, 
based on reciprocity and inter-subjective understanding can emerge.  When these conditions 
of interaction are achieved, all street users may evaluate and amend their own partial 
perceptions and the frameworks on which they rely when engaging in moral judgments of 
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 As noted earlier, the Supreme Court of Canada has already determined that the Criminal Code is not the 
appropriate governance instrument to meet these goals; as noted above, the vagrancy provisions in Canada 
have been struck down as overbroad: Heywood, supra note 165.  
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their ‗others.‘  In the final subsection, I argue that HomelessNation (HN) attempts to promote 
such conditions by instantiating street law as a Tracking Shot.  
2.3.4 STREET LAW AS TRACKING SHOT  
 
 Until now, I have argued against conceptualizations of street law as always activating 
and reinforcing totalizing logics and hierarchical relations, as always embedded in competing 
rights, or as constituting fixed legal subjectivities.  Instead I suggest that street law is 
dispersed, dialogic, and embodied in interacting individuals.  Street law can therefore be 
apprehended by imagining the governance of and by street-involved people as an Aerial 
Viewpoint, within a Shot/Reverse structure, and in Close-up. Here I deploy the Tracking Shot 
to discuss how HN – which attempts to foster a street community - symbolizes and generates 
street law. 
 HomelessNation is a Montreal-based non-profit organization dedicated to 
―democratizing technology‖ throughout Quebec and elsewhere in Canada.  It offers access to 
the internet443 and training on new media and communications technologies (including e-
mail, video cameras, sound recording equipment and editing software) to street-involved 
people. The overarching goal is to facilitate the street community‘s ability to ―tell their stories 
and have their voices heard‖ through written, audio and video testimonials.444 HN began as a 
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 According to HN‘s ―National Homeless Survey‖ (on file with author), most street-involved people can access 
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differences among street-involved people.   
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 The project was inspired by the photographic images archived by the Farm Security Administration and 
especially the images of migrant workers taken during the dustbowl era which ‗captured‘ the lived reality of rural 
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―street archive,‖ a documentary film project designed to collect, preserve and transmit 
localized histories of the street community.445 Referring to homelessness as a ―national 
disaster,‖ documentary filmmaker Daniel Cross envisioned HN a space that provides ―a class 
of people underrepresented in mainstream media‖ the ―opportunity to create unique and 
poignant works of art.‖446   
 HomelessNation‘s sizeable additional aims include constituting a forum for the ―virtual 
and actual‖ street community to develop a ―national collective voice,‖ to ―change people‘s 
lives,‖ and to ―create dialogue between Canada‘s homeless and mainstream society.‖447  I 
argue that by tracking and archiving interactions on and through the street over time, HN 
generates and embodies street law that is imagined, framed, and communicated by the 
people most concerned with it.  First, it was designed to bring us into ‗homeless spaces‘ in 
ways that the Aerial Viewpoint attends to, but does so from a view ‗on the ground‘ rather than 
from a ‗view from above.‘  Second, it is an archive of interactions which includes but is not 
limited to resisting the reifying power of official legal agents‘ gaze.  Third, the space itself 
mediates between multiple relations of connectedness and otherness, whether as a virtual 
space between the street and the non-street or by way of its moderators who generate 
conditions of dialogue between street-involved and non-street-involved people.   Finally, 
while providing a site through which street-involved people can voice their unique concerns 
(not merely as the objects of their others‘ perception). HN is a medium through which 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
poverty in America: HomelessNation, Homeless Street Archive (Montreal: 2002) at 3 [hereinafter, 
HomelessNation (Archive)].  
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 In relation to his other documentary endeavours, Daniel Cross writes that ―personally and artistically‖ he was 
―tired of cutting out all the stories / characters that don‘t fit into the narrative arch.‖ His aspiration was that the 
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 Ibid. at 2.  
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members of the street community can generate their own laws and the conditions they deem 
necessary for a meaningful exercise of their autonomy and agency through creative acts and 
non-formulaic expressions of normativity.  In so doing, its members go beyond challenging 
pre-existing, received categories about the street and about street law.  They provoke tacit 
legal change by suggesting other ways of imagining how to govern through interactions on 
the street.  It is by performing these functions, that HN generates conditions of multiple 
interpretive possibilities through relationships based on proximity instead of only being based 
on confrontation.  It is also by performing these functions that HN symbolizes street law as a 
Tracking Shot.    
 
 
THE TRACKING SHOT   
 
Andre Bazin‘s cinema of ‗duration‘ refers to an aesthetic upholds the value of realist 
filmmaking practices that retain a sufficient uncertainty of meaning in order to constitute lived 
reality.448  The method he proposed was shots in long takes, shot in depth because the 
essence of the cinematic event becomes ―dependent on the simultaneous presence of two or 
more factors in the action‖.449 The Tracking Shot is a species of long take that permits a long 
depth of field and it corresponds with Bazin‘s desire to respect the autonomy of the subjects 
and objects within the continuous space.  It is an unbroken sequence that preserves spatial 
and temporal unity and invites multiple interpretive possibilities through relations of proximity 
among and between bodies, objects and spaces instead of imposing meaning through 
juxtaposition or confrontation.   
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The mobile camera in tracking can move backwards and forwards, vertically and 
horizontally; it permits viewers to take more time to get a sense of the detailed ways in which 
bodies and objects interact within a particular framing.  Rather than the synthetic and 
abstract spatio-temporal feel of Shot/Reverse sequences, for instance, the Tracking Shot 
allows interactions and actions to develop of their own accord, over a longer time and from 
multiple vantage points (those subjects and objects that are at the front of the frame and 
those which are farther away from the camera and any combination thereof).  Within the 
Tracking Shot, there are always competing meanings, shifting subjects and objects to 
contemplate, movements within movement all vying for the attention of the active and 
engaged audience.  Similarly, rather than fostering relationships between two separate, 
autonomous fields (such as the street vs. the broader public), sites of normativity can be 
conceived through the relationships that occur within and through them, and on different 
planes and in different forms simultaneously.  The Tracking Shot is consequently a powerful 
way of symbolizing law‘s irreducible plurality.   
HomelessNation operates as a Tracking Shot of street law (provides new sights on 
street law‘s sites and modes) and symbolizes street law as a Tracking Shot (it constitutes 
street law in the symbolic register). In the first instance, HN is materially ‗on the ground‘ as it 
comprises a network of moving cameras operated by its members.  Through the camera eye 
which ‗moves among‘ its subjects, people who are not-street-involved are encouraged to 
draw on multitude information sources and get a sense of how relationships on and with 
relation to the street develop and shift over time.  In the second instance, HN is an archive of 
interactions that organizes and provides new information about the specific situation of 
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individual street-involved people as well as the broader ‗street community‘ (a heterogeneous 
social group with many shared experiences, commitments and concerns).   
In the third, HN is motivated to be both medium and mediator, a virtual space where 
assumed boundaries between self and other (or street and non-street) are dissimulated by 
suggesting ways in which we are all governed and governing through a fluid assemblage of 
networks and through our interactions.  Finally, HN advances conditions of agency for street-
involved people.  Rather than assuming that they must respond to official state-based legal 
normativity, its members project ―an imagined future upon reality‖450 through their collected 
footage and performance pieces (such as news bulletins that provide information which is 
directly relevant to street-involved people and satirical commentary on information which is 
deemed less so). Their symbolization of street law moves beyond visual evidence of the 
existence of an alternative normative structure that emerges from the street to instantiating 
street law as irreducibly plural.  
 
HOMELESSNATION AS SITE, SIGHT AND MEDIA OF STREET LAW   
 
HomelessNation was designed to provide a new way of seeing the street which 
simultaneously complements and is qualitatively different from the Aerial Viewpoint.  Rather 
than taking distance and looking from above in order to get a better sense of movements of 
things and bodies or to identify the production of space through new assemblages, the 
mobile camera in the hands of participants conveys ―a feeling of life on the street‖ in ways 
that ―artistically ... immerse the average Canadian into the sights and sounds of the homeless 
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experience‖451 and ultimately ―stimulate a new genre of social documentary.‖452  Non-street-
involved members of HN who access the website are  
… placed in an environment familiar to a homeless person or … confronted with the 
 drone of rush-hour traffic under the Gardiner  Expressway ... the  wail of sirens at 
 Pigeon Park ... scores of discarded needles at  Place Pasteur ... [and] the din of 
 hundreds of men eating soup at the Salvation Army.453   
 
The aim was originally to have ―outreach workers‖ capture sounds and images 
(―accurate video‖ and ―panoramas‖) through their ―direct involvement with people on the 
street.‖ 454  Eventually, street-involved members of HN would generate, after training, their 
own ―recordings of real events, real places and real people.‖455  By moving with members 
through city spaces as mediated by their camera eye, non-street-involved people (―the public 
and institutions‖) would ―explore the spaces lived in by homeless people, to feel the texture of 
what it is to live on the street‖456 and ultimately ―get a virtual feeling of what homelessness is 
all about.‖457  
Some of its discourse unintentionally perhaps reflects the problematic subject-object 
assumptions of early ethnographers.458 Yet, the overall belief is that through the HN site, 
street-involved people will generate new visions of how governance in the city actually occurs 
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and perform their own normative geography.  HN members welcome their interlocutors into 
certain spaces and exclude them from others, thereby producing new spaces and new 
modes of interaction among multiple street users.  Moreover, in moments where street-
involved people explicitly present themselves as subjects in their cinematic mapping of the 
city, they hold themselves up as authoritative participants in and interpreters of the world they 
represent.459  
In the proposal which ultimately lead to the funding required to implement the project, 
HomelessNation is defined as a ‗street archive‘ or a web-based digital memory of and from 
the street. The ‗archive‘ is a trope that conjures up questions around representation and 
interpretation and how these concepts intersect with questions about identity, memory, 
evidence and authenticity.  Furthermore, it incites critical engagement with definitional, 
classifying and containment processes, including those performed in and through law.460 
HomelessNation is not merely a street archive; it is, in the literal sense of the term, a 
documentary archive, ―documenting the voices of homeless Canadians‖461 and their 
interactions in and through the street.  Outreach workers ask whether street-involved people 
want to learn skills, such as: how to document their stories on camera, how to edit audio and 
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video files, and upload files onto the web.  However, in claiming to provide a ―collective 
memory,‖462 HN runs the risk of presenting a homogenized vision of street-involvement or a 
representation which fails to do justice to the diversity of recollections which belong to the 
individuals who are street-involved.   
The footage stored and amassed by outreach workers structures but also limits the 
stories the site will preserve. Like the formal legal processes that define and contain street-
involved people as homeless, the archive of ―homeless voices‖ is not an unambiguous 
collection of ‗facts.‘  Nevertheless, as Derrida claims, every archive is ―revolutionary and 
traditional‖ at once.463 In and of itself, the existence of the street archive problematizes other 
archival-based claims to truth, such as those found in the official, enacted law or in industry-
produced cinematic depictions, by drawing attention to the shallowness or at the very least, 
incompleteness, of these records. Members of the street community have rarely been active 
participants in decision-making processes that directly impact their lives.  They certainly have 
not been consulted around vagrancy type legislation.464 The street archive can operate as a 
corrective to these conditions and showcase individual lives rather than the caricatured 
versions embodied in legislation, research, and even the policies of some help institutions.    
Further, the street archive was created because of its potential as a historical record 
which would contain and convey information over time that might be useful to street-involved 
people in the future.  In this endeavour, the archive has been used to articulate an alternative 
street law which has, to some extent, been incorporated into the official legal order.  For 
instance, the images collected by members in Victoria were used to substantiate the formal 
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legal claims by anti-poverty lawyers that the city‘s bylaws against camping in public violated 
homeless people‘s right to life, liberty, and security of the person.465  The street archive has 
been deployed in ways that puts into sharp relief how the containment of memory in written 
formal law is porous and incomplete.  In so doing, HN also articulates a different expression 
of street law that includes the memories of those individuals coping most with its exigencies.    
Unlike RAPSIM (through the Projet RADIS and the Clinique Droits Devant as 
discussed earlier), HN does not explicitly aim to integrate members of the street community 
into formal legal mechanisms.  Some members support such initiatives (and there is overlap 
between people who are HN members and people who rely on RAPSIM‘s mobile clinic).466 
Others adamantly oppose any mode of negotiation within the formal legal system.467  
HomelessNation’s function, as I elaborate, has become one of mediator between worlds 
rather than that of archivist.  That is, HN has more recently shifted from its expository 
(showing the street) and archival (documenting the voices from the street) aspirations and 
has taken on a life of its own through the practices in which its users engage.  As a result, it 
has more recently began deploying ‖interactivity potential‖468 as between the street 
community, support groups and the broader public.   
HN has circulated some problematic discourse, in the form of ―giving a voice to the 
homeless‖ or assuming that they can ―empower‖469 others which tends to reinforce the view 
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that their constituents are ‗subjects‘ rather than ‗agents.‘  Nevertheless, the values that inform 
how the site has been constructed and how it is used indicate a strong desire on the part of 
outreach workers and moderators to act as conduits and facilitators of dialogue rather than 
as anthropologists or activists.  HN is a material, a virtual, and a symbolic site of street law in 
and through which multiple street law constituents can represent and evaluate their own 
visions of street law. It attempts to bring about this shared outcome by taking on the role of 
host, medium, and mediator.   
On one level, HN positions itself as ‗host,‘ materially creating ―a hospitable 
environment of involvement and inclusion.‖470  In line with Derrida‘s view of hospitality, in 
which the host is constituted by defining and treating the guest as someone who is different 
from herself, the guest in the hospitable relation generated through HN is the street-involved 
person‘s other.471  Through HN, the host-guest relationship is altered subtly. The organization 
is ‗housed‘ in the sense that there is a physical space with an office and computers 
administered both by people who have and have not lived from the street.  It is also ‗being 
housed‘ in the sense that it has furnished community partners with recycled or donated 
computers to set up internet cafes and training sessions within shelters.  Each venue is 
intended as ―a central point for artists, activists and homeless people to interact physically 
(brainstorm, training etc.) in assisting each other to develop unique ways to interact.‖472   
On another level, HN is a virtual space that is moderated by volunteers and staff. It 
provides space for articulating immediate concerns (including a forum to submit information 
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about missing persons), and long term commitments to generate conditions of empowerment 
(information on housing rights and guidelines for health and safety on the street). The HN site 
is, consequently, an instrument of street law.  It has been used as a medium through which 
people enact judgment of policies, practices and individual actors who further entrenched 
social inequities.  By uploading videos commentaries and visual evidence of negative 
interactions, HN members constitute these exchanges as negative and contrary to shared 
beliefs and values.    
Finally, HN aims to relieve some of the tensions that exist between individual street-
involved people and their immediate ‗others‘ – whether other street-involved people, family 
members, service-providers, police - and their more distant ‗others‘ – policy makers, judges, 
and other official decision-makers.  HN does so less by providing space to enact judgment 
and more by taking on the role of mediator. It provides a virtual space designed to promote  
dialogue and negotiation among diverse members of the street community in ways in which 
(ideally) all interacting parties take responsibility for their level of commitment to one another 
and have exchanges that will challenge the boundaries between those who are street-
involved and their real/imagined others.   According to one staff member, it takes on a 
‗facilitative‘ role rather than a ‗directive‘ one:  
We use video and online technologies to give the homeless a voice. We empower and 
act as a vehicle, but do not decide on content/issues. Many people from the street 
community might want to blog about human rights violations, but they may also just 
want to blog about their shitty day or the new dog they got. 473  
 
 In deploying discourse such as ―merging art and technology,‖ ―bridging the gap 
between the rich and the poor,‖ and ―bringing together Canada‘s homeless and mainstream 
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society,‖474 HN embodies Cover‘s conception of law as a conduit between normative ―worlds 
that are‖ and those ―that might be.‖475  At the same time, it re-constitutes the ―‗worlds that 
are.‖  Specifically, members articulate alternative relationships through a social site which 
offers new configurations for interaction that are not present in face-to-face interactions.  As 
Danah Boyd suggests, relationships engendered through social media are increasingly 
organized around persistence (speech acts leave a trace), searchability (community is 
constituted through the search and discovery of ‗like minds‘), replicabilty (through cut and 
paste functions, the original becomes indistinguishable from the ‗copy‘), and invisible 
interlocutors (it is impossible to know who will fall upon specific utterances made in 
networked spaces).476   
HomelessNation embraces social media as a means of complicating and 
fundamentally altering how street-involved people engage as citizens and how they interact 
with one another and with the broader public in two ways.  The people who initially 
conceptualized HN imagined it first as a medium through which street-involved people will 
―access a national community‖ and thereby gain a ―sense of belonging‖ as well as ―control 
[over the] distribution of their own voice and image.‖477  In turn, the ―general public‖ would 
have the opportunity to ―talk directly with homeless people on discussion boards‖ and ―hear 
unique first person stories from the street.‖478 The intended result was normative insofar as 
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HN sought to encourage non-street-involved people ―breakdown‖ any ―stereotypes‖ they 
have about street-involved people.479   
Second, by creating conditions of ―communication‖ through access to the internet, 
according to Daniel Cross (HN‘s founder) ―holds limitless potential and promise‖ and can 
―solve problems in a democracy.‖  He envisioned HN as providing a ―methodology for 
homeless people to take part in public processes.‖480 Darin Barney cautions, through our 
engagement with new and emerging media technologies, and the renewed sense of hope 
they engender, information, communication and participation become surrogates for 
motivation, judgment and democratic action.481  Nevertheless, HN‘s aspirations are in and of 
themselves significant: to persuade its actual, imagined or ideal audience of the legitimacy of 
its members‘ interpretations and claims through inclusive technology; to provide checks on 
abusive or coercive behaviour; to encourage a general ethos of dialogue and respect; to 
generate a space of egalitarianism where all voices, regardless of the status of the person 
making the utterance (whether from the ‗street‘ or not), will be granted equal weight.  These 
aspirations and their symbolization through the HN media are broad ethical principles of just 
conduct, the very kinds of rules generally associated with ‗law.‘    
 Further, HomelessNation has tapped into changes in the social and cultural landscape 
through which the vast majority of urbanites navigate intuitively, using a pastiche of 
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computer-mediated communications through which they make ―offline connections‖ with 
other social actors.482  I argue that through shifts in practice and discourse endorsed and 
performed over time, HN has become a space where street-involved people represent and 
evaluate their own visions of street law.  In its ideal mode, HN embodies Sousa Santos‘ ―neo 
communities‖, the translocal and transtemporal groupings that shatter the street/non-street 
dyad by generating conditions of interchange, common purposes and ultimately 
―intersubjective web[s] of reciprocity.‖483   
Through the sites (the individuals, the physical space, the virtual, and the metaphoric 
space) and sights of HomelessNation (from the street, of the street, of the public, for the 
public, through creativity rather than confrontation), the distinction between users and their 
intended audience is reconfigured as a community of vusers and one that is constantly 
shifting as people move in and out of their roles as content-providers/knowledge producers 
and content-receivers/knowledge consumers.  It is also in the interactions of these multiple 
interpretative communities, as Cover reminds us, that HN members create street law. 
Consequently, it has the potential to favour but also move beyond relations based on 
reciprocity to promote those based on respect, dignity, forgiveness, love, and compassion, or 
in short, the values and aspects of human relationships most advanced through gift 
exchanges. 
 HN is a medium: it creates the space for interlocutors to take the perspective, and 
consequently to evaluate, the normative commitments of street-involved people. Street-
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involved people, in turn, advance their ―own laws‖484 through the narratives they circulate and 
the images they construct with HN. This is not to say that there is a ‗street sub-culture.‘485 If 
we take culture as a set of practices interwoven with all social practices, however, then 
clearly there is a street community.  Each member of HN may well have his or her ‗own laws‘ 
and his or her own normative commitments.  Like any other person‘s, these values are 
constituted by, and graspable through, reference to shared values and norms, including, 
perhaps those of a discrete social group.486 More than returning the gaze on formal legal 
actors or responding to other normative forms and sites, individual members of HN assert 
their jurisdiction to govern interactions on the street, to speak as a community with shared 
normative expectations, endowed with the authority to use, reject, and re-craft official law‘s 
language, form and content, adjudicate when conflicts arise and thereby articulate new 
visions of the future.487 
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2.4 BEYOND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH  
 
 The camera cannot see everything at once but it makes sure not to lose any part of what it 
 chooses to see.488 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that what I call cinematic legal metaphors can be part of 
critical explorations in law: they encourage ways of perceiving that are embodied and 
potentially ethical.  These sights of street law reveal aspects of our existence as urban 
subjects and agents that may not be perceptible in more orthodox symbolizations of street 
law.  I have deployed cinematic legal metaphors to prompt critical engagement with the 
taken-for-granted assumptions about the subjects and the agents of street law that inform 
these more dominant instantiations of street law.  These metaphors were grounded in my 
empirical research on the governance of and by street-involved people.  
 While the use of these plural, overlapping, and sometimes contradictory perspectives 
may seem, as Linda Williams would argue, ―splintered,‖489 these competing interpretations 
are neither inherently nor necessarily intolerant of one another.  On the one hand, each 
mode of perception, as a cinematic device, has its own rules, its own way of embedding 
relationships. On the other, the determining factor for each of the cinematic metaphors I have 
produced is that each can at once seem like an invitation to embrace familiar modes of 
appreciating street law.  Simultaneously, each provides a new focus, a reworking of our 
common assumptions about street law‘s subjects and agents.  
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 These contradictory and partial perspectives allow for a ―constantly recurring 
refraction‖ of interactions on the street.490 When viewed cinematically, street law must be, in 
Laura Marks‘ telling, ―perceived all over again,‖‘ thereby compelling the viewer to choose 
afresh which image of street law or which part of an image of street law remains relevant to 
his or her purposes.491 The cinematic metaphors permit an uncertainty in ways that trigger 
ethical questioning, such as: What is the possibility of caring relations between relative or 
imagined others? Can we be hopeful about the possibility of destabilizing entrenched social 
boundaries?   
 Perceiving street law and its agents from multiple vantage points, as I have done, can 
encourage more pluralist contestations of those aspects of street law that are oppressive. As 
Bazin puts it, no camera angle can fully capture the subject of its gaze.  Each cinematic legal 
metaphor for street law that I suggest presents a different scale; at times each serves similar 
functions; at times they contradict one another.  Nonetheless, taken together they make 
complementary contributions to understanding street law as a complex facet of human life.  
 The Aerial Viewpoint provides a distance from what it being perceived.  It can thus 
bring elements about street-involvement into view that from other, more embedded vantage 
points are more difficult to see the Close-up can sometimes violently confront its perceiver 
with details that make it difficult to ignore the deeply personal nature of street-involvement in 
the context of much broader systemic problems. Nevertheless, as Doane explains in cinema, 
―the detail and enormity, miniature and gigantic, are inextricable‖492 and complement one 
another.  Similarly, the Close-up and the Shot/Reverse work well together insofar as both can 
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consolidate ―humanity as an aspect of subjectivity‖493 – through proximity for the former and 
through dialogue despite difference for the latter.    
 Both the Close-up and the Tracking Shot linger for a longer duration than what is 
appropriate in relations between strangers on the street.  Whereas the former can invite the 
‗perceiver‘ to morally perceive her ‗others‘ (and sometimes as a result to self-reflexively 
evaluate her own normative expectations of herself), the latter upsets assumed delineations 
between self and other (or street and non-street) by suggesting ways in which all street users 
are governed and are governing through fluid assemblages, networks and  interactions.  
 The Shot/Reverse sequence relies on expectations that emerge from habit and from 
spectators‘ past experiences and knowledge.  These in turn have developed by learning how 
to read cues through interactions. The Shot/Reverse is, then, a powerful reminder that street-
involved people‘s perceptions of state-based legal actors are largely based on expectations 
that have been generated from lived experiences (often marked by negative interactions).  
Though taken in its dialogic instantiation, the Shot/Reverse is also a powerful reminder that 
other modes of interaction between police and their interlocutors are possible.  
 The Close-up gives us some indication as to how we might alter those expectations 
through relations of proximity. Paradoxically, it can equally bring us in too close and provide a 
claustrophobic perspective which might exacerbate our already negative impressions of 
others‘ expectations and of our possible interactions.  
 Finally, while the Shot/Reverse favours a ‗unity of meaning‘ that can help constitute 
shared interpretative communities, the Tracking Shot allows for competing meanings, shifting 
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subjectivities and the possibility to contemplate the multiple normative commitments that vie 
for the attention of any agent of street law.   
 Having developed a conceptual frame for street law through metaphor in this chapter, 
in the following chapter I look toward cinematic instantiations of interactions between street-
involved people and their interlocutors that gesture towards different visions of street law to 
those found in more entrenched, formalized and institutionalized legal forms.  I go on to 
argue that it is through the interactions between these characters and their real/imagined 
others with whom they share multiple and overlapping legal constellations, street law is 
constituted.    
  
167 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE: CINEMATIC STREET LAW 
 
Law (as artifact, as discipline, as process) confronts, competes and is inextricably 
interknit with innumerable other ways of arranging and constructing knowledge.  Cinema is 
one of the competing and complementary modes of knowing that stands in relation to law.  
To more orthodox writers, law and culture (including film) exist in binary opposition or are, at 
least, separate and separable from each other.  The ‗cultural turn‘ in legal scholarship posits 
a shift in such thinking about legal processes, subjectivities and identities, and problematics.   
‗Culture,‘ then, becomes a framework for law.  Through it, we can undertake to 
understand how we make sense of our world and our role within it.  Correspondingly, ‗law‘ 
becomes an important site of cultural construction of cinema‘s meanings.  To iterate a point 
made in earlier chapters, film and law are both ways of symbolizing how to be and co-exist; 
they deal with interpersonal conflicts; they circulate, reinforce and destabilize deep-seated 
assumptions and beliefs; they produce bodies; and they can generate multi-sensory 
responses to suffering.  In a world in which we need symbols by which to live,494 law and film 
are integral aspects of the contemporary human experience.  Consequently, film is an 
important site of cultural construction of legal meanings and law is an integral site of cultural 
construction of cinematic meanings.  
 In Chapter One, I described what I understand as ‗street law‘ and the particular 
instantiation that I refer to as the governance of and by street-involved people.  I also 
discussed how concepts from cinema and cinema studies can assist in furthering a critical 
legal pluralist hypothesis of street law.  In Chapter Two, I expressed a pluralist vision of street 
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law by suggesting what it might look and feel like through four cinematographic techniques.  
Each of these foregrounds in different ways the expectations, commitments and restrictions 
and agential behaviour of people most concerned with street law‘s exigencies.  In this 
chapter, I further develop a critical legal hypothesis of street law by turning my attention to 
the cinematic instantiations of interactions between street-involved people and their ‗others.‘  
 I begin from the assumption that the cinematic dimension of human experience 
already exists in law and the legal dimension of human experience already exist in film.495 I 
also engage with law as more than the rules as expressed in written texts, the 
pronouncement of judges, or the private law of individual rights and responsibilities. Law is 
one attempt to imagine how rules shape and reflect our relationships and interactions. This 
endeavour also includes the tentative and ambivalent normativity, the intangible and affective 
normativity, and the sensory and embodied normativity that is generated in, by, and through 
film. I also begin from the view that film is more than a consumer-driven mode of 
entertainment or a spectacle that threatens law‘s legitimacy. Films are progenitors of legal 
thought; they may be jurisgenerative.   
In what follows, I provide a critical review of how law, film, and the relation between 
them have been, and perhaps should be, conceptualized in legal scholarship.  Work at the 
nexus of law and film is generally concerned with the doctrinal, pedagogical and 
jurisprudential relevance of film to law. As I will discuss, some law-film methodologies 
assume and reinforce the positivist view that film provides an external perspective on law and 
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legal processes.496 There is nonetheless a broader shared understanding among most 
people working in the field that neither the social phenomena nor the disciplines that study 
them are self-governing or self-sustaining. I will briefly discuss the former articulation. I prefer 
to emphasize the latter, however, and build upon it to argue that film is law.   
In each of the following subsections, I interpret cinematic moments of interaction 
between street-involved people and their ‗others.‘  These are, of course, my interpretations 
which are in turn informed by my sensory responses to what I see and hear in the film, my 
own memories, my familiarity or lack thereof with narrative and thematic conventions, my 
interpretation of what feels like embodied responses, and so on. 
  While the discursive formations circulating in fictional film can at times reproduce and 
reflect the conceptualizations of street-involved people as they are instantiated in formal legal 
doctrine (some of which I discussed in Chapter Two), they also inform and shape the basis of 
alternative beliefs about street-involved people. I discuss a few cinematic moments that 
provide different symbolizations of the relationships that make street law meaningful.  
 In my interpretation of these films, my concern is not with the fidelity of the 
representation of street-involved people or what I would call the ‗law of the street‘ (formal and 
explicit state-based regulation directed at street-involved people).   I do not offer a survey of 
the treatment of every possible mode of street-involvement in film. To my knowledge no such 
conspectus exists on the figure of the ‗beggar‘ or the ‗panhandler‘.  The Tramp, and 
especially Chaplin‘s iconic embodiment of that figure, as a trope and the self-conscious 
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presentation of zones of poverty and homelessness in a distinct ‗genre‘ (Film Noir) have 
generated some rich scholarship.497  
 In the face of the proliferation of documentaries about street-involved people (in part 
the outcome of new user-friendly editing software, file-sharing, portable equipment, camera-
ready phones, and new exposition venues such as YouTube(c)) that often rely on 
ethnographic methodologies, I prefer to limit my discussion here to ‗fictional‘ narratives.498 I 
do not discuss films that claim to give ‗voice‘ to the street community (e.g. documentary films 
designed to elicit a sense of common humanity and compassion), nor films made with the 
community (e.g. in collaboration, through the use of auto-cinematography, or within 
anthropological paradigms that favour filmmakers‘ immersion in their subject‘s social 
networks and daily lives).499 I agree with theorists from documentary studies who claim that 
empirically based realist historiography may not always be the most appropriate mode for 
some discussions of lived events,500 and that fictional strategies can often confront difficult 
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social questions in powerful ways.501  Further, while I pay attention to a few rich instances 
when street-involved people are protagonists, the cinematic performance of street law I have 
often found more compelling is constituted through secondary or ‗minor‘ characters in a 
singular interaction that nonetheless furthers a broader narrative.  
 I am not concerned here with ‗the law of filming on the street.‘  This is not to say that 
the legality of videotaping interactions on the street (or, as noted in Chapter Two, whether the 
filming of police by street-involved people has regulatory effects) is of no interest to me. 
 As I will elaborate, engaging with law and film with an eye to whether or not footage 
taken by the street community is within the confines of established legal doctrine runs the risk 
of missing a more normatively tacit and expressive potential of cinematic artifact.  Too much 
emphasis on the regulation of what can and cannot be filmed may also miss some of the rich 
insight of legal pluralism: law exists beyond the boundaries of the state.  It also misses the 
insights of critical legal pluralisms: law is irreducibly plural and polycentric; it is experienced in 
a multisensory way; it is generated by multiple legal agents with shifting normative selves; its 
processes are dynamic; and its effects are symbolic.  Consequently, an inquiry into the ‗law 
of street films‘ would require attention to these myriad modes and sites of law.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
the feeling of the real‖; as a result, the documentary can ―treat the real as a problem‖ and thereby can 
―experiment more fully with the variable games of action and life, significance and insignificance:‖ Rancière, 
(Film Fables), supra note 127 at 17. In Chapter Four ―Film as Law as Film,‖ I discuss some of the possibilities 
that non-linear, explicitly interactive documentary film opens to a critical legal hypothesis of street law.  
501
 Janet Walker, "The Traumatic Paradox: Documentary Films, Historical Fictions, and Cataclysmic Past 
Events" (1997) 22:4 Signs 804. See also: White (Content), supra note 211. Regina Austin argues for greater 
scholarly attention in law to documentary films: "The Next 'New Wave': Law-Genre Documentaries, Lawyering 
in Support of the Creative Process, and Visual Legal Advocacy" (2006) 16 Fordham Intellectual Property, Media 
& Entertainment Law Journal 809. Finally, to Viviane Sobchack, the documentary method - unlike fictional 
material – situates our ontological bodies in the real world: Vivian Sobchack, Carnal Thoughts (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2004). 
 
172 
 
 We can, as I do in Chapter Two, argue that institutions, such as Copwatch, enact 
judgment, generate precedent, and reinforce its members‘ normative expectations for 
respectful interactions on the street.  In this chapter, I want to continue to think cinematically 
about street law, but in a different register.  I argue that certain cinematic sequences can be 
considered ethical frameworks for understanding our interactions on the street.  I further 
contend that street law is symbolized through a few selected films in at least four ways:  films 
mediate interactions between the characters and their real/imagined others; they show 
various legal constellations (both diegetic and extra-diegetic) that street-involved people and 
their interlocutors negotiate; they generate conventions that play with audiences‘ 
expectations in their interactions with their ‗others;‘ they invite interpretations by viewers who 
are themselves complex normative agents.  I begin with a discussion of the broad field of 
research located at the nexus of law and film.     
 
3.1 THE LAW-FILM NEXUS  
 
There is a well-founded belief that many law students, and most members of the 
broader population, develop some of their understandings and at least some of their 
expectations, about law through popular media, including the cinema.502  As a result, ―law – 
film‖ studies has emerged as a diverse field generally concerned with the doctrinal, 
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pedagogical and jurisprudential relevance of film to law and, at times, though exceptionally, 
of law to film.503 
  There are a number of ways to talk about the points of contact between these 
disciplines and socio-cultural processes.  In this chapter, I discuss five ways we can think 
about the law-film relation. These are conventionally understood as: ‗film law‘ (the ways in 
which film production and cinematic practices are governed through legislation, the decisions 
in which courts balance the claims of competing groups in areas such as copyright); ‗law in 
film‘ (films are a legal text which can be mined for legal themes); ‗law and film‘ (film and law 
are mutually constitutive socio-cultural fields); ‗cinematic law‘ (thinking through the cinematic 
dimensions of formal and informal legal processes); and ‗legal cinematics‘ (thinking through 
the legal qualities of cinematic events).  
I show how each of these modes of engaging the law-film relation points to some of 
the multiple and competing normative orders in any film.  These include the regulatory 
frameworks in which the film is produced, the norms of the constructed world described and 
lived in the film‘s diegesis, the fixed order of sounds and images, the ideologies and 
normative commitments that inform the actions of the director, the rules of genre that 
constitute systems of knowledge through associations, and the individual viewers‘ own law 
and how she positions herself within these normative orders.  
I revisit the more conventional understandings to argue how in each of these other 
modes of grappling with the law-film nexus, film is normative in itself.  Drawing on my 
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interpretations of a number of films that feature interactions between street-involved people 
and their ‗others,‘ I suggest each of these interrogations of the law-film relation can be 
interpreted in ways that conceptualize film ‗as‘ law, in the sense that film constitutes a mode 
of imagining rule-governed behaviour in interactions on the street.  
3.2 FILM LAW   
 
 ‗Film law‘ can refer to the ways in which film production and cinematic practices are 
governed through a complex matrix of formal, explicit, informal and/or implicit social, cultural 
and economic ordering. It can include policies and legislation governing the film industry, 
such as the decisions in which courts balance the claims of competing groups around 
questions such as ownership, contractual obligations, cultural protection, freedom of speech, 
and health and safety regulations.504 It can also, however, refer to formal economic and 
cultural regulation that shaped the industry such as the Hays Code and the Jim Crow laws in 
the United States.505  Finally, film law can be taken as the implicit norms that govern film 
production, such as the moral codes of each person involved in the production or the informal 
norms that developed through filmmakers‘ collective practices that developed over time.   We 
can ask, for example, about the ways in which moral perception is shaped and constituted 
                                                                
504
 For a discussion of the substantive legal disputes around one film, see:  Matthew Rimmer, "Shine: Copyright 
Law and Film" (2001) 12 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 129.  For an early articulation of ownership of 
cinematic images from a Marxist perspective: Bernard Edelman, The Ownership of Image: Elements for a 
Marxist Theory of Law (London: Routledge, 1979). On the United States Supreme Court ruling over state 
censorship of films: John Wertheimer, "Mutual Film Reviewed: The Movies, Censorship, and Free Speech in 
Progressive America" (1993) 37:2 American Journal of Legal History 158. For a rich account of copyright law in 
the U.K. through the prism of aesthetics and Marxist theory, see: Anne Barron, "The Legal Properties of Film" 
(2004) 67:2 Modern Law Review 177. 
505
 The United States provides the paradigmatic voluntary industry rating system.  Its code and means of 
certification emerged primarily to avoid formal municipal, state and federal structures and remains backed, 
among other things, by economic incentives, religious affiliations, notions of citizenship and public opinion.  
Other jurisdictions have implemented legislative documents that bestow authority on official bodies to determine 
industry standards.   
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through an individual filmmaker‘s worldview or how we should respond to a filmmaker who 
has engaged in monstrous and immoral acts.506  Or, we can inquire into non-legislated 
normative orders: the ―censorship of caution‖ 507 in Holland after the murder of Theo Van 
Gogh, governed cinematic form and content often in far more profound ways that other 
modes of regulation.508  
 Of these, I focus here on the relationship between the Motion Pictures’ Production 
Code (Code) and the films about street-involvement produced while it was in full effect.  In 
1934, amendments to Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America‘s (MPPDA) 
Code required that all films receive a certificate of approval from its Studio Relations Office 
(SRO).  The Code’s guiding principles included the proviso that ―sympathy of the audience 
shall never be thrown to the side of crime, wrongdoing, evil or sin.‖509 In theory, the Code 
regulated content of all films but informally it was used by the five major production 
                                                                
506
  Consider Roman Polanski‘s history of sexual violence (he drugged and raped a 13 year old girl (Samantha 
Geimer) in 1978 then fled to France on the eve of his sentencing hearing; British Actress Charlotte Lewis has 
recently disclosed that Polanski also sexually assaulted her when she was 16; and he publically declared in an 
interview with Martin Amos that ‗Judges want to f— young girls. Juries want to f— young girls. Everyone wants 
to f— young girls!‖).  See generally: Jillian Weinberger, "Roman Polanski: An Un-detected Rapist? ", online: 
(May 18, 2010) Ms Magazine   <http://msmagazine.com/blog/blog/2010/05/18/roman-polanski-the-undetected-
rapist/>.  Yet the film industry has, to a large extent, tacit acceptance of his behaviour.  It is, after all, en route to 
receive a lifetime achievement award, that Swiss authorities arrested Polanski in September 2009.   For a list of 
filmmakers who signed a petition calling for his immediate release:  "Free Polanski", online:   
<<http://community.livejournal.com/ohnotheydidnt/39618660.html>>.  
507
 Van Gogh collaborated with Aavan Hirsi Ali to make a short film about women‘s inequality under certain 
fundamentalist instantiations of Islam: Theo van Gogh, Submission (2004). He was murdered shortly after the 
film‘s release.  See generally: Imre Szeman, "The Politics of Documentary Today: A Roundtable", online: (2008) 
9:2 Politics and Culture   <http://www.politicsandculture.org/>.    
508
On the ideological function of the United States‘ Production Code (or Hays Code), see: Richard Maltby, 
"Documents on the Genesis of the Production Code" (1995) 15:4 Quarterly Review of Film and Video 5.  
Contrary to the ‗repression‘ story of Production Code Hollywood, Maltby documents how pressures from 
regulatory bodies and commercial interests shaped an aesthetic of ambiguity, inferences, connotations and 
often contradictions. On the relationship between the Catholic Legion of Decency and film censorship in the 
United States: Gregory Black, The Catholic Crusade Against The Movies, 1940-1975 (Cambridge: University 
Press, 1998).  
509
 "The Motion Pictures Production Code of 1930", online: <http://www.artsreformation.com/a001/hays-
code.html>.  
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companies510 to limit independent and other filmmakers‘ access to the major first-run release 
outlets (which would refuse to screen films that did not carry the SRO‘s ‗seal‘).511 In practice, 
the narrative conventions of films released between the mid-1930s and 1940s within the 
Hollywood system relied on implicitly (through allusion, allegory, and double-entendre) or 
explicitly (through characters whose motivations did not meet the Code‘s standard of 
propriety) constructed their own aesthetics.   
 Virtually all ‗social problem‘ films featured protagonists who had meaningful 
encounters with marginal workers or other street-involved people (then formally regulated 
under vagrancy laws).  Consequently, in direct contravention of the Code, protagonists were   
‗on the side of crime.‘  For instance, one of the main tropes of social problem films is a 
dignified upper-middle-class (often male) character who engages in ‗class transvestitism.512  
By literally taking on the attire, the lifestyle of, and inevitably identifying with marginal 
populations, he attempts to bridge differences and constitute new relationships between the 
rich and the poor.513  In most of these films, the ‗homeless person‘ is a minor character who 
                                                                
510
The five studios at the time were: Paramount, Warner Brothers, RKO, MGM and 20
th
 Century Fox. 
511
 In 1948, the United States Supreme Court found that this distribution model was in violation of American 
anti-trust laws.  The Court ruled that the production companies were required to divest themselves of their 
monopoly over film exhibition. See: United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).  Further, in 
1953, the Supreme Court overturned Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio 236 U.S. 230 
(1915).  In that case, the Supreme Court held that the free speech protection in Ohio‘s Constitution, which was 
almost identical to the First Amendment of the United States‘ Constitution, did not extend to motion pictures.  In 
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), the Court held that the provision of New York State‘s 
education laws which allowed censors to ban non-licensed motion pictures was an unconstitutional restriction 
on freedom of speech. In 1967, the MPPDA was renamed the Motion Picture Association of America.  It 
instituted a letter rating system which remains in place today.  See generally: Maltby, supra note 508.  
512
 Eric Shocket, "Undercover Explorations of the 'Other Half', Or the Writers as Class Transvestite" (1998) 64 
Representations 109.  Shocket refers to middle class ‗investigators‘ - researchers and artists - who attempt to 
―close epistemological gaps‖ and bridge social boundaries through impersonation: at 110.   
513
 John Dawson (Lionel Atwill) is disabled by an accident in his factory; rendered destitute, he travels the 
country organizing the homeless to help him regain control of his steel mill in Phil Rosen, Beggars in Ermine 
(1933). Class-transvestitism is also a convention of depression-era comedies such as Gregory LaCava, My 
Man Godfrey (1936).  In that film, a disheartened millionaire becomes one of the ‗common people‘ living and 
working in New York‘s factory district. This trope remains a popular narrative engine: see more recently: Mel 
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nonetheless plays a pivotal role in the narrative. Conventionally, a curmudgeonly protagonist 
reveals his entrenched assumptions about poverty and the people for whom it is a daily 
reality. His belief-structure is shaken as a result of an interaction with a street-involved 
person; this encounter is a catalyst for (sometimes mutual) self-transformation.514   
Often, the narrative would indicate that the philanthropic protagonist is better-equipped 
than governmental actors to provide services and infrastructure to street-involved people.515  
Consequently, some films have been read as circulating ideological messages that do little to 
identify or address the structural causes of homelessness.516  This may be true even with 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Brooks, Life Stinks (1991) in which a wealthy businessman wagers he can get by living with the ‗common folks‘ 
in Los Angeles in order to gain choice real estate. Of course, women who enter ‗poor spaces‘ have an 
additional layer of transvestitism: they tend to take on the attire of working class boys.  See for instance, Nancy 
(Louise Brooks) in Beggars of Life (1928) and Veronica Lake (credited as ‗the Girl‘) in Sullivan’s Travels (1941).  
In a recent twist on both tropes, see Raoul Ruiz‘ Trois vies et une seule mort (1996).  In that film, Georges 
Vickers (Marcello Mastroianni) abandons his career as a professor to find meaning on the street.  He meets, 
and falls in love with, Tania (Anna Galiena), a street-level sex worker, who turns out to also be the Chief 
Executive Officer of a well-established company.   
514
 The expectation that the protagonist will be transformed through this encounter remains common in films that 
portray interactions between street-involved people and their others.  For instance, the comedy: Harold Ramis, 
Groundhog Day (1993) which grapples broadly with the possibility of reconfiguration through repetition.  During 
a series of replayed days, Phil Connors (Bill Murray), a narcissistic weather man is trying to get the day right in 
order to acquire Irene‘s (Annie McDowell) attention and affection.  During a series of replayed days, he 
encounters ‗Old man‘ (Les Podewell).  His responses shift from disdain to indifference to care as he learns 
more about his day to day. However, despite various attempts (money, food, companionship, medical care), he 
cannot stop the man from dying at the end of each day.  On the film‘s evidence, through his interaction with Old 
man, Phil contemplates the possibility of loss, the finitude of life, and the empathetic qualities of care, and 
ultimately a sense of connection to the social world. 
515
 In My Man Godfrey and in its re-instantiation in Life Stinks, the protagonists invest in infrastructure for the 
homeless and provide them with shelter and low-level, low-skill employment opportunities).  Sometimes these 
individual interventions usually result in a heterosexual monogamous union: Gregory LaCava, Fifth Avenue Girl 
(1939) in which a young homeless woman is taken in by a millionaire and marries his son; Michael Barnard, 
Nights in White Satin (1987) in which a young homeless woman taken in by a photographer); and Life Stinks 
(Molly, a kindly homeless woman marries the rich land developer).  
516
 See for instance: William Brigham, "Down and Out in Tinseltown: Hollywood Presents the Dispossessed" in 
Paul Loukidas & Linda Fuller, eds., Beyond the Stars: Studies in American Popular Film (Volume 5) (Bowling 
Green, OH: State University Popular Press, 1990) 165-186.  Brigham does not sufficiently compare the 
shattering potential of slapstick films, especially those embodied by Chaplin.  His work, in the fields of plot, 
performance, mise-en-scene, irreverence and play with technological regimes, mechanization, and linear time 
have been read as directly and indirectly confronting ―the culture of status and distinction:‖ Miriam Bratu 
Hansen, "The Mass Production of the Senses: Classical Cinema and Vernacular Modernism" (1999) 6:2 
Modernism/Modernity 59 at 69. See also Charles Musser, "Work, Ideology and Chaplin's Tramp" (1988) 41 
Radical History 37.   
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films and filmmakers associated with the ‗popular front‘ (which combined Hollywood formulas 
and anti-fascist politics) who were making films with social messages whose political content 
may, according to some scholars, have been displaced by questions of the relation of 
medium to message and the power of the mass-media form.517 Moreover, these films were 
produced at a time when writers, sociologists, and other producers of knowledge about 
homelessness were embedding themselves in the communities upon which they wrote.518  
‗Outsiders‘ negotiated disgust and desire, and generally framing trampdom or hoboism – the 
wandering casual labourers whose work was instrumental in the development of western 
industrial capitalist structures - as ―liberating‖519  and within embedded within a romanticized 
discourse of self-sufficiency and adventure.       
 Within this historical context, it seems less interesting to struggle with whether or not 
these narrative conventions offer an indictment of the formal regulation of street-involved 
people. Rather, these cinematic instantiations of interactions are a indication of the complex 
interplay between the explicit and informal normativity of the Production Code and its 
relationship to the more implicit normative expectations of the perceive audiences to whom 
filmmakers and producers directed their work.   
                                                                
517
 Kathleen Moran & Michael Rogin, "'What's the Matter with Capra?' Sullivan's Travels and the Popular Front" 
(2000) 71 Representations 106 at 112. On the popular front as a socio-political formation and the attempt to 
create a leftist national popular culture, see: Micheal Denning, The Cultural Front (London: Verso, 1996).     
518
 See especially, the work of Nels Anderson who as a graduate student drew on his previous experiences as a 
migrant worker to engage in ethnographic observation of the ‗hobo‘ as an integral component of the frontier 
labor market: Nels Anderson, The Hobo: The Sociology of the Homeless Man (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1923). In later work, he developed a satirical taxonomy of figures and glossary that includes definitions 
such as ―eye doctor,‖ or a ―panhandler who can catch the eye of his client and hold it without quailing‖ to point 
out how the ‗life on the road‘ had largely been romanticized by ‗outsiders.‘ The Milk and Honey Route A 
Handbook for Hobos (Chicago: Vanguard Press, 1931). The classification system he circulated – the hobo 
(migrant worker), the tramp (dreamy wanderer) and the bum (sedentary and often prone to vice) - were adopted 
by other academics and especially his colleagues from the Chicago School who were developing and refining 
their ethnographic methods which continues to hold currency in contemporary social research.      
519
  For a literature review and discussion of transient workers as fundamental to continental capitalism‘s 
processes: Todd McCallum, "The Tramp is Back" (2005) 56 Labour / le travail 237. He found that most of the 
―scribblers in hobo jungles were sociologists in disguise‖ at 245. 
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 Take for example Sullivan’s Travels (1941).520  The protagonist Sullivan (Joel McCrea) 
is told by his producers that he has insufficient knowledge of ―hard luck‖ to make a powerful 
social problem drama.  He decides to don the attire of the ‗hobo.‘521 With ten cents in his 
pocket, he takes to the road in order to learn ―what it‘s like to be poor.‖  One endeavour could 
be to fixate on conventional iconography of street law: What does Sullivan‘s arrest tell us 
about formal state-based regulation of migrants in depression-era America? We can also 
consider films that achieve ―greater sophistication‖ in the treatment of street law that suggest 
more meaningful interactions with the ‗other‘ and the possibility of self-transformation through 
the encounter.522   
 The film is rich intertextual references to prevailing leftist values in the industry at the 
time (―What‘s the matter with Capra?‖), extra-diegetic references to informal regulation (by 
the Hollywood system through the figure of the producer) and self-reflexive and layered 
interrogation of the relationship between authority, objectivity, and representation (a movie 
about making a movies about ‗the poor‘). The film inspires interrogation of the interplay 
between the implicit governance of leftist politics and shifts in explicit governance of 
cinematic institutions and practices and interactions that shape and reflect a cinematic 
artifact.   
 
                                                                
520
  Preston Sturges, Sullivan’s Travels (1941).  
521
 The hobo is the figure of transients that remained archetypal at the time the film. See Paul DePastino‘s 
social and economic history of homelessness between the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries through the figure 
of the transient worker (the ‗hobo‘): Citizen Hobo: How a Century of Homelessness Shaped America (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2003). 
522
 Bazin has similarly suggested that while the subject matter of ‗religious film‘ genre and its hagiographies and 
biblical epics especially, ―does indeed show specific affinities with the cinema considered as a formidable 
iconography,‖ more sophisticated films work against the exploitation of such affinities and invite a broader 
openness to the ‗other:‘ André Bazin, Bazin at Work: Major Essays and Reviews from the Forties and Fifties 
(New York: Routledge, 1997) at 67.  
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3.3  LAW IN FILM  
 
 Despite the richness of exploring these modes of governance, the overwhelming 
majority of law– film thinking situates itself within the study of ‗law in film‘ (cinematic 
representations of official legal processes, legal doctrine and formalized modes of law 
enforcement). While there have been shifts in thinking toward an expansive and pluralistic 
view of representation,523 a survey of law school curricula and legal inquiry – in English 
common law jurisdictions at least – suggests a focus on the realist depiction of law in film 
endures.524   Broadly speaking, law in film concerns itself with films ‗about‘ law.   
 Films are considered popular and accessible legal texts.  In practice, students are 
asked to turn their minds to the truthfulness of ‗the‘ law – limited to formal, state-sanctioned, 
written rules and legal practices – as represented within the film world‘s narrative.525 By 
engaging in legal reasoning through film, law students build on their existing skills and gain 
new tools to ‗think like lawyer‘: piecing together relevant facts, determining legal rules, and 
                                                                
523
 Namely that neither law nor film exists in a one-to-one relationship of representation to reality and that rather 
than simply documenting facts without idealization, both processes produce and constitute contested meanings 
and world-views.   
524
 The seminar description for Andrew Sheppard‘s ―Law and Popular Culture‖ (Spring, 2006: Hofstra University 
School of Law) is representative of the ‗law in film‘ approach: ―We will discuss the accuracy and inaccuracy of 
the way that lawyers and the legal system are portrayed in popular culture, particularly whether the portrayals 
are consistent with good legal practice and the codes that regulate lawyer behaviour.‖ On the development of 
‗law and film‘ courses in legal academy: Philip Meyer & Stephen Cusick, "Using Non-Fiction Films as Visual 
Texts in the First-Year Criminal Law Course Symposium: Law in Film/Film in Law" (2004) 28:4 Vermont Law 
Review 895.  For a recent discussion of law-film scholarship in francophone and civilian institutions in Canada, 
see: Marie-Claire Belleau,Valérie Bouchard & Rebecca Johnson, "Droit, cinéma et doute : Rapport minoritaire" 
(2009) 14:1 Lex Electronica. Interestingly, Belleau et al highlight how in the ‗law / film‘ dyad that organizes much 
law-film scholarly, law remains the privileged pole of the dichotomy: at 3.  
525
 This focus is unsurprising given that ‗fact-determination‘ remains a fundamental strategy of legal method and 
that much of law‘s claim to legitimacy and authority is conventionally thought to depend on its ability to divine 
truth from competing claims.  However, as Ruth Buchanan and Rebecca Johnson argue, films can be used 
because they confront the jurisprudential belief that law and legal processes can divine such truth:  "Getting the 
Insider's Story Out: What Popular Film Can Tell Us About Legal Method's Dirty Secrets" (2001) 20 Windsor 
Year Book of Access to Justice 87. 
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generating legal solutions to complex social problems.526 Students are asked to recognize 
law as a pre-existing referent and one that remains within the institutionally dominant 
paradigm: law as a separate social and cultural entity, embodied in rules and procedure, and 
imposed by the state.   
 Film is relevant to law only insofar as it tells an already ‗legal‘ story527  from which an 
accurate legal interpretation can be offered by people with legal training.528  Such narrative 
content-analysis eschews the interpretivists‘ insight that meaning is contingent and that it is 
ultimately derived from the experience it generates in readers;529 that the relation between 
law and film is never purely mimetic or a unilateral reference from one artifact to another; and 
that film and law consciously or unconsciously quote one another in infinite, contradictory, 
and potentially transformative ways.530   
                                                                
526
 Using film for experiential learning that gives new blood to the Langdellian method of Socratic exchange, 
professors ask students to track down the legal references and compare and contrast the representation in film 
with official and authoritative sources of law (namely doctrine, private law arrangements, formal procedure and 
institutional competence).  Usually, they proceed to correct
 
or critique the representation of formal legal 
apparatuses and conventionally recognizable legal actors. One of the more interesting academic explorations of 
law in film is Diane Waldman‘s discussion of Civil Action 
 (1998).  She claims that the film asks whether, given the legal system‘s bedrock of private law and individual 
rights and responsibilities, it can ever adequately respond to injuries, harm and illness that result from 
environmental degradation.  It also asks whether punishment, deterrence and compensation are the proper 
avenues for achieving justice: Diane Waldman, "A Case for Corrective Criticism: A Civil Action" in Austin Sarat, 
Lawrence Douglas & Martha Merrill Umphrey, eds., Law on the Screen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2005) 201-230. 
527
 Jane Baron offers a similar reading of scholarship that compares and contrasts literature and law with 
techniques that suggest the former‘s capacity to come to the service of the latter: Jane B Baron, "Law, 
Literature and the Problems of Interdisciplinarity" (1999) 108 Yale Law Journal 1059.   
528
 On the hermeneutic impulse to find a text‘s meaning, see: Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New 
York: Continuum, 2002).  
529
 Interpretation of legal texts (reader-response) occurs through and within ‗interpretive communities‘; a text‘s 
meaning does not exist outside its cultural context (which includes authorial intent and the expectations of the 
members of particular interpretive communities). See for instance: Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: 
Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); 
James Boyd White, The Legal Imagination: Studies in the Nature of Legal Thought and Expression (Boston: 
Little, Brown, and Co., 1973) [hereinafter, White (Imagination)].  
530
 Filmmakers can, for instance, exploit the narrative potential for tension and resolution (or lack thereof) that 
formal adjudicative processes (and trials especially) offer.  They can also use symbols of formal law and other 
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A related ‗law in film‘ project is to establish a consistent method of inquiry, namely, 
descriptive and content-based analysis of films that contain sufficient legal elements.531 
Without clearly defined guidelines, proponents of this view argue, the analysis of ‗law films‘ 
will ―dissolve into film studies,‖ which is of ―limited interest‖ to legal scholars.532 The 
apprehension is the expression of a two-fold anxiety in legal scholarship and pedagogy:533 
fear and dismissal of film‘s power.   
First, thinking about law through film – a medium which blurs entertainment, memory, 
dreams, facts and fiction - is dangerous insofar as it can undermine disciplinary order, 
institutional legitimacy, and especially its vocation for truth.534  Second, in contradistinction to 
law‘s sobriety and ‗real effects‘ in the world, film is frivolous, trivial, and subjective; attention 
to it will detract from ‗more important‘ political, social, and economic problems ‗the law‘ 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
normative sites to aestheticize the crass exercise of power, to expose faulty processes of justice, to signal 
transgressions of dominant legal norms. 
531
 These elements include ―the geography of law, the language and dress of law, legal personnel and the 
authority of the law:‖ Greenfield et al, supra note 194; Osborn, supra note 194; Steven Machura, "An Analysis 
Scheme for Law Films" (2007) 36:3 University of Baltimore Law Review 329; Peter Robson, "Law and Film 
Studies: Autonomy and Theory" in Michael Freeman, ed., Law and Popular Culture:Current Legal Issues 
Volume 7 (London: Oxford University Press, 2005) 21-46.  The notion of an established ‗canon‘ of law films 
raises familiar questions as to whose world view is promoted and reinforced in ‗classics‘ or ‗great‘ art.  Authors 
point out how the exclusion of certain books from the canon contributes to the marginalization of women‘s and 
racialized groups‘ perspectives in legal academy: Richard Delgado, "Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: 
A Plea for Narrative" (1989) 87 Michigan Law Review 2411; Judith Resnik, "Convergences: Law, Literature and 
Feminism" (1990) 99 Yale Law Journal 1913.   
532
 Namely, film‘s ―aesthetic or technical‖ specificities - which they reduce to cinematography -  while 
―intrinsically interesting,‖ is ―peripheral to any serious consideration of law and film.‖  Robson, ibid at 33 
[emphasis mine].  Similarly, James Elkins, "Popular Culture, Legal Films, and Legal Film Critics" (2007) 40 
Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal 745. 
533
 Margaret Thornton refers to the apprehension in relation to popular culture as ‗legal vertigo:‘ "Law and 
Popular Culture: Engendering the Legal Virtigo" in Margaret Thornton, ed., Romancing the Tomes: Popular 
Culture, Law and Feminism (London: Cavendish, 2002) 3. 
534
  For instance, Richard Sherwin has cautioned against an overly ‗postmodern‘ or deconstructionist view of the 
film‘s relation to law.  It is valuable for legal thinkers to wrest with cinematic images that irritate law‘s self-
representation as the embodiment of objective truth, rationality and universal justice.  However, when this 
analysis converges with communications technology and market demands (the ‗aestheticization‘ of legal 
processes through the reliance on visual media) law risks becoming meaningless: supra note 221 at 227.  
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should resolve.535  However, engagement with film, media and communications studies 
would reveal a taken-for-granted assumption from many scholars in those disciplines, and as 
I illustrate in my framing of ‗film law‘:  film is a historically-situated, materially-grounded social 
practice embedded in power relations, political forces and economic dynamics.536 
 Even remaining within the realm of dominant modes of legalities, we can consider 
how films inform what is deemed a social problem warranting official and institutionalized 
legal intervention;537 they can suggest formal and informal legal strategies to counter 
discrimination;538 they can be used to evaluate the material impact of legislative 
symbolizations of norms;539 they can be anecdotal evidence of how people perform the role 
of lawyer; 540 and can play a role in shaping legal subjectivity.541  
                                                                
535
 In Common law jurisdictions generally, and in the United States especially in part due to its unique 
relationships to the dominant ‗Hollywood‘ system, courts have been suspicious of film as potentially deceptive 
medium.  For a genealogy of the judicial decision permitting filmic evidence in the United States, see:  
Schwartz, supra note 204.   
536
 Indeed, like any representation, filmic meanings are derived, at least partially, from practical, material 
concerns:  Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science 
(Cambridge: University Press, 1988).  
537
 Stuart Hall et al discuss the emergence of moral panics around ‗mugging‘ in the U.K. stems in part from 
images disseminated in the mass media: Stuart Hall et al., Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and 
Order (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1998). 
538
 North Country (based on the events documented in Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co and the book Class 
Action: The Story of Lois Jenson and the Landmark Case that Changed Sexual Harassment Law, 2002) invites 
spectators to consider how a litigant was being ―retraumatized‖ in a sexual harassment case when acting as an 
individual and suggests that a collective response to such discrimination may bring about more just results: 
Rebecca Korzec, "Viewing North Country: Sexual Harassment Goes to the Movies " (2007) 36 University of 
Baltimore Law Review 303.  
539
 For instance, the relevance of the Seneca Falls Declaration Settlements (equality under the law) can in part, 
be assessed, through the cinematic depictions of female lawyers: Louise Everett Graham & Geraldine Maschio, 
"A False Sentiment: Narrative and Visual Images of Women Lawyers in Film" (1995-96) 84 Kentucky Law 
Journal 1027. 
540
 For a discussion of the ways in which depictions of lawyers in films shape clients‘ expectations of effective 
lawyering and may also contribute to lawyers ‗forgetting‘ generally shared normative assumptions around acting 
lawyerly, see: Nancy Rapoport, "Dressed for Excess: How Hollywood affects the Professional Behaviour of 
Lawyers" (2000) 14 Notre Dame Journal of Law Ethics & Public Policy 49. On the ways in which the cinematic 
construction of female lawyers can promote, just as it undermines, women‘s social power and their status as 
legal agents: Cynthia Lucia, Framing Female Lawyers: Women on Trial in Film (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 2005).  
541
Peter Drexler, "The German Courtroom Film During the Nazi Period: Ideology, Aesthetics, Historical Context" 
(2001) 28:1 Journal of Law and Society 64.  
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Meaningful interaction with film, media and communications studies might also reveal 
long-standing debates as to how cinema does have these effects in the world: whether 
through the activation of mental, psychological, or emotional responses in a (passive) 
spectator through embedded ideologies in individual artifact.542 It may also remind us that the 
historically-situated spectator is in active engagement with narrative and cinematic 
techniques543 - whether or not the film itself is intended to provoke critical thought.544  It may 
also suggest how the cinematic process is informed by the normative expectations and 
relative social power of the filmmaker constituting a worldview.545 Finally, it might hint at film‘s 
capacity to symbolize power through complexity and ambiguity.546 To wrestle with multiple 
normative modes, sites and instruments that commingle and collide through films, we should, 
consequently consider how editing techniques restructure spatio-temporal laws and invite 
                                                                
542
 To Metz, cinema is akin to Lacan‘s mirror-stage: Christian Metz, The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis 
and the Cinema (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982). It is noteworthy that courts have grappled with 
the power of films to guide individual spectator‘s responses.  For instance, according to the Motion Picture 
Producers and Distributors of America‘s Production Code, film‘s essence lies in its ability to bring about change 
in those who consume it.  It can improve humanity or, conversely bring about its moral decay: ―If motion pictures 
present stories that will affect lives for the better, they can become the most powerful force for the improvement 
of mankind (sic).‖ Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Mutual Film Corporation v. Ohio Industrial 
Commission, 236 U.S. 230, U.S. Supreme Court (1915) that state governments were constitutionally entitled to 
censor films prior to exhibition because films ―could be used for evil‖ at 224.      
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 Relying on ethnographic studies of audiences to argue the ways in which films neglect or obscure the lived 
reality of particular audiences: Barbara Creed, The Monstrous-Feminine: Film, Feminism, Psychoanalysis 
(London: Routledge, 1993).  
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 For instance, associative montage mandates that viewers draw their own psychological connections through 
juxtaposition and metaphor: Stan Brackage, Metaphors of Vision (New York: Film Culture, 1963); Sergei 
Eisenstein, Film Form and Film Sense (Cleveland: Meridian, 1957). 
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censorship and filmmaker‘s Duc Hoan‘s rendering of the Vietnam war in The Story of A Phy is a rich exploration 
of such questions: Karen Turner, "Shadowboxing with the Censors: A Vietnamese Woman Directs the War 
Story" in Corey Creekmur & Alexander Doty, eds., Cinema, Law and the State in Asia (New York: Palgrave, 
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 To Rancière, film is always already political insofar as it recasts and reconstitutes relations between what is 
perceived, communicated and thought. It can interrupt aesthetic and political hierarchies; it can destabilize 
systems of representation and modes of governance.  Film is the realm of ambiguity, negotiating between the 
―readability of the message that threatens
 
to destroy the sensible form of art‖ and the ―radical uncanniness
 
that 
threatens to destroy all political meaning.  Film risks becoming meaningless when political or transformative 
meaning is imposed upon it: Rancière (Aesthetics), supra note 347 at 63. 
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new understandings about who has the authority and legitimacy to govern interactions on the 
streets.  
 For instance, cinematography and allegory are deployed in Fritz Lang‘s M547 to 
establish that the usual suspects (police and lawyers) do not have legal authority to enforce 
the rules that govern interactions on the street. The film follows the police‘s ineffectual 
attempts to find the man who is stalking, sexually assaulting and murdering little girls.  
Intense police crackdowns, fueled by public outcry and pressure from the government, create 
conditions that render organized crime incapable of running their affairs.  Faced with 
dwindling funds and a blow to their reputation, the ‗Union‘ (a cluster of organized crime 
factions each, according to regulations, with a representative authorized to vote on their 
behalf) determines to find and prosecute the ―non-member‖ who is ―screwing up.‖ There is a 
series of rigid, drawn-out, almost identically framed cross-cuts.  The men in suits sitting 
around a board room tables are indistinguishable and ineffectual bureaucrats: formal legal 
agents on the one hand, and Union members on the other.  
 The juxtaposition of police officers strategizing how to find the murderer (―search every 
house‖, ―fingerprinting, enforce i.d. cards‖), and sequences of the mob doing the same (―we 
need spies,‖  ―the girls must take more notice‖) builds tension and gives the film a rhythm.  
However, it also suggests potentially disturbing or potentially normalizing - which will vary 
depending on one‘s expectations as to appropriate agents of governance - the connections 
or parallels between the police to mob and of mob to police.548 It also highlights how these 
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 Fritz Lang, M (1931)  
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 For a discussion of the shot structure in M, see: David Bordwell & Kristin Thompson, "Chapter Eight: The 
Relation of Shot to Shot: Editing", Film Art: An Introduction (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008) at 275. 
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expectations may shift in relation to the norm-generating communities to which we believe 
they belong.  
 Whereas police decide to search every prison and asylum for clues, the Union 
representatives decide that ―every square foot‖ of the city must watched and by ―people who 
can go everywhere, not be noticed, and can follow children without arousing suspicion.‖  This 
task they bestow upon the ‗Beggars‘ Union‘ – offering a hefty reward to whomever tracks the 
killer.  Contrary to the static camera reserved for the bureaucrats, however, spectators are 
introduced to the Beggar‘s Union by way of a long, unbroken sequence through headquarters 
which encourages attention to the interactions within and through the lived space.  A man 
counts cigarette butts and takes in the smell of a cigar, another which peels potatoes, others 
still play cards, wash dishes and sleep.  Two men tabulate and price found food items to be 
resold to members.   
 Rather than cutting, the camera tracks up from the ‗underworld‘ to the mob‘s 
headquarters, suggesting that the two unions have formed an alliance:  whereas the mob  
will parallel the police and combs the city for suspicious personalities, the network of  
beggars are given zones of surveillance and given the task to watch over the children in 
these spaces.549 Whereas police and mob members are shot primarily in tight frames of 
interior shots, the beggars, practically invisible to passer-by, can inhabit, move through, know 
and organize vast swaths of their city space.  Ultimately the street law in M is expressed in 
terms of the normativity ascribed to the beggars‘ mobility and at times their relative 
immobility.    
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 Associations of beggars are also a recurring trope in other cultural forms.  See for instance Brecht‘s The 
Three penny Opera (1928), itself an adaption of John Gay‘s Beggar’s Opera (1728), and of course, Dickens‘ 
Oliver Twist (1838), and ―Baker Street Irregulars‖ who assist Sherlock Holmes with clues in Conan Doyle‘s 
series since A Study in Scarlet (1886).  
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 Through their spatial and legal practices, they ways in which they act in and through 
city spaces, the Homeless Union members determine what is and what should be 
appropriate behaviour in the street. It is, after all, the blind street vendor who identifies and 
ultimately sentences Hans Beckert as the killer.  When he hears him whistling,550 the 
experience was sufficiently uncanny to rouse his suspicion and his own expectations of 
normal encounters on the street.  When he hears it again, it will be to determine the killer‘s 
identity. Thus, the blind beggar is constituted through M as the site of moral perception: the 
only person with the specific knowledge required in order to enact (ethical) judgment.551 
Whether or not his rendering is ethical will ultimately depend on each viewer‘s personal 
assessment of his judgment; these in turn are based on that viewer‘s belief, interpretations, 
analyses and own judgment.  As a consequence, what viewers believe they expect of other 
street users, what they believe those street users expect of them, commingle with other 
symbolizations of these beliefs and expectations, through formal legal texts but also through 
myths, including those constituted within and circulated through M.    
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 Edvard Grieg‘s composition ‗In the Hall of the Mountain King‘ for Henrik Ibsen‘s play entitled Peer Gynt 
(1876).   
551
 In mythology, the blind seer / prophet is a figure who, with the loss of one sense, acquires greater acuity in 
the others and correspondingly otherworldly abilities, such as paranormal psychic or intuitive powers and 
knowledge of the past. There are many examples in mythology, philosophy and literature: Teresa (from Greek 
mythology, the blind prophet of Thebes), Odin (from Norse Mythology, who gave up sight for wisdom) and even 
Geordie (the moral authority in the Star Trek television series). See also: Tim Burton, Sweeney Todd: The 
Demon Barber of Fleet Street (2007) in which the ‗blind beggar woman‘ is all-knowing and dangerous to the 
protagonist.  See also: Leos Carax, Les amants du Pont-Neuf (1991) in which Michele (Juliette Binoche) is an 
artist (who has fallen in love with a vagrant) is slowly losing her vision from a congenital condition.  She 
embodies memory for her lover and for the audience.  
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3.4 LAW AND FILM  
 
Law and film scholarship endeavours to highlight the mutually constitutive and inter-
textual relation between two socio-cultural artifacts, discourses, practices and fields of 
inquiry).552  The assertion that film is a legal text – even if it is limited to one with a fixed 
content to be discovered or described - is in itself provocative.  It is insofar as it destabilizes 
what counts as legal authority, legal sources, and the skills and attributes necessary for good 
lawyering.  However, examining the work of legal thinkers who engage with law and film 
helps address some of these more troubling features with some of the more decorative553 or 
taxonomic554  approaches to the field.  
Less concerned with questions of methodological unity or of factual depictions, law 
and film scholars call attention to how these two socio-cultural formations, discursive 
practices and modes of representation can share a number of features such as: narrative 
strategies; a desire for truths – whether factual, analogous, or metaphorical; interpretive 
techniques; and world-building functions. They can also retain their own modes of 
communicating, technologies, apparatuses, and unique sensory, spatial and temporal means 
of persuasion.555 In highlighting these continuities and disjunctions, scholars wrest with the 
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 I point out gaps and absences in some ‗law in film‘ inquiries and I refer to a ‗shift‘ or ‗a move towards‘ an 
alternative ‗law and film.‘  This is not to say that I believe there has been a cavalcade of thinking in this field.  
Law in film scholarship weaves through law and film to ask questions about how film can be descriptive and 
normative at once, how it shapes and reflects law, and how the law-film entanglement is one of mutual 
resistance, adaptation and interdependence.  
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 We might, following Tushnet, call this approach ―film studies2:‖ Mark Tushnet, "Interdisciplinary Legal 
Scholarship: The Case of History-in-Law" (1996) 71 Chicago-Kent Law Review 909. He jabs at legal scholars 
―decorating‖ texts with quotes from philosophers without ―a serious effort to use philosophical authority to 
support the author‘s conclusion‖ at 913.    
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 For a trenchant critique of taxonomic approaches to law in film: David A. Black, Law in Film: Resonance and 
Representation (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999).  
555
 Though according to some, these differences are ‗vanishing‘ as law becomes increasingly cinematic:  
Sherwin, supra note 221.  
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inter-textual dialogue between law and film which permits each narrative regime to shed light 
on how the other functions.556 Navigating and trying to move beyond what Schlag has called 
the ―de-differentiation problem‖ (the inability to articulate any positive relation between law 
and culture),557 I imagine how film and law, like a palimpsest, are ‗grafted‘ onto one another.  
They are mutually constitutive in myriad ways.  Through structural or thematic references to 
normativity, for instance, films mediate our lives in law and our legal lives.  Legal discourse 
and practices, concurrently, mediate the films through which our complex legal lives can be 
translated into cinematic discourse.558 
Films and law may be in a semi-autonomous relation.  They can, as a result, 
potentially irritate formal law‘s hegemony by examining the interactions or interactive 
relationship between official and unofficial law as expressed through film.559  More often than 
not, film is offered as the ‗corrective‘ to the rigidity, exclusions and injustices of positivist and 
centralist conceptualizations of law. 560 The Beggar‘s Union is not, for example, the first 
instantiation of a formal adjudication performed by members of the community deemed the 
appropriate interpreters of justice. The ‗underworld‘ trial in M is prefigured by (or may have 
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 To Black, films about law are always already inter-textual because they are ―at one and the same time, both 
film (one narrative regime) about law (another)‖ at 1. David A. Black, Law in Film: Resonance and 
Representation (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999). 
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 Pierre Schlag, "The De-Differentiation Problem" (2009) 41 Continental Philosophy Review 35. Note that 
Naomi Mosey queries whether we should talk of ―relationships between law and culture at all:‖ Naomi Mezey, 
"Approaches to the Cultural Study of Law: Law as Culture" (2001) 13 Yale Journal of Law and Humanities at 36. 
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 White (Translation), supra note 4 at 266.   
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 An early articulation of the symbiotic relationship between law and film can be found in Friedman‘s assertion 
that popular culture both gets its ideas about law from, and reflects ideas of law through, legal culture: 
Lawrence Friedman, "Law, Lawyers and Popular Culture" (1989) 98:8 Yale Law Journal 1579. 
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For instance, Brooks argues how films by Black American directors on the urban realities faced by male 
youth ―portray‖ how the rules of the formal criminal justice system ―collide‖ with ―the rules of the neighbourhood 
justice system: Justin Brooks, "Will Boys Just be Boyz N the Hood?  African American Directors Portray a 
Crumbling Justice System in Urban America" (1997) 22:1 Oklahoma City University Law Review 1.  
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been inspired by) the comedic scene in Beggars of Life (1928).561  In that film, a group of 
―hobos‖ create a ―kangaroo court‖ with a judge demanding: ―Disorder! Disorder! in the court‖ 
and a ―persecutin‘ attorney.‖ Without hearing from the accused and threatening to ―disbar 
and dismember‖ the defence lawyer, the judge passes sentence: ―the court will dispense with 
justice.‖ While Beggars of Life can be more easily read as an explicit commentary on the 
criminal justice system‘s inability to perform justice, especially when it concerns street-
involved communities, M also, as noted above, grapples with the construction of who may 
well be best authorized to dispense that justice.   
Pinpointing the ‗shadow‘ law in film draws attention to informal ways that we govern 
and are governed. As noted above in reference to M, formal law may be cast as an 
ineffectual tool for positive social and redistributive change; and films provide the evidence of 
law-in-action: whether demonstrating how law and legal processes mask and perpetuate 
exploitation and injustice along various markers of privilege and disadvantage;562 allegorizing 
corruption in administration of justice,563 or providing an antidote to the dominant vision of law 
as separate from morality, values and politics.564 Casting ‗film‘s law‘ as a shadow to ‗law‘s 
law‘ or as something that chips away at law‘s sobriety also highlights a key insight of legal 
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 William Wellman, Beggars of Life (1928).  
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 Elizabeth Conley‘s seminar entitled ―Film and the Law: Courtroom Drama‖ (Fall 2008, University of Utah) is a 
―forum for examination of concerns of non-dominant groups regarding rights, representation, and opportunity in 
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 Jonathan Rayner, "Masculinity, Morality and Action: Michael Mann and the Heist Movie " in Paul Mason, ed., 
Criminal Visions: Media Representations of Crime and Justice (Portland: Willan Press, 2003) 73. He argues that 
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enforcement mechanisms. See especially: Deep Cover (1992) and Donnie Brasco (1997).  
564
 For instance, Christine Corcos reads Ivan Reitman, Ghostbusters (1984) as a story about an undisclosed 
environmental threat that tells us something about competing interests in the environmental regulation debate: 
Christine Alice Corcos, "Who ya gonna c(s)ite?  Ghostbusters and the Environmental Regulation Debate" 
(1997) 13 Florida State University Law Review 231.  
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pluralism: jurisgenerative processes will always occur even without ‗the‘ law.565 However, the 
assumption remains that the law casting the shadow is fixed in formal and institutional sites 
rather than fluid and dynamic processes differently distributed within multiple and overlapping 
normative regimes (each with their own plurality in scales, modes and instruments of 
normativity). Furthermore, zones and moments of normative interaction do not only exist 
between the state and the non-state.  In conceptualizing the law–film relation only in terms of 
confrontation between formal and informal normative sites, these approaches overlook 
insight from critical legal pluralism: law is constituted, exists within and through multiple 
interstitial spaces for personal, communal and societal negotiation and interaction.566 
For instance, Sullivan’s Travels may reveal little about the externally imposed formal 
law that governs our interactions on the street.  It does, however, provide rich insight into the 
beliefs that may govern these interactions in far more profound ways.   Following a series of 
events, Sullivan is mistaken for a legitimate tramp; he is transformed through his 
performance into that which he was masquerading; and he embodies what the presumed 
audience fears most: anyone can fall from upward mobility.   The fear associated with 
becoming street-involved is normative; it guides our behaviour based on the belief that a life 
of poverty is a possibility that resides within us all; and street-involved people are 
fundamentally no different than non-street-involved people.  In Fisher King (1991), this insight 
is foregrounded both implicitly and explicitly.  The former is achieved by rhyming sequences 
in which Jack Lucas (Jeff Bridges) observes a panhandler through his car‘s tinted windows, 
is later mistaken for a homeless man and beaten but saved by a squatter (Robin Williams), a 
                                                                
565
 Ewick & Silbey, supra note 74; Harry Arthurs, Without the Law: Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in 
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 Cover (Uses), supra note 66; Macdonald (Emergence) supra note 8.      
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university professor whose broken heart keeps him in a state of altered consciousness.  The 
latter is achieved through the cameo by musician Tom Waits, also iconic and romanticized as 
symbolic of a generation‘s collective imagination.  Waits embodies the reflexive 
beggar/philosopher calls himself the ―moral traffic light‖ for passers-by.  In a Close-up, he 
explains:  
The people who work nine to five in soul-sucking jobs are one step from stabbing the 
asshole bosses in the warm when they think of the people they pass on their way to work, 
‗At least I‘m not begging for a living‘.  Sure enough, Bob‘s gonna put those scissors down 
and pucker up. 
 
The sequence invites us to consider the four levels of interactions that film expresses.  Three 
are within the diegesis:  Jeff Bridges‘ character is in dialogue with Tom Waits‘ character over 
the norms that guide his encounters with relative strangers; he is also in self-reflexively 
assessing his own normative commitments and how they materialize in similar interactions; 
and Tom waits, through analogy, directs our attention to the norms that guide day-to-day 
survival strategies which in turn function to maintain distinctions between street-involved 
people and their ‗others‘. The fourth is extra-diegetic: Tom Waits‘ iconicity and the 
uncanniness of his role may invite those who recognize him to further grapple with their 
interpretations of his perceptions of the relationships between street-involved people and 
their interlocutors.   
3.5 CINEMATIC LAW AND LEGAL CINEMATICS  
 
  In order to understand how films capture our legal imaginations and also become a 
fundamental aspect of legal lives and our lives in law, we should, contrary to more orthodox 
law-film approaches, turn our attention to the aesthetic and affective dimensions of law, and 
of film.  While content analysis and close-reading still hold currency in both film and legal 
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studies, moving beyond the text nudges us to think about how films works on us, and how 
they may produce ―structures of feeling that help to cohere [or destabilize] contemporary 
legal and political institutions‖ 567 Thinking about law cinematically (cinematic law) and 
cinema legally (legal cinematics) may bring us closer to such an endeavour.  I argue that 
cinematic law should be conceptualized in terms of the plurality of normative commitments 
and expectations that each individual viewer navigates.  In the next sub-section, I elaborate 
how legal cinematics are best conceptualized in terms of the production of norms through the 
interpretation, evaluation and reconfiguration of generic conventions.    
3.5.1 CINEMATIC LAW  
 
 Blurring any assumed boundary between law and film, cinematic law refers to how 
cinematic practices are already embedded in legal practices and symbolization.  To some 
cinematic law is the deployment of audiovisuals as rhetorical strategies that ‗speak‘ to jurors 
(who will be, it is assumed, more receptive to such media), which have been dismissed as 
dangerous encroachments on law‘s legitimacy.568 Similarly, media coverage of trials has long 
been suspect as a source of misinformation and distortion of legal facts, concepts and 
procedures.569 Finally, cinematic law is often justified as a way of discouraging coercion in 
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embodied dimensions of thought and constitution of subjectivities: Buchanan & Johnson (Strange),  supra note 
227.    
568
 Sherwin, supra note 227.  
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formal legal structures and permitting adjudicators to better evaluate the truthfulness of the 
claims before them.570  Cinematographic technology is increasingly common in various 
American jurisdictions and adjudicative settings through taped evidence and confessions, 
video-conferences, video settlement brochures, and victims‘ impact statements, and more 
recently still, through forensic animation and re-enactments of events.571  Though, as Silbey 
notes, it sees ―preposterous‖ that such mediated evidence be any less vulnerable to 
―manufacture or intervention‖ than viva voce or written testimony.572  
 Another way of understanding cinematic law is to interrogate the ways in which law, 
like film, constitutes ‗interpretative‘ audiences that evaluate, reconfigure and apply norms.573  
As explained above, one of the laudable aims of much law-film scholarship (and the 
pedagogy the field encourages by extension) is to activate law students‘ imaginations, to 
generate learning conditions in which empathy is prized over confrontation, and ultimately to 
deploy legal pedagogy in ways that will induce ―political self-actualization.‖ 574 The belief is 
that films can bind students viscerally and provoke them to cast a critical lens on their 
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195 
 
assumptions and beliefs about law, legal subjectivity, justice, ethics and morality.575  Through 
film, students ―by-pass‖ the analytical reasoning so fundamental to their legal education and 
allow themselves to be ―enchanted‖ by new images of law.576  While the transformative 
potential of performance and creation has been suggested,577  the impact of transforming 
‗law viewer‘ into ethical ‗law interpreters‘ through new modes of identification remains elusive.  
However, the argument that cinematic practices shape (without completely determining) law 
and legal consciousness is a powerful one.  Put more explicitly, cinematic law refers to how 
films can constitute judging audiences.   
 Within this orbit of thinking, some law–film scholars ask how legal subjects (in 
moments where they are governed by rules) and legal agents (in moments when they 
generate and enforce rules) are constituted through filmic processes. Some emphasize the 
ideological function of film in interpolating audiences into traditional subject positions which 
reinforce legal myths.578  Others argue that film‘s formal and ideological operations ―rhyme‖ 
or ―parallel‖ the stages, logic, narrative processes, and regulatory features of the trial: 
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 I have argued elsewhere that the ‗‗Women in Prison‘ genre is a shifting and complex feminist jurisprudence.  
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viewers actively adjudicate an ―unofficial trial of the legal system.‖579 Others still argue that 
cinematographic processes - espeically of framing, shot sequences, montage - operate 
indistintinguishably from the juridical processes – namely, censorship, sovereignty, and  
logic.580  Yet, as rich as these discussions are, the assumption sometimes remains that in 
performing these functions (defining, ensuring legitimacy, and constituting order), film does 
so through as aesthetic, cultural and popular medium, whereas law does so as a formal, 
positive and institutional medium.581 Film remains positioned as an ethical supplement 
outside law that guides it towards values of ―beauty and truth and justice‖;582 law‘s beauty, its 
common place in our lived reality, its affective lives, and its own modes of ambiguity are 
devalued or ignored altogether.   
 In what follows, I discuss how filmmakers symbolize interactions between street-
involved people and their others in ways that are less easily read as providing ethical 
guidance on how to live.  And yet, these films are nonetheless constitutive of street law.  I 
discuss Varda‘s Sans toit ni loi583 and Renoir‘s Boudu sauvé des eaux584 because both 
refuse to reward audiences with satisfying answers to complex social problems.  Neither film 
relies on primarily narrative cues to give insight into the source of their protagonists‘ 
wandering.  Instead, both turn rely on normative geography (a set of rules generated and 
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interpreted the authority to determine who is ‗in‘ and ‗out‘ of place)585 and use space to 
convey legal meanings. Further, both films deploys aesthetics of ambivalence and of 
pluralism rather than refine recognizable ‗tramp‘ narrative structures; they  edge viewers to 
question the boundaries between self and the other, and consequently, their relationships 
and responsibilities to real, relative or imagined strangers.   
 Sans toit ni loi unfolds in twelve linked Tracking Shots and each starts with an image 
that rhymes with the previous shot‘s ending. Mona (Sandrine Bonnaire) is a young, educated, 
middle-class ―vagabonde‖ who has relinquished all material possessions.  Aside from these 
details, she remains inscrutable to spectators who learn of her mythically nomadic life 
through third person accounts, anecdotes, interviews and observations by people who knew 
her, and if at all, merely in passing during the few weeks before her death. An opening 
sequence of the film – a slow zoom of barren snowy field to a ditch where a young woman 
has frozen to death and the overall unstructured feel of the narrative, draws attention to the 
material conditions of Mona‘s existence.586   
 She resembles earliest instantiations in the late 1800s of the tramp in the sense that 
her existence, and especially her inability or refusal to integrate into the various normative 
communities she encounters, is disturbing.587 Unlike the caricatures that stood in for fears 
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 Tim Cresswell, In Place/Out of Place: Geography, Ideology and Transgression (University of Minnesota 
Press, 1996).  
586
 For a rich discussion of the function of space in Sans toit, see:  Udris, supra note 497.  
587
 In the earliest Hollywood cinematic instantiations around the 1870s to early 1900s, in a context of economic 
depression, major waves of immigration, and unemployment, the tramp – distinguishable by a slouch hat, torn 
jacket, round-toed shoes and a dirty face - is often male, a villain, a thief, and a sexual predator.  Thomas 
Edison created a series of short films that informed later depictions of the tramp: A Tramp’s Dinner (1897) 
(trying to steal a baby‘s bottle for sustenance and is beaten); The Tramp and the Muscular Cook (1898) (trying 
to kiss the cook and is hit over the head); The Tramp Caught a Tartar (1898) (a tramp begs for food but is 
beaten); Meandering Mike (1901) (steals a pie but the cook turns his dogs lose on him); The Tramp’s 
Unexpected Skate (1901) (boys attach roller skates to an unsuspecting tramp who is asleep then violently wake 
him).  David W. Griffith also produced a cluster of films featuring tramps.  See for instance: The Girls and Daddy 
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about nationhood and citizenship, immigration, and race (expressed through action editing), 
the camera treats Mona in long-shots.  Indeed, the film has been referred to as one long 
tracking shot separated into pieces.588 Audiences witness her interactions with others and the 
camera invites interrogation as to whether meaningful inter-subjective relations can occur 
without the ability to articulate shared understandings of how to inhabit the world.  
Audiences and her interlocutors alike are confronted by her uncompromising world-
view and her embodied marginality.  Mona (from the Greek monos, for solitary, singular, 
one)589 is also in dialogue with Chaplin‘s tramp, the light-hearted, mischievous yet generally 
harmless vagrant who breaks all conventions of the Fordist work ethic and attempts to 
behave with grace and dignity notwithstanding his socio-economic status. While Mona 
breaches the norms associate with  middle-class respectability  (such as particular modes of 
femininity or cleanliness), unlike Chaplin‘s Tramp, she also, breaches norms that make up 
the ‗Code of the Road‘ but that are less easily marked as embedded in class relations (such 
as courtesy, respect and  gratitude for generosity).  
 Rather than inviting a quick judgment of her actions, her rejection of these norms is 
contextual.  She insults a truck-driver (―Everything but a radio. What a Heap!‖), but only after 
he makes sexual advances toward her; when offered to share a lifestyle with an intellectual-
cum-farmer who attempts to narrate her existence for her (―You have total freedom but total 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
(1909) (tramp tries to steal money from two young women); and The Lonedale Operator (1911) (a pair of 
tramps try to rob a train); and The Girl and her Trust (1912) (tramp tries to steal from a girl). All these films 
feature visual cues such as the tramp costumed as ‗villain‘ in a slouch hat and often recognizable as a drunkard 
through gestures.  As I have mentioned earlier, Chaplin‘s tramp shattered these symbolizations.  
588
 Susan Hayward, "Beyond the Gaze and into Femme-Film Ecriture" in Susan Hayward and Ginette 
Vincendeau, eds., French Film Texts and Contexts (London & New York: Routledge, 1990) 290-303 at p. 292. 
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 This connection is drawn by Françoise Aude: ―Sans toit, ni loi‖ (1986) revue Positif 65 at 65. It is interesting 
to note, that the name Mona bears the same meaning in Sanskrit; however, Mona means ‗noble‘ in Gaelic; in 
Persian the name stems from Mana, meaning that which lasts for eternity. 
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loneliness … if you want to live you must stop‖), she refuses (―I don‘t care.  I move‖).  She 
articulates her own laws; she conceptualizes conditions that foster inter-subjective exchange 
rather than power struggles (whether or not her interlocutors cooperate).  That is, she 
interprets the gifts from her interlocutors, the values and the gestures that underlie them (an 
expectation of reciprocity), as modes of symbolic domination.  She refuses to engage in with 
interlocutors who deny her agency, refuse her singularity, or whose interactions are not 
embedded in the values that give structure to her nomos – freedom, dignity, and autonomy.  
Throughout these interactions, Mona maintains authority over the diegetic normative 
universe; she is the also moral geography of the screen: her actions are an implicit invitation 
to her interlocutors in the extra-diegetic normative universe to interpret, evaluate and 
ultimately approve of her perspective.   
 In Boudu sauvé des eaux, we meet Boudu (Michel Simon) a ragged ―clochard 
sauvage‖ who has, unremarkably, (as we learn from a blasé onlooker) attempted to take his 
own life.  Edouard Lestingois (Charles Granval), a gentlemanly, intelligent, morally sure, 
middle-class bookseller, first encounters Boudu, teetering on the edge of the Pont des Arts 
through a visual apparatus: his telescope.  This sequence suggests one the film‘s key 
themes: the negotiation of proximity and distance between the urban poor and their ‗others.‘  
A variation of the familiar class transvestitism of the Hollywood ‗social problem‘ films,590 
Lestingois gives Boudu his clothes in an effort to inculcate him into the world of civilized.  
 Boudu, however, is ruled through his body. He operates by instinct, motion, 
impetuousness, irreverence; his impulses cannot be assimilated.  Like Chaplin‘s tramp, who 
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 Other instantiations of the tramp taking on the attire of his or her wealthy ‗other‘ include Charlie Chaplin, City 
Lights (1931) in which Chaplin‘s tramp befriends a drunken millionaire and is later mistaken for him.  
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relied less on narrative than on movement (physical comedy and other devices including 
pratfalls and fights), camera angles (for comical effect), and associative montage (which 
mandates that viewers draw their own psychological connections),591 Boudu organizes his 
world through his body.   
 Unlike the Tramp who exhibits depth of character, tenderness, and fear, Boudu is an 
id incarnate.  Rather than subverting norms infused with middle-class values, he is 
impervious to any normativity based in habits or shared assumptions: social conventions 
around personal distance (invading people‘s private spaces, he is unkempt and emits a bad 
odour) and of decorum (he only seeks the immediate gratification of his basic needs – food, 
rest and sex).  The responses he elicits from his interlocutors are invariably a desire to 
apprehend mixed with confusion, disdain, and irritation. 
 Renoir and Varda each admit, embrace, and invite us to reflect the tension between 
attraction and repulsion, proximity and distance. Like Mona, Boudu‘s ambivalence and even 
disregard toward the kindness of others, gestures viewers towards new understandings of 
relationships.  Neither film is a complete indictment of the generosity of others:592 characters 
who attempt to help the wandering protagonists remain sympathetic and their acts of ‗ethical 
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  Indeed, to some, Chaplin stands in for cinema itself.  He shatters the barriers of linear time, does away with 
conventional mimetic appeal, and radically develops new techniques to conquer ―the spirit of weight‖ through a 
―spirit of lightness,‖ of space and of movement: Jean Cocteau, Professional Secrets: An Autobiography (New 
York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1970) at 81. Similarly, to Shklovsky, ―Chaplin‘s movements and all his films are 
not conceived as words or sketches but in the flashing of white and shadows‖:  Viktor Shklovsky, Literature and 
Cinematography (Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1985) at 57.  
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 Of the two films, Boudu, which takes place in Depression era France at a time of dramatic increase in the 
visibility of people where living in parks and city streets, certainly has been read as, at least, a partial judgment 
of the hypocritical middle-class: Christopher Faulkner, "Boudu Saved From Drowning: Tramping in the City" 
(2005)  Notes to the Criterion Collection Edition.  
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caring.‘593 Their attempts at meaningful exchanges, while not entirely dismissed, are at least 
relativized in relation to the protagonist‘s own commitments, desires and agential practices. 
   Unlike the blind seer, whose narrative function and character motivations we 
understand through memory and interactions with this mythological trope, neither 
protagonist‘s motivations are accessible. We cannot easily assess either‘s normative 
expectations or commitments.  We are sometimes forced into the uneasy position of relying 
on the interpretations of their interlocutors (a series of strangers in Mona‘s case and 
Lestingois in Boudu‘s). While these are the explicitly privileged interpretations their ability to 
generate conditions of mutual responsibility are limited because their assessments are based 
on conjecture rather than on the specificity that can be perceived in relations of proximity.   
 Ultimately, these other norm entrepreneurs do not see their interlocutors, but the 
viewers see what they have overlooked.  As a result, we are invited to look to the less explicit 
norm entrepreneurs for guidance on how to interact with street-involved people: the 
protagonists themselves.  
 
3.5.2 LEGAL CINEMATICS  
 
 Neither Sans toit ni loi nor Boudu follows the generic conventions of films that feature 
interactions with the street-community.  Failing to do so, they bring into sharp relief another 
aspect of the law–film relation: cinematic law.  That is, audiences have a normative 
expectation of some predictability with the right amount of variations.   
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 ―Ethical caring‖ is the mode of care we perform when ―moral caring‖ – which is sustained through love, 
sympathy, generosity and reciprocal attention – fails: Noddings, supra note 176 at 54. 
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Legal cinematics can also refer to the generic systems that orient audiences, and 
shape and reflect expectations that emerge from the interactions among the film industry, the 
viewing subject, and the artifact itself.  Genre is a set of stylistic, thematic and narrative rules; 
it is one of film‘s normative modes. A spectator‘s expectations of a film are, to some 
measure, produced, encouraged or destabilized in relation to what she expects will happen.  
These expectations are equally based on her prior interactions with similar narrative, stylistic 
and thematic conventions. Through the following definitional process and the expectations 
that give them shape, genre explicitly, formally, informally, and implicitly governs film.  First, 
generic conventions can be arbitrarily and externally imposed system of rules (for instance by 
censors).594  Second, they can be used rhetorically, harnessing the normative power of taste 
and fashion by producers and advertisers who want to market to specific populations.  Third, 
they can operate in ways that further dialogue between cinema and other modes 
communication: filmmakers rely on audiences‘ assimilation of myth and assumptions in order 
to infer specific values and traits to recognizable tropes and figures in their films. Finally, 
generic convention can generate conditions of agency, by inviting spectators to make new 
associations based on learned perceptual categories and memory.   
A genre can never conclusively be defined and even when its conventions seem fixed, 
one film can upset its standards and undermine its integrity.  Genre is implicitly self-reflexive 
(it is aware and makes plain its referential flaws) and is a series of continually shifting 
practices:  reference, inclusion, exclusion and adaptation.  These practices provoke 
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 Recall that Derrida argued that no text ever ―belongs‖ to a genre. Rather, ―contamination‖ is inherent to any 
generic demarcation because to mark or to impose a ―citation‖ of genre on a text simultaneously ―unmarks‖ it.  
While every text participates in one or many genres, ―such participation never amounts to belonging:‖ Jacques 
Derrida, "The Law of Genre" (1980) 7 Glyph 176 at 187.     
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spectators to draw new connections between similar events and create dialogue between 
multiple artifacts.595  
Some law-film scholars have focused on patterned and recognizable (generic) films 
such as trial films to demonstrate how cinema cultivates expectations in its viewer-subjects‖ 
that ―perpetuate the law‘s promise.‖596 During audience engagement with a cinematic legal 
text there operates multiple unconscious processes ―caught up in,‖ ―formed by,‖ and 
constituting meanings.597 Through interaction with generic conventions, a spectator may 
position herself ambivalently, for instance, both identifying with and enacting judgment of a 
victim.598 Rather than attempt to develop a ‗street law‘ genre, however, I argue that it is more 
fruitful to think about how conventions, and our expectations that inform and flow from them, 
are always in flux. And yet, I suggest that looking broadly at films that engage with the 
question of relationships between street-involved people and their others (such as how do we 
co-exist and how should we deal with conflicts), it is often by considering them in terms of 
genre, in terms of their relationships to other similar cultural expressions,  that meaning 
emerges.   
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 The literature on genre theory is immense.  For a helpful introduction, see: Stephen Neale, Genre (London: 
British Film Institute, 1980). For critical engagement with genre, arguing that it must be understood in light of 
cinematic practices, see: Rick Altman, The American Film Musical (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1987).  On the ideological character of genre: Barbar Klinger, "Cinema/Ideology/Criticism 
Revisited: The Progressive Genre" in Barry Keith Grant, ed., The Film Genre Reader III (Texas: University 
Press, 2003) 75.  On the fiction of sustaining a definition of ‗genre‘:  Christopher Morris, "The Reflexivity of the 
Road Film" (2003) 28:11 Film Criticism 24. For a critical appropriation of genre: Cavell, supra note 270.    
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 Trial films can fulfill or disappoint subject-viewer expectations and thus enable a relationship between 
audience and film that ―both critiques the discursive practices of law and of film as disciplining forces on their 
subjects and relies on those practices as they designate their subjects as integral to their meaning-making:‖ 
Jessica M. Sibley, "Patterns of Courtroom Justice"  in Stephan Machura & Peter  Robson, eds., Law and Film: 
Journal of Law and Society (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2001) 97 at 97.  
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 Annette Kuhn, Women's Pictures: Feminism and the Cinema (London: Verso, 1994) at 44.  
598
 Kamir illustrates this beautifully in her reading of Death and the Maiden (1994): supra note 227 at 185.  
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Consider Ryan.599  This film is constructed as a series of animated images rhyming 
with extensive conversations between two Canadian animators, Ryan Larkin and the film‘s 
director Chris Landret.  Ryan may share some generic features of documentary films made 
about or ‗with‘ street-involved people. However, by virtue of its bending of genre, Ryan 
emerges as not simply a new mode of instantiating documentary film or even a new mode of 
instantiating homelessness.  The film plays with and ultimately shatters the normative 
conventions of documentary in order to tell a more specific story about an artist who happens 
to panhandle from time to time. It is ultimately a film that wrests with broader questions: the 
limits of agency, our ethical obligations to our interlocutors, and the possibility that our other‘s 
agency will ultimately result in a rejection of our attempts to establish caring relationships.  
      There is a romanticized figure of the self-sufficient wander/philosopher/poet that 
dominates popular literature of the early twentieth century (in the work of Josiah Flynt and 
Jack London for instance).600 This image also features prominently in documentary films that 
feature a tramp/panhandler breaking social conventions because of a higher calling as 
artist/philosopher.601  
Ryan tells this familiar story from a different point of view through the mediation of 
experimentation and animation.  In making the film about Ryan Larkin, a visionary animation 
genius, who struggles with alcoholism and declines into depression and homeless, Landreth 
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 Chris Landereth, Ryan (2004).  
600
On the desire to embody vagrancy through one‘s art, see: Greaney, supra note 437; Kristin Ross, The 
Emergence of Social Space: Rimbaud and the Paris Commune (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 
1988). 
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 See for instance, Earl ‗Snake‘ Richards (Jim Birdsell) as the homeless songwriter: Richard Brill, That 
Tennessee Beat (1966) In Les amants du Pont-Neuf (1991), Alex is a circus performer addicted to alcohol and 
sedatives and Michele is a painter driven to a life on the streets because of a failed relationship.  Stanley Tucci, 
Joe Gould’s Secret (2000) is a fictionalized account based on two New Yorker profiles written by Joseph 
Mitchell.  Gould was a homeless Harvard graduate and Greenwich Village fixture writing An Oral History of the 
World, providing a venue for the voices of everyone he encountered, including the disposed and downtrodden.  
Rhyming the trope of the blind seer, Gould is a (acerbic perhaps) truth-teller.     
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breaks with most received conventions of biographical documentary.  The only reference 
points for viewers to evaluate the truth-claims of the statements made are taped interviews 
reconstructed through jolting animation effects and disembodied 3D generated and animated 
characters.  The film‘s richness can be summarized through one especially difficult 
interaction. In a Shot/Reverse sequence, Landreth condescendingly discusses his concern 
about Ryan‘s alcohol consumption.  An animated halo appears above Landreth‘s head which 
serves as striking commentary on the power relations at play in some forms of charity and 
rescue narratives that are features of many films ‗about‘ street-involved people.  The Reverse 
shot features Ryan, annoyed with Landreth‘s attempt to meddle in his affairs.  It repositions 
him as judge: with careful and detailed animation techniques, Ryan‘s pulsating brain 
explodes all over Landreth face. Landreth collects Ryan‘s brain, hands it back to him; his 
halo peters out and eventually disappears. The final (return) shot in the Shot/Reverse 
sequence is deferred to the additional footage that accompanies the animated short. In real 
documentary footage of Ryan watching the animated film, he is visibly disturbed, confused 
and wounded.  He is uncertain as to Landreth‘s intentions: ―it is always easy,‖ he says ―to 
show the grotesque version of reality‖.   
 On one level, this sequence put into sharp relief the constructed nature of truths 
generally and some of the violence that can occur through externally imposed definitions of 
how to relate with the world.  On another, the sequence gets at some of the most difficult 
paradoxes that interactions between street-involved people and their interlocutors will raise, 
and more broadly, that any interaction between self and other will bring about.  On another 
level still, it suggests, through its explicit self-reflexivity (like Sullivan’s Travels, it is a film 
about a film and a film about making film) that caring for our others requires that we be 
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prepared to constantly re-evaluate our normative assumptions.  And on a final level, the film 
is a powerful reminder that concern and care may be insufficient to bring about meaningful 
conditions for the exercise of agency: without doubt, Landreth wants to help his intellectual 
and artistic mentor, and is deeply disturbed by (but ultimately powerless to prevent) Ryan‘s 
self-destructive behaviour.   
 Agency, that said, is always relative and for street-involved people (as for anyone 
else) subjectivity can resist even its own determinations of agency.  The film symbolizes 
some of the most difficult aspirations and fears that we have when imagining how to live with 
one another, those which are most difficult to express  in written or in spoken modes: if one 
accepts the agency of our real or imagined others, that recognition must include the 
possibility of the rejection of one‘s own values, beliefs and intentions; if one accepts the 
agency of our real and imaged others, one must also recognize that agential actions may 
take the form of distortions, self-harm, and other survival mechanisms; if one accepts the 
agency of our other, we may be confronted with the reality that recovery-oriented intervention 
models of care,  if even they exist, can be ineffectual.602  
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 Recovery models of care abide by a number of guidelines including: collaboration among multiple assistance 
programs in multiple fields (housing, medical and dental care, mental health, substance use, depression and 
anxiety, nutrition, education and training and so on).  Fostering agency (by addressing these concerns and 
through peer support and developing other supportive relationships) is the cornerstone of recovery process.  
See generally: Laura Gillis, Gloria Dickerson & Justine Hanson, ―Recovery and Homeless Services: New 
Directions in the Field‖ (2010) 3 The Open Health Services and Policy Journal 71.  
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3.6 BEYOND INTERPRETATION 
 
 I have illustrated through my interpretation of films that feature moments of interaction 
between street-involved people and their interlocutors, how a critical legal pluralist hypothesis 
of the law–film relation does not limit itself to films which are explicitly about law.  Cinematic 
expressions of street law can be symbolized through people‘s navigation of canonical legal 
instruments such as legislation and cases, coercive institutions such as the prison, or official 
legal actors like judges, lawyers, and police.  I choose instead to focus on films that engage 
implicit and inferential normativity: conceptions, values and beliefs (about more recognizable 
markers of law such as judgment and legal subjectivity) but more elusive ones as well (such 
as the ideals of community, belonging, autonomy, and agency) without necessarily resorting 
to the direct representation of formal and state-based legal institutions, actors or processes.   
To the extent that film is a space through which we can ask questions about fairness, 
hierarchies, and interpretations and the multitudinous ways these relate to one another in 
viewers engaging in agential practices, it is normative.  Film is at once regulated by law and 
is one of many sites in which legal rhetoric and iconography are constituted.603 Law is 
visually organized through rituals, paraphernalia and symbolism. These images and symbols 
of the legal processes (dress, architecture, and iconography) organize law as much as it 
attempts to organize them.  They convey meaning and can elicit feelings such as alienation, 
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 As Douzinas and Nead remind us, law both ―loves and fears images‖; it will regulate images while reordering 
its own processes and practices in a visual manner.  It renounces images as frivolous and devoid of reason, as 
potentially contamination forces that will dupe, seduce, or corrupt.  Yet, it has always been rich with 
iconography and visual paraphernalia (wigs, stages, and images of justice): ―law has always had a visual policy 
and understood the importance of the governance of images for the maintenance of the social bond:‖ Douzinas 
& Nead, "Introduction" in Douzinas & Nead, supra note 193 at 8-9.   
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disempowerment, anxiety, awe and relief.604 The ideas about law which are circulated 
through film are consequently already invested in these existing frameworks through which 
we construct cinematic and legal meanings.605    
 Film is more than a container to be filled by individual directors with images of legal 
themes or recognizable (formal, explicit) legal actors and institutions.  Nor does it merely add 
new meaning to law‘s traditional artifacts, such as legislation, judgments and contracts.  Of 
course, it can, and does, serve these functions.  To borrow from W.J.T. Mitchell, filmic 
symbolization of law is ―a complex interplay between visuality, apparatus, institutions, 
discourse, bodies, and figurality.‖606 Films are not taken to represent law but to generate a 
sense of our multiple legal selves and the myriad sites of normativity we navigate daily and 
they offer a semblance of existing norms and the material realities that inform and produce 
them. Law and film are both media.607 Both are expressive forms that attempt to symbolize 
how to conduct ourselves.  Both are matrices of rules embedded in institutions and 
processes.  Both are dynamic and inherently plural.  Both are comprised of multiple and 
shifting sites of meaning-making.  The interactions that constitute the legal and the filmic 
event both occur at the intersection of reality as represented, mediated and contained within 
the irreducible site of the individual.   Film is, then, a normative symbolization of street law as 
it suggests alternative ways to govern relationships through rules.608 Put differently, film 
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 Goodrich, supra note 233 at 184.  
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 Id.  
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 Mitchell (Pictures), supra note 238 at 87. 
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  At its simplest and most explicit level, film is a recording on material strip or flickering lights on a screen, 
whereas law is the words that make up legislation, judgments and contracts.   
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James Boyd White has for several decades argued that law is art: (Imagination) supra note 529 at 5.  The 
corollary point has been made in reference to other  artifacts that are not communicated through (formal law‘s) 
natural language such as architecture, dance, painting, music yet are normative in and of themselves:  Anker 
(Painting), supra note 52; Kasirer (Dance), supra note 185; Macdonald & MacLean, supra note 78; Manderson 
(Songs), supra note 25. 
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constitutes law in the broadest and more pluralist sense of imagining our interactions on the 
streets in their complexity and in ways that further relationships that make that law 
meaningful to the people most embedded in its exigencies. 
 In the next chapter, I explore another mode of conceptualizing film as law. I discuss 
my production of a film through the Korsakow hypermedia program.  This rule-governed, 
explicitly interactive, and dynamic visual media poses a challenge to positivist, logocentric, 
and chirographic legal discourses by suggesting other modes of apprehending meanings 
about street law.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: FILM AS LAW AS FILM  
 
The Three Goals 
 
The first goal is to see the thing itself 
in and for itself, to see it simply and clearly 
for what it is. 
 No symbolism, please. 
 
The second goal is to see each individual thing 
as unified, as one, with all the other 
ten thousand things. 
 In this regard, a little wine helps a lot. 
 
The third goal is to grasp the first and the second goals, 
to see the universal and the particular, 
simultaneously. 
 Regarding this one, call me when you get it. 
 
- David Budbill
609 
 
 In Chapter Three, I held up films that feature the potential conflict as well as the inter-
subjective possibilities that inhere in any encounter between street-involved people and their 
interlocutors.  The symbolization of these interactions, I suggested, is one of the multiple 
ways in which film is street law.  Some stories, Boudu for instance, show the complexities, 
challenges and possibilities of relating to inscrutable others.  Such street law stories are 
sometimes often better told in a ‗fictional‘ register.  The caricatured nature of certain 
protagonists may create a space to grapple with negative affective responses (including 
frustration, indifference and anger) in ways that might not work were the characters‘ 
motivations, habits, and modes of generating law attributed to ‗actual‘ people.  Other stories 
show how conditions that promote the exercise of agency may nonetheless be insufficient to 
generate situations in which individuals can receive the care they require.  These stories may 
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 David Budbill, Moment to Moment: Poems of a Mountain Recluse (Port Townsend: Copper Canyon Press, 
1999) at 151. 
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require a ‗realist‘ feel in order to relate them to embodied material practices or to suggest 
relational conceptions of autonomy between street-involved people and their interlocutors.  
Yet, as in the case of Ryan, sometimes the painful visceral and affective responses such a 
film may elicit (including guilt, uncertainty and powerlessness) require the mediation of 
experimental film and animation to make these stories bearable.610  Others still, such as 
Sullivan’s Travels, which operate on multiple intertextual, contextual, and self-reflexive levels 
require a ‗fictional‘ but ‗linear‘ narrative in order to maintain, and thereby disrupt, audience‘s 
expectations. Finally, some stories about street law, which may be more tentative and 
exploratory, may be best cast in a ‗realist‘ register that is ‗non-linear.‘   Building on what 
Budbill suggests above, when such films attempt to invite new perceptions, attend to 
singularity, and ultimately express more universal understandings, there must be space for 
expression, abstraction, symbolization.  To this end, I grapple with some of the implicit and 
inferential law that governs interactions on the street through the production of a non-linear, 
associational, mélange of fictional, realist, classical and experimental registers.  
 In this chapter, I discuss how making a film that thinks about street law through an 
explicitly interactive structure without a predetermined narrative path which is also a way of 
symbolizing street law, and within the broader critical legal pluralist ethos, all law. In Part 
One, I describe the Korsakow hypermedia program which has permitted me to make such a 
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 I use realism here in the sense of materialist aesthetics. Film, while not a purely mimetic or indexical media, 
can register the everyday, the contingent, and the unpredictable.  It registers but not in a narrow, positivist, or 
literal sense. Rather, film‘s photographic properties enable it to inscribe an image with moments of temporality 
and contingency: Seigfried Kracaeur,Theory of Film: Redemption of Physical Reality (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997). See also Miriam Bratu Hansen‘s reading of Kracaeur‘s oeuvre in ―Introduction:‖ Ibid. at 
vii-xiv.    
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film.  The ‗Korsakow System‘611 enables a kind of organized contingency (with varying 
possible outcomes that depend, to a significant extent, on filmmakers‘ definitional practices) 
in a process of flux and continual change (in light of the implicit and explicit audience 
engagement). In Part Two, I discuss some of the methods (filmed interviews, modified auto-
cinematography and collaborative filmmaking) that inform and help me convey the aim of my 
film: an endeavour to express multiple conceptualizations of street law. I conclude with the 
claim that the production of a Korsakow Film (K-Film) furthers my critical legal hypothesis of 
street law: it symbolizes encounters between street-involved people and their interlocutors as 
governed by rules.   
4.1 THE KORSAKOW FILM  
  
 Korsakow is an open source project for creating non-linear interactive films.612 A K-
Film  is produced through the Korsakow hypermedia software application referred to as the 
―K System.‖613 Such films are published and accessed on-line. They are rule-governed, 
explicitly and implicitly interactive, dynamic media.  Each of these characteristics is 
considered below.  
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 I use the term ‗system‘ because it is the qualifier used by its creator.  However, as will be made more evident 
in the ensuing discussion, I believe the term has unfortunate positivist connotations.   On the one hand, Patrick 
Glenn reminds us ‗systems‘ (he refers to legal systems especially) are temporally fixed, ―momentary‖ in nature, 
with each moment constituting a new system and correspondingly the death of the previous one (whereas 
traditions rely on their ‗pastness‘ for their normative thrust):  H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World: 
Sustainable Diversity in Law, 4
th
 edition (Oxford: University Press, 2010). Korsakow, on the other, relies of 
vusers‘ memories and lived experience, deriving its normative impulse from associations they construct 
between and among these.   Moreover, system works less well to convey the dynamic and non-linear quality of 
the software.   
612
 The K System has been released under the GNU public license: http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html 
613
 The software was invented by Florian Thalhofer - a digital filmmaker and (then) graduate student from 
Concordia University, Montreal - in 2000. It is open-source and available for free on the internet. CINER-G 
(Concordia Interactive Narrative Experimentation and Research Group) ‗houses‘ the Korsakow project and 
published Version 5 of the K System in 2009: www.Korsakow.org.   
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4.1.1 THE K-FILM AS RULE-GOVERNED  
  
 A K-Film is organized around definitional and interactional practices. The filmmaker 
completes and selects a number of SNUs (Smallest Narrative Unit) which comprise the 
audiovisual data for the broader film project.614 Each SNU may express meaning in multiple 
modes (usually through film, but also through still images and sound files), in variable 
narrative forms (whether cinéma verité, fiction, home video, archival footage, or experimental 
sounds and images), and through a myriad of instruments (such as continuity, realist, or 
associational editing techniques).615 SNUs are then ‗tagged.‘ Each narrative unit is assigned 
a number of keywords which are inputted by the filmmaker into the K System. Keywords can 
refer to substance (characters, spaces, location, moods, dialogue), form (colour, line, 
orientation, contrast, camera movement), and metaphor (juxtapositions, associations and 
abstraction). The keywords permit the filmmaker to ‗link‘ SNUs to one another based on 
shared language: there are ‗I am‘ terms (those with which the SNU identifies) and ‗You are‘ 
terms (those that the SNU will seek out).  The ‗links‘ between the self and other are neither 
fixed nor stable, however. The K System designers refer to them as ‗Points of Contact‘ 
(POC) which suggests they are more than links: they represent the possibility of a link.616    
                                                                
614
 A SNU is an audiovideo file whose duration can be up to approximately three minutes. 
615
 SNUs are prepared by using other editing software applications; these media files are then imported into the 
Korsakow System.  
616
 The concept of ―points of contact‖ in this context is attributed by Korsakow administrators to filmmaker and 
theorist Heinz Emigholz: CINER-G, "Korsakow: Home of the SNU: FAQs", online:   
<http://Korsakow.org/learn/faq>. The POC recalls Deleuze and Guattari‘s rhizome and especially its principle of 
multiplicity whereby, there are ―no points or positions in a rhizome … only lines.  When Glenn Gould speeds up 
the performance of a piece, he is not just displaying virtuosity, he is transforming the musical points into lines, 
and he is making the whole piece proliferate:‖ Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia, trans. by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota  Press 1987) at 7 and 13.  
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Through definitional and associational processes, the filmmaker establishes rules through 
which SNUs will relate to one another.   
 The K-Film works best when there is a tension between relative degrees of order and 
chaos.  The points of contact between narrative units can neither be overly direct and explicit 
(which would destroy the variable and associational nature of the film) nor so implicit and 
indirect (which would render any associations so abstract that they would frustrate a 
vuser‘s617  engagement with the film). For instance, the program works according to the 
general guidelines established by the filmmaker (e.g., vusers can only view each SNU once; 
or the vusing experience must begin with a specific audiovisual file) and allows for the 
development of more detailed and fixed rules (e.g., a SNU will end a film by being coded the 
last media file possible to access; a particular SNU must be watched entirely; or narrative 
units in certain formats will not speak to one another).   
 If too detailed and prescriptive, these rules can constrain conditions of agency for the 
vuser by limiting her choices.  There must, as a result, be enough randomness to maintain 
the database quality of the film.618 Yet, there must also be enough consistency so that 
                                                                
 
617
 As noted, vuser is Bill Seaman‘s concept that gets at the processes through which the viewer / users co-
constitutes the incessantly possible interactive artistic experiences when they engage with interactive media: 
supra note 212.    
618
 In ―database cinema,‖ the story develops through the viewer‘s selection of a scene from a larger corpus of 
scenes.  To this end, it rattles the fixed linearity often attributed to traditional cinema: Lev Manovich, "Soft 
Cinema", online: (1999)  <http://softcinema.net/form.htm>. Korsakow, however, is not pure ‗database‘ because 
the corpus from which the vuser chooses is in constant flux (the ‗content‘ of the film itself, as I elaborate, may 
change) and the options available for vusing will vary with every individual interaction with the media.  Compare 
the K software and YouTube©. Both rely on user-generated content.  However, YouTube is a database to the 
extent that the program randomly selects clips from a pre-existing pool of images organized according to 
externally defined criteria (as most videos have a generic title, description and some user generated tags).  It is 
also an algorithm because it creates a map of video relations, enables ‗real time‘ content and ranks video 
according to the frequency with which they are viewed (the more frequently people interact with a particular 
video, the more frequently it will appear in the list of generated content suggestions).  The Korsakow System 
distinguishes itself from YouTube in the following ways.  It will not determine which may be of interest to viewers 
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meaning is generated through the associations vusers make between narrative units 
regardless of the order in which they are experienced.619  The K System then automates the 
probability that a SNU will interact with another based on their shared language (or 
keywords).620 To speak of automation does not mean that the links between SNUs are pre-
determined. The encounter or point of contact is contingent upon a complex interplay 
between at least three features of the vusing experience: the external definitional process (in 
turn shaped and reflected by an individual filmmaker‘s normative expectations and 
commitments), the internal program‘s functions that search for images that share a language 
(in turn shaped and reflected by the designer‘s normative expectations and commitments), 
and the aesthetic preference of the vuser (in turn shaped and reflected by the individual 
vuser‘s normative expectations and commitments).  The points of contact cannot be reduced 
to whether two images will ‗speak‘ to one another; rather, they make up the multiple matrices 
of possible interactions between multiple normative agents.  The K-Film‘s mode of 
governance is, consequently, neither coercive, nor predetermined, nor instrumental. It is 
facilitative and organized around rules that symbolize self-directed action on the part of the 
vuser.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
based on their previous selections (but based on the rules generated by the filmmaker) and importantly, these 
guidelines remain regardless of how many times a particular SNU is experienced.   
619
 I rely on Manovich‘s conceptualization of the database as ―endless and unstructured‖.  We inhabit, he 
argues, a world that is an ―endless and unstructured assemblage of images, texts, data.‖ The database is, 
correspondingly, the symbolic form of our current cultural moment. He adds that equally appropriate is that we 
develop ―a poetics, aesthetics and ethics of this database: Lev Manovich, Database as a Symbolic Form 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998) at 219. The K-Film is not then a pure database because it defies object-oriented 
hierarchies and enables its vusers to assemble (and disassemble) new relationships 
620
 As noted earlier, in ―algorithmic cinema,‖ the system of rules entirely determines the sequence of the media 
files and often ranks and generates content suggestions: Ibid. However, with Korsakow, vusers retain a relative 
agency over the order of the images she will experience.   
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4.1.2 THE K-FILM AS EXPLICITLY INTERACTIVE  
  
 The K System facilitates the crafting of web-based films that, in addition to being 
implicitly interactive (as any film) are explicitly interactive in that they are organized in ways 
that permit vusers to make choices based on their aesthetic interests and expectations.  To 
return to a point made in Chapter Two, the engagement a K-Film encourages is akin to that 
which the Tracking Shot invites.  Both generate conditions for the exercise of agency by 
viewers, letting them choose – based on preferences, desires, interests etc. – where and to 
what to direct their attention.  However, the K System adds a more overt and explicit 
interaction with vusers by letting vusers choose – based on aesthetic tastes, time-constraints, 
investment in a story – whether or not to engage with an image at all.621   
 The K-Film‘s model for spatial navigation is not labyrinthine.  It is rhizomatic.622  
Rather than mapping out fixed, linear and pre-determined set of pathways such as in a   
flowchart or a ‗choose your own ending‘ format, it operates within principles of possible 
interactions, assemblages and connections through time and space.  Because it is the vuser 
who ultimately decides which SNUs she will look at, there can be no privileged mode – 
whether imposed by the filmmaker, the media, or general social conventions - of 
experiencing the film.  The non-linear structure may well disturb common sense 
understandings and expectations of narration.  But it simultaneously suggests new modes of 
narrational agency.  The assumed default mode of structuring (and thereby constituting) 
                                                                
621
 Obviously, this is not to suggest that film viewers are ‗subjected to‘ a Tracking Shot; they can close their 
eyes, turn off the television, or eject the DVD. But to the extent that they are invested in and committed to 
experiencing the audiovisual data before them, unlike the K-Film, the sequence of events they encounter are 
pre-determined through ordinary cinematic processes, such as narrative construction and editing.  
622
 I use rhizomatic in the sense that ―any point … can be connected to anything other‖ and indeed, as Deleuze 
and Guattari state, it ―must be:‖ Deleuze & Guattari, supra note 615 at 24. 
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stories is the linear narrative (in law and in film).  The Korsakow process puts into sharp relief 
how filmmaking, like law, is an on-going process of definition, imagination and creation.  As 
noted above, there are only suggestions of paths and relationships between images that 
have been facilitated by a filmmaker using the software.  As will be discussed below, those 
rules are always being negotiated, evaluated and thus reconstituted by a community of 
vusers. 
4.1.3 THE K-FILM AS ALWAYS UNFINISHED  
 
 The K-Film is always unfinished in several senses.  First, given the fluidity of its 
governance through rules and the vuser‘s relative agency is determining the SNUs she will 
experience within that malleable structure, the K-Film will never be the same event twice.  
The designers of the K-Film encourage people to use the program creatively as an open-
ended tool that can itself be interpreted and used against its own purposes: used and vused 
in unintended or previously unimagined ways.623   Filmmakers are also invited to be self-
reflexive about the filmmaking process, to publish SNUs ‗in progress,‘ and constantly modify 
SNUs and the rules which link them based on vuser responses. Second, in constituting a 
community of K-Film makers and vusers, the Korsakow website encourages the continued 
development of the System by requesting that people create and share new features and 
codes.624 Rather than what we may refer to as the ‗modernist‘ aesthetics of order, fixity and 
closure as embodied  in some orthodox understandings of film and of law, Korsakow 
                                                                
623
 For instance, Korsakow designers are currently developing a way in which vusers can leave comments on 
specific SNUs: correspondence with Matt Soar, director of CINER-G (on file with author).  Further, at a 
Korsakow workshop I attended in the winter of 2010, filmmaker Mel Hogan created (over a period of two days) 
a K-Film that only featured text-based stills (going against the system‘s database and cinematic qualities).  
624
CINER-G, "Korsakow: Home of the SNU: FAQs", online:   <http://Korsakow.org/learn/faq>.  
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embodies the critical aesthetics of pluralism, mutability, indeterminate transformation, and 
malleability.625 
 
4.1.4 THE K-FILM AS CRITICAL LEGAL HYPOTHESIS OF LAW   
 
These three identified features – its symbolization of relationships as governed 
through rules, its explicit and implicit interactivity and its on-going becoming - make the K 
System itself a metaphor for imagining law within a critical legal pluralist ethos. Nonetheless, 
my very cataloguing of these qualities is necessarily reductionist.626 It is so because other 
critical legal pluralist hypotheses might emphasize its chaotics (the film‘s unpredictability, 
complexity and promise of surprise)627 or its teleidoscopic features (the vuser‘s unlimited 
perspectival range).628  As pluralist hypotheses are irreducibly pluralist themselves, mine is 
necessarily but one of many.  In what follows, I discuss my process for creating a K-Film 
which attends to the features I identify and which in part symbolize my critical legal 
hypothesis of street law. 
 
 
                                                                
625
 For scholars developing conceptualizations of critical legal pluralist aesthetics, see: Kleinhans & Macdonald, 
supra note 37; Davies (Ethos), supra note 7 at 37; and Manderson (Songs), supra note 25.  For the rich 
potential of K-Films in other disciplines, see: Wilson (Moving Camera), supra note 482.  
626
 As I note in my discussion of radical legal pluralism, not everyone dwelling within its ethos will necessarily 
challenge each of the tenets conventionally associated with Western common law: Chapter One, 1.1 (―Critical 
Assumptions‖).    
627
 Manderson (Songs), supra note 25 at 177.  
628
 Macdonald develops the teleidoscope – hybridized telescope and kaleidoscope - as legal analogy in: 
(Jamais deux), supra note 200. See also: Roderick A. Macdonald, "Kaleidoscopic Federalism" in Jean-François 
Gaudreault-DesBiens & Fabien Gélinas, eds., The States and Moods of Federalism: Governance, Identity and 
Methodology (Montreal: Éditions Yvon Blais, 2005) 261. 
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4.2 PERFORMING STREET LAW: METHODS AND METHODOLOGIES  
  
 The Korsakow Film I have produced is my own symbolization of street law.  Yet, it can 
never only ever be my personal symbolization of street law.  The expression of street law 
which has been conceptualized through my K-Film emerged from the intermingling of at least 
three practices: filmed semi-structured interviews, auto-cinematography, and the implicit and 
explicit collaboration that inheres to any filmmaking 
4.2.1 INTERVIEWS  
 
 I have relied on interviews to ground my critical legal hypothesis of street law.629 Over 
three years, I conducted twenty-five semi-structured interviews, of which fourteen were filmed 
with (and sometimes by) street-involved people.  While it may be tempting to consider my 
film an attempt to provide new evidence of street law, I do not use filmed interviews in this 
manner.  They are not a means of discovering, recording and archiving raw (truthful, 
untouched, authentic), reliable (legitimate, interpreted by experts, scientifically proved) 
evidence (official facts or hitherto unknown facts) about street law.  As I argue in Chapter 
One, street law is not an identifiable and autonomous body of rules and principles contained 
within a single institutional framework. Nor do the filmed interviews establish the truth-value 
                                                                
629
 As noted in my Introduction, I recruited participants primarily through my volunteer work with a mobile legal 
clinic offering legal information and support services to the street community with la Clinique Droits Devant,  
Bon Dieu dans la rue (an organization serving youth living on, or at-risk of living on the streets), RAPSIM and 
HomelessNation. Other individuals who work and volunteer for these organizations also put me in contact with 
people they believed would be interested in my project.  Finally, I draw extensively on the multiple informal 
conversations I have had in my daily interactions on the street with multiple street-users and with various street 
law constituents at conferences, rallies, and parliamentary commissions grappling with the complexities of 
street-involvement and the appropriate means, methods, and visions for the governance of interactions on the 
street as imagined through rule.  For a more detailed discussion of the ethical concerns and guidelines, see 
Appendix: Ethics Application & Templates. 
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of the claims about street law which I have made earlier through other modes of perception I 
deploy in earlier chapters.  The interviews do not prove what I have claimed elsewhere 
through other symbolic discourses (cinematic metaphors and cinematic artifacts). 
 Nevertheless, they do constitute a form of legal knowledge.  They are, consequently, 
also jurisgenerative. I consider the interviews to be performative, historically and contextually 
specific, dialogic processes through which participants (including myself) co-construct 
meanings about how street-involved people govern and are governed.  That being said, I 
agree with some critics who have pointed to the overly romantic view of a dialogue between 
a ‗sensitive and self-aware researcher‘ and a research participant ‗exercising full agency‘ and 
recounting a non-contentious description of her experiences. The narratives that emerge 
during the filmed interviews are not unproblematic and unequivocal statements about street 
law. Interviews are iterative and interactive; they can be mutually transformative narrative 
constructions of normative expectations and commitments. During the filmed interviews, 
participants engage in a retroactive construction of meaning around street law by examining 
and ordering their experiences, explaining, confirming, interpreting, feeling, contradicting, 
defending them to me, to themselves, to other interlocutors (albeit in very specific spatio-
temporal and aesthetic contexts).630 At the same time, I articulate, challenge, and revisit my 
own conceptualizations or their experiences, or my assumptions about their experiences, 
what I believe those assumptions say about me, and how I consider they are interpreting my 
                                                                
630
 Each interview took place in its own unique context and interactions are informed by, among many other 
variables, physical location (some individual interviews took place on the street while participants were working,  
another in a café, another in a participants‘ apartment; a group interview with ten participants took place at a 
service-provider), who was behind the camera (myself or a collaborator – whether a participant or an artist), and 
whether people – and if so, who - could overhear (such as in a focus group session or when interviewed in 
more public locations).     
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responses. To this end, like any other mode of interaction, there is the possibility that all 
participants are reconstituted through the encounter. 
 Approximately half of the SNUs produced for my K Film use portions of these 
interviews – whether directly (the interview as filmed forms part of or the entire SNU) or 
indirectly (the voice of the participants is associated with another image).  When possible 
(given, as discussed in Chapter Two the complexities of street-involved peoples‘ movements 
in and through city spaces), participants were shown any SNU that featured them or their 
voice (as well as any other SNU they were interested in vusing) to assess whether they 
approved of their representation in each clip.  While, as I will discuss below, I attempted to 
draw on footage that emerges more directly from participants‘ perspective, my expectations 
and aesthetic assessments were constantly being informed, challenged, refined and 
(re)created through my interactions with participants and other collaborators.  
4.2.2 MODIFIED AUTO-CINEMATOGRAPHY  
 
 As I point out in Chapter One, there is a vexing relation between written texts, on the 
one hand, and power and authoritative knowledge on the other, in both law and in film.  Non-
textual methodologies, such as filmmaking can favour the understandings that are 
sometimes marginalized in canonical accounts of street law. They can also invite new 
associations among what may at first blush feel like divergent standpoints. 
 Some filmmakers who produce ethnographic artifacts also attempt to engage in self-reflexive 
filmmaking practices.  They invite, for example, their film‘s subject to be integral to the data-
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collection process.  This research method is sometimes referred to as auto-cinematography;631 it is 
a kind of ‗inside-out‘ approach. 632  Advocates of auto-cinematography argue that established 
modes of communication deployed by researchers in interviews and other research methods 
constitute conceptual frames that influence the form and the content of participants‘ responses.  
They believe that, as a self-reflexive research method, auto-cinematography can democratize 
scholarship by training research subjects as ‗critical‘ data gatherers who appropriate and interpret 
multiple meanings.  Intended as an embodied critique of false distinctions, auto-cinematography is a 
mode of what Michael Jackson calls ―radical empiricism‖ and makes ―the interplay‖ between the 
―domains‖ of researcher and researched, the focus of scholarly interest.633 According to this 
perspective, rather than relying on external representations and ordering of their experiences of 
street law (such as in other cultural artifacts like case law and legislation for instance), I should ask 
                                                                
631
 The use of auto-photography and more recently auto-cinematography in social sciences is often attributed to 
Worth and Adair‘s innovations in documentary ethnography.  They trained members of the Navajo nation to use 
16 millimeter cameras in order to collect and recollect traditional stories and myths.  In the manuscript they 
published as a companion piece to the footage, they suggest that the films offer viewers ―a rare opportunity to 
see through the eyes of persons with a different cultural background:‖ Sol Worth & John Adair, Through Navajo 
Eyes: An Exploration in Film Communication and Anthropology (Albuquerque: University Press, 1972) at 1.    
632
 According to some ethnographic researchers (especially in linguistic anthropology), a researcher / 
documentary filmmaker can express perspective on a phenomenon by standing in one of two relations to her 
subject of enquiry. First, she may begin from her own conceptual frameworks and take the position of ‗insider 
looking in‘ based on the view that members of a culture constitute valid knowledge of their own social practices.  
This is the emic (from phonemics) perspective.  It is considered valid when it expresses shared normative 
expectations and a consensus view of the community.   Second, she may start from the conceptual frameworks 
of an interpretive and analytic community that is taken to exist beyond the members of the culture.  This 
perspective is called etic (from phonetics) and is usually expressed through large case studies: Kenneth Pike, 
Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of the Structure of Human Behaviour (Volume I) (Glendale, C.A.: 
Summer Institute of Linguistics, 1954).  The emic-etic duality has been destabilized.  The etic view is more 
commonly thought of as an ‗outside in‘ perspective (whereby researchers or filmmakers attempt to gain access 
to the insider‘ lived reality) and the emic view more commonly an ‗inside out‘ perspective (whereby participants 
guide the researcher in her process) through self-reflexive and collaborative research and filmmaking practices. 
These practices highlight how the outside always inheres to the inside and the inside is always already 
embedded in the outside.  As Elizabeth Grosz writes, ―the subject‘s exterior is psychically constructed‖ 
conversely ―the processes of social inscription of the body‘s surface construct a psychical interior:‖ Elizabeth 
Grosz, Space, Time and Perversion (London Routledge, 1995) at 104. Finally, to Vico, we must always become 
a part of the things we study, just as they must become a part of us: Giambattista Vico, The New Science 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968). 
633
 For instance, on how Anthropology must be reciprocal in nature and in enterprise:  Michael Jackson, Paths 
Toward a Clearing: Radical Empiricism and Ethnographic Inquiry (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983) 
at 3.  
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research participants to speak for themselves through the camera and articulate and ascribe 
meanings to the footage they collect.   
 There are potential pitfalls to auto-cinematography as a research method, however.  
While critically engaging with beliefs in transcendental observations and objective and 
scientific judgments about a distanced other, auto-cinematography can also reinscribe 
established power relations.  It may enable me to position myself as non-interventionist and 
as merely providing a ‗vehicle‘ for my participants‘ expression (and ultimately as a legitimate 
medium for further articulating their concerns).  Auto-cinematography can also be used in 
ways that assume and maintains the false distinction between the inside (the personal 
narratives of participants) and the outside (my ‗sensitive but ultimately more objective‘ 
interpretations of their stories), researcher and researched, observer and observed.  While at 
least one filmmaker634 and one service-provider in Montreal635 have used this version of 
auto-cinematography by street-involved people in ways that do not seem to reinforce such 
hierarchies, I have nonetheless opted for a more tacit approach to inviting active involvement 
of research participants.  My modified version of auto-cinematography is a blending of two 
modes of expression of street law.   
 
THE HOMELESSNATION ARCHIVE 
 
 My K Film is in part comprised of images and footage produced by street-involved 
people for their own purposes.  Two of the SNUs are borrowed from the HomelessNation 
                                                                
634
See for instance: Daniel Cross & Eric 'Roach' Denis, Squeegee Punks In Traffic [S.P.I.T.] (2001). The film 
includes several scenes that use footage taken by ‗Roach,‘ the film‘s protagonist.   
635
 Spectre de Rue, an outreach organization for street-level injection drug users is currently compiling photos 
taken by their members with disposable cameras as part of a larger art-based intervention strategy: 
http://www.spectrederue.org/photos-des-projets.php 
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archive of images compiled ‗for and by‘ the street community. Despite my desire at the 
beginning of this research project, 636  my intention is not act as ‗witness‘ or to seek out and 
document brutality (whether inflicted on or by street-involved people - such as police 
misconduct, cruelty from passers-by, or altercations between various people using the street 
to generate income).  Copwatch, as noted in Chapter Two, already performs this function.  
Much like HomelessNation, its members may well be in a unique position to produce the kind 
of footage that would make audiences ―want to kick and yell,‖ and ―do something‖ about the 
injustices that the street community negotiates daily.637  In retrospect, I am no longer of the 
view that film will or should bring about law reform. It can, as I have argued throughout this 
dissertation, engage us to think about what counts as street law.  Nor is it my desire to 
provide a direct corrective of other documentary films on street-involvement that seem to 
promote a less substantive and relational conception of agency to which I subscribe.638   
While literary critic, Janet Staiger has argued that ―[i]mages that disrupt norms, that display 
                                                                
636
 In my Thesis Proposal, I was ―instrumentally driven … to produce a different kind of artifact that might be a 
useful tool to anti-poverty activists.‖  I wanted to ―engage with a shift in leftist activism toward filmmaking as 
resistance tactic‖ and believed in the possibility that my film could ―engage people who hold social power [to 
engage] in a conversation of a different register.‖  Moreover, through this dialogue, I hoped that ―formal legal 
actors and bureaucratic agents [would] question and perhaps even move toward dismantling regulatory 
systems that create offenses against street-involved people.‖ I believed my research might engage multiple law-
generators on an emotional level to contemplate the ways in which formal and informal legalities operate to 
‗other‘ certain social groups and render them more vulnerable to criminalization: ―Thesis Proposal‖, McGill 
University, Faculty of Law: 2008 (on file with author).   
637
 For a rich discussion on the utopian aspirations that documentary film will contribute to leftist political 
struggles, see: Jane Gaines, "Political Mimesis" in Jane Gaines & Michael Renov, eds., Collective Visible 
Evidence (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1999) 84.  
638
 This is not to suggest that such artifact should not be so challenged.  For instance, Fredericton-based 
filmmaker Doug Sutherland is completing a documentary which follows Brian Jones, a 40-year-old bank 
executive who has made the decision to live ‗on the street‘ for one week. Without doubt, both the filmmaker and 
his subject are well-intentioned, but there are surely other ways of generating attention around the complexities 
and immediacy of street-involvement that stem far beyond not having a ‗home.‘ For a sample of some of the 
(albeit mixed) responses the film has received, see: http://www.cbc.ca/canada/new-
brunswick/story/2010/01/29/nb-bank-manager-streets-600.html 
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current norms‖ can also ―set agendas for change,‖639 I would nuance this statement 
somewhat to further a cinematic and pluralist conceptualization of law.   
 Cinema does not directly incite institutional reform (legal or otherwise).  It can invite 
each of us to ask more fundamental questions about our relationships with our multiple 
interlocutors in various sites and in myriad interactions.  Consequently, it can enjoin us to 
evaluate our own values, commitments, and expectations that govern those relationships.    
With that understanding of the function of film, I chose sequences from HN that I interpreted 
as particularly poignant expressions of street-involved people‘s expectations of their 
interlocutors and what they believe those expectations are of them.  
 
PARTICIPANTS AS CINEMATOGRAPHERS 
 
 The second aspect of my modified auto-cinematography was to invite participants to 
direct the camera‘s movement in the context of our interviews and to request their feedback 
during post-production.  To this end, I consider them cinematographers tout court rather than 
auto-cinematographers.   
 Participants were asked if they were interested in taking the camera during the 
interviews. It merits mention that only a small number of participants – three in fact – 
decided, for reasons I can only conjecture based on each individual‘s complex normative 
lives, against such interventions.640  Subsequently, once footage was compiled and edited, I 
                                                                
639
 Janet Staiger, Bad Women: Regulating Sexuality in Early American Cinema (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1995) at xvii  
640
 Some preferred to let the ‗experts‘ (my filmmaker colleagues) direct the camera‘s gaze; others were 
delighted to be provided a venue to express their concerns directly, others seemed to be indifferent to the 
process.  And to be sure, ‗Why not?‘ was not a question that I always felt comfortable pushing.   I believe that 
had this project been structured more explicitly as collaboration (in the sense of the auto-cinematographic 
methodologies discussed above) that participants may have felt a greater sense of ownership and creative 
direction.  This is but one of the many learning moments I had in post-production.  
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met with as many of those participants as I was able to contact for their feedback and 
advice.641   Even with these attempts at generating conditions for street-involved people to be 
formally and explicitly engaged in the filmmaking practices, I reserved for myself the task of 
selecting what interesting images, moments, and expressions would comprise the SNUs.  
 Research participants‘ engagement with the film was more implicit and informal: 
through their own existing symbolizations and conversations (whether actual or my attempt to 
imagine their responses to particular images).  These processes of mediation and selection 
render the symbolization of street law through my K Film, as I elaborate, entirely filtered 
through my (shifting) subjectivity but still cannot be reduced to my singular vision of street 
law.    
4.2.3 COLLABORATION  
  
 As narrative regimes, film and law reveal as much about their storytellers as they do 
the stories they constitute and circulate. However, whereas ‗auteurism‘ reclaims the director 
or judge as creative agent constituting meaning through her singular and individual ‗vision,‘ 
pluralism foregrounds how film, law and other modes of meaning-making are always a 
collaborative, interactive processes. The accessible format of the K System, detailed 
tutorials, and collaborative impulse of Korsakow‘s designers generate conditions that 
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 Given the often temporary nature of street-involvement, this was in itself a difficult task.  However, some of 
my research participants and I were able to remain in contact through electronic mail. For these participants, I 
posted SNUs-in-progress onto a closed YouTube© site and asked for their thoughts and comments. I also 
facilitated a follow-up session at Spectre de Rue (where a group interview was conducted) during which 
participants were shown clips and asked for feedback and direction.  
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facilitate filmmakers with little programming experience to create non-linear films.642  This 
structure destabilizes conventional understandings of expertise (who counts as a filmmaker, 
creative, lawmaker).643  It also highlights and helps foster better conditions for the use of 
collaborative and non-dominant research methodologies discussed above.   
 Just as the interviews that comprise my K Film and give it shape are not a collection of 
facts about street law, but are themselves one quality of street law, there is no single human 
agent to whom the overall feel or vision of the film can be attributed.  And yet, in my role as 
‗filmmaker,‘ I impose my interpretation of street law first, through editing choices and second 
through the denotative (literal, descriptive, explanatory words) and connotative (symbolism, 
metaphors) keywords.  These processes are the product of my own normative commitments 
and expectations.  For instance, I can never fully ‗bracket‘ my thoughts about street-involved 
people and what I believe may be some of their understandings, interpretations and modes 
of generating street law.644 In spite of this reality, I can strive for what Latour refers to as 
―artificial distance‖ from my research.645  I can attempt to keep in check my more immediate 
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 The Korsakow website is intended to constitute a community of K-Film creators.  It provides multiple modes 
of support including discussion fora and interactive instruction manuals.  CINER-G also provides intensive 
training sessions and on-going peer-to-peer support: http://Korsakow.org/learn/faq   
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 On the rise of ‗amateur‘ artists in part as a consequence of new digital technologies and new opportunities to 
publish and circulate work and the different kinds of creativity have emerged, see: Lawrence Lessing, 
"Forward", FreeSouls (On-line: http://freesouls.cc/essays/00-foreword-lawrence-lessig.html, 2010). 
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 Early and established phenomenologists advocate what Husserl calls epoché - from the Greek for cessation 
- the suspension of judgment in their search for meaning and a return to intuition, imagination and universal 
structures to capture experience.  The starting point of transcendental phenomenology is that the individual 
makes sense of her experiences that exists prior to any interpretation and theorizing of an ‗outside‘ observer. 
Edmund Husserl, Ideas: A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 1931).  Recall that in Chapter Two (―Cinematic Legal Metaphors‖), I do propose a kind of ‗bracketing‘ a 
withholding of commitment to  what we know or what we think we know about street law to reflect upon it from a 
different perspective. Bruno Latour has argued that we can bracket ―our familiarity with the object of study‖ in 
order to adopt a position of ―artificial distance‖: Bruno Latour & Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Social 
Construction of Scientific Fact (Beverley Hills: Sage, 1979) at 277.      
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 See Chapter Two in which I provide an overview of some of the critical legal scholarship that provides 
important insight on the regulation of street-involved people.  
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and visceral responses to the regulation of street-involved people in order to understand how 
they also govern interactions in the street and are agents of street law.  
 The media through which I attempt to do so is cinema – whether through its concepts 
in Chapter Two, its fictional form in Chapter Three, or in my own deployment of its strategies, 
modes and instruments through the production of a film about street law in Chapter Four.  
There are hazards to be avoided when performing ‗artificial distance.‘ My self-reflexive 
filmmaking and research practices are informed by the following matrices of commitments to 
which I adhere and by which I attempt to abide.  I have tried to avoid voyeuristic or 
objectifying practices directed at street-involved people. I have endeavored to reveal the 
underlying epistemological assumptions which have lead me to ask particular questions or 
seek out particular stories.  I continue to believe that participants have multiple, shifting and 
sometimes conflicting viewpoints. I have attempted to express my interpretation of these 
viewpoints in all their complexity. Finally, I have approached my interactions with research 
participants with the aspiration of developing on-going relationships.   
 At least two SNUs (individual audiovisual files) exhibit as subtle indictments of the 
research methods I have employed.  This effect may have emerged from the camera‘s 
consciousness, by which I mean, what was expressed in the frame emerged irrespective of 
my intentions or explicit editing choices.  It may also have been heightened through the 
collaborative editing process itself. These SNUs express moments in which I believe that I do 
not live up to my guiding principles, or at least where certain normative commitments were 
temporarily set aside for the more pragmatic commitments (such as finishing my research). I 
note my (clearly subjective) responses to these SNUs not to excuse my moments of 
insensitivity but in an attempt to reframe them as opportunities for further self-reflection.  Yet, 
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ultimately, it is to the vuser to speculate (or not) as to the ethical perception (or lack thereof) 
that these images generate (or fail to generate).    
 That being said, my own normative aims are but one aspect of the street law 
expressed through my K Film.  I collaborated with many people throughout this project:  
implicitly and informally with my colleagues and teachers working in a University environment 
dedicated to pluralist and transdisciplinary enterprises; more explicitly and formally with my 
research participants; and explicitly and informally with the artists without whom I could not 
have produced such an artifact.646 Each of these collaborators co-constructed my K Film and 
consequently the concept of street law which it embodies and expresses.  
 To return to one of the key insights of critical legal pluralism, authority, in the sense of 
who has the power to define, interpret and ascribe meaning lies less in any individual 
author‘s claim.  My K Film‘s authority, for instance, rests in the responses of its audience – 
those individuals who are themselves the film‘s ―authors, compilers, and samplers.‖647 On 
one level, vusers engage in an implicit and informal collaboration by filling in gaps in the non-
linear narrative, extrapolating stories from truncated sequences with their memories and 
desires, their fears and aspirations, their imaginations and other critical faculties, their lived 
experiences, their relationships and commitments.648  On another, individual vusers make 
choices – which are informed and refracted through these same features of self -  to engage 
with particular images based on aesthetic interest in (or lack thereof) and normative 
expectations in relation to each SNU.  By drawing connections among and interpreting SNUS 
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 I worked directly but informally with eleven of my friends who work full-time at their craft: six filmmakers, four 
musicians, a performance artist, a playwright and two web designers.    
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 Macdonald & Kehler Siebert, supra note 168 at 394. 
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 Iser coined the term ‗implied reader‘ to grapple with how a reader responds to certain textual cues (gaps) 
and how she constructs and uses interpretive strategies and schemata to derive meaning from what she 
perceives: Wolfgang Iser, The Implied Reader (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974).   
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in and through their lives in law and their legal lives, vusers collaborate in constituting street 
law through the cinematic event.  
4.3 BEYOND REPRESENTATION: KORSAKOW FILM AS STREET LAW  
 
 The K Film I produced puts into sharp relief some methodological and epistemological 
discussions regarding law, such as: How is legal knowledge constituted?  How does it 
circulate? How it is embodied and performed?  Neither law nor film merely represents lived 
reality; they both constitute and embody it.  The meanings and values they circulate do not 
emerge only at the level of signs.  They emerge throughout a complex mix of interactions in 
and through space and time; these interactions are themselves jurisgenerative.   
 These encounters, or points of contact, are contingent upon a complex interplay 
between at least three features of the vusing experience.  First, there are assemblage of 
speculative and tentative selections and definitional processes by multiple collaborators who 
are all socio-spatial, self-monitoring, complex normative agents negotiating multiple 
demands, desires, and aspirations.  Second, the K System‘s internal dynamics enables it to 
be mechanized and automated yet ultimately a chaotic process; this effect can be attributed 
to the reality that the K System emerged as an expression of its designer‘s normative 
commitments and expectations and continued to develop due to the ingenuity and creative 
potential of its heterogeneous community of filmmakers (who range from neophytes to 
dedicated and established artists).  Third, the implicit and explicit engagement of vusers  
shape and reflect their interests, familiarity with the media, memories, desires, expectations, 
and capacities that permit them to organize, interpret and make creative inferences from a 
network of disjunctive sequences.      
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 These three features suggest that the Korsakow System generates conditions in 
which films informed by pluralist aesthetics can be produced.  For our purposes, a K Film 
embodies cinematic thinking that demands a rejection of positivist, monist, centralist, binary, 
chirographic, and/or linear modes of thinking about street law (and indeed law generally).  
Namely, every SNU emerged through the interactions in multiple sites and in various modes 
of a matrix of socio-spatial, self-monitoring, self-reflexive agents.  Each is a new encounter.  
Further, because of the K Film‘s overall disjointed and improvisational feel, in our various 
engagements with audiovisual narrative units, we are reminded of their specificity and 
singularity.  Through the vusing experience, which is explicitly and implicitly interactive, we 
are also reminded that we are actively engaging in the constitution of a community.  The 
street law that is expressed through my K Film has far less to do with my intended outcome 
or vision than with the non-linear, interactive and unfinished nature of the software that 
generates conditions for new encounters and consequently, new understandings.  
 The production of a Korsakow film has also been a process of self-reflexion. 
Producing a film about street law has enabled me to open lines of inquiry that are not 
adequately answered within law faculties.  Specifically, why do we still privilege one 
representation of law (canonical, explicit, and institutional) over others (symbolic, inferential, 
and implicit)?   To argue that a film is law, and to perform law through film, reminds us that 
any representation is not merely a reflection of phenomena.  It is also its own unique mode of 
perception, symbolization and conceptualization.  By extension, it enjoins us to represent, 
perceive, symbolize and conceptualize law differently than we have done so conventionally.   
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CONCLUSION:  A CRITICAL LEGAL PLURALIST HYPOTHESIS OF 
STREET LAW   
 
 In this dissertation, I have advanced a critical legal pluralist hypothesis: street law is 
on-going process of imagining and expressing interactions on the street as guided by 
rules.649  I have relied on the lexicon and concepts of cinema to move away from inherited 
ways of describing street law, especially those that are inherently repressive. I have found 
that there are other ways of expressing street law. I have, as a result, attempted to 
cinematically symbolize interactions between street-involved people and their interlocutors as 
governed by rules.   I did so through traditions of thought associated with symbolizing 
aspects of social life (film and law) in ways that might help us reflect on how to pursue more 
meaningful relationships between interacting legal agents on the street.  Consequently, I 
have described street law in ways that engage with its facilitative and relational potential.  
 The vision of street law I propose reflects attitudes and understandings that may 
challenge the expectations and commitments of some other critical anti-poverty scholarship 
and activism.  It requires that we use words, images and other modes of symbolization that 
reflect the belief that street-involved people are both subjects and agents of street law.  This 
view of street law affirms street-involved people‘s self-understanding as legal subjects – as 
members of a community which is regulated in oppressive ways.   It also affirms street-
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 For a review of some the principle critical legal pluralist works, and for an elaboration of this hypothesis, see 
my discussion of critical legal pluralism and especially the work of Roderick Macdonald in Chapter One, 
especially subsection 1.1.3 (―Critical Legal Pluralism‖).  
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involved people‘s self-understanding as legal agents – as members of a community who 
demand meaningful and respectful interactions on the street.   
Framed as such, my divergence from other anti-poverty work does not undermine or 
to minimize their platforms, mobilization, and scholarship aiming at law reform.  I agree with 
Margaret Davies and Susan Armstrong that sometimes we are required to think about law in 
positivist terms for purely pragmatic purposes.650  Law reform – even when conceptualized in 
orthodox ways - can make ―significant, albeit incremental, differences‖ to people‘s daily and 
nightly lives.651  Thus to advance a critical legal pluralist hypothesis that law is not limited to 
written texts enacted by formal and institutional jurisgenerative agents, is  a commitment to  a 
multi-dimensional approach to street law.652 Such a hypothesis may use formal and explicit 
forms and modes in ways that will effect material changes in the lives of street-involved 
people (e.g., the recognition, by the Commission des droits, of social profiling against street-
involved people, and the subtle shifts in police practices as a result).  
That being said, the purpose of my research was not simply to articulate or to 
rearticulate concerns about law as (only ever) an ideological apparatus of dominant interests 
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 They point out that to takes as starting point the definition of law as an autonomous system and fixed entity 
may be a ―pragmatic necessity‖ even though law reform may not address broader social problems or embedded 
biases in legal institutions. Davies, supra note 7 at 29 (citing Susan Armstrong, "Is Feminist Law Reform 
Flawed? Abstentionists and Sceptics" (2004) 20 Australian Feminist Law Journal 43). 
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 See other representational and agential strategies deployed by feminist groups in constitutional reform: 
Andrea Dobrowlsky, The Politics of Pragmatism: Women, Representation and Constitutionalism in Canada 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).  See also Annelise Riles‘ pragmatic humanist study of law.  She claims 
that it is a mistake for cultural legal theorists to ignore ―the technical aspects of legal thought‖ because ―the kind 
of politics that they purport to analyze is encapsulated there, along with the hopes, ambitions, fantasies, and 
day-dreams of armies of legal engineers":  Annelise Riles, "A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking 
on the Technicalities" (2005-2006) 53 Buffalo Law Review 973 at 975.  
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 For a multi-dimensional approach to poverty, see : Amartya Kumar Sen, "Conceptualizing and Measuring 
Poverty" in David B Grusky, S. M. Ravi Kanbur & Amartya Kumar Sen, eds., Poverty and Inequality (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2006) 30. 
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or as an instrument for subjugation of the poor. Rather, my research is an invitation to 
consider more symbolic (and for my purposes cinematic) dimensions of street law. 
Imagining street law cinematically is not about identifying a body of rules that guide 
behaviour on the street. Street law is often implicit, uncertain, and, consequently not 
articulated in orthodox, linear, written principles. Imagining street law cinematically is, 
however, about using an alternative conceptual structure (cinema) to interrogate street law‘s 
modes of defining interactions between street-involved people and their interlocutors.  My 
starting assumption has been (and continues to be) that there are interactions on the street in 
which certain ‗law‘ (such as the discretionary practices of official and unofficial decision-
makers and vagrancy- type legislation) ―directs the hermeneutical dialogue‖ with other forms 
of normative regulation (such as the self-reflexive engagement between an askor and an 
askee in the panhandling encounter).653 This kind of formal and explicit legal framework does 
not protect street-involved people when they are vulnerable or otherwise marginalized.  It 
may even exacerbate the conditions that contribute to their vulnerability and marginalization.   
Imagining street law cinematically is one way we can rely on other symbolic means at 
our disposal to reconsider the values that inform how we govern interactions on the street.   
One critical legal pluralist impulse is to bring about a shift in values that structure our 
interactions in ways that may foster conditions of more meaningful relationships. In an 
attempt to show how such an impulse may translate into the realm of what I call street law, I 
have suggested three alternative symbolizations of street law: metaphor, myth, and film 
production. First, metaphors, such as the four cinematic legal metaphors I suggest, help us 
get at the material conditions of street-involved people without resorting to revanchist 
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discourses.  Second, myths, such as those circulated in films, tell us something about 
interactions between self and other.  Third, collaborative filmmaking process can express 
law.  
Through these symbolizations, I have explored how various constituents of street law 
give structure to particular beliefs and commitment through symbolic means.  These include 
RAPSIM‘s role in assisting informed and engaged legal agents; education platforms and 
research conducted by anti-poverty scholars; Ryan‘s refusal of externally imposed 
expectations through his gestures; and my editorial choices in terms of what images may 
invite particular responses from my real or imagined audience.  These expressions of 
normativity may be harnessed to further adherence to street law that is based on shared 
expectations rather than coercion, that promote nurturing relationships and environments for 
vulnerable individuals, and that generates conditions in which street-involved people can 
exercise agency in their daily negotiations on the street.  
I have used such symbolizations to perceive those sites and sights of street law that 
embody gift relations based on reciprocity, according to some understandings of street law, 
or singularity, dignity, respect, compassion and love, according to other versions.654  
Understood in such terms, street law requires us to acknowledge that there will be some life 
conditions faced by street-involved people that will vitiate their autonomy and agency.  
Consequently, such conditions also vitiate their ability to gift and have an impact their law-
making capacities. These conditions may include (to varying degrees and for varying 
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 For a review of various gift theorists and the subtle differences in these two understandings, see Chapter 
One, especially 1.2.4 ―Street Law.‖ 
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durations): severe addiction as well as mental, emotional and/or physical deterioration to the 
point of not being able to make meaningful life choices.    
I do not offer a clear roadmap for reforming these life conditions.  I argue, however, 
that better relationships between street-involved people and their interlocutors may be a 
good starting point.  I believe that in structuring these new relationships, we must engage 
with law‘s plural, interpenetrating, interacting modes, forms, instruments and registers.  Such 
efforts will include more pragmatic work such as: halting regulative regimes that target the 
urban poor; working within existing formally created and recognized legal institutions to 
generate the possibility of new legal subjectivities; and mobilizing against police brutality.  It 
will also include more tangential, subtle, speculative, implicit, indirect work such as: 
facilitating better conditions of inter-subjective engagement during the panhandling moment 
(whether through education or  opportunities for interaction outside of that event); facilitating 
the exercise of agency and autonomy (by funding resources that meet the needs of street-
involved people as they define them – whether in terms of community gardens, medical 
attention or wet shelters); by  promoting the view that street-involved people (except in the 
rare instances when their life conditions vitiate their agency) are already self-monitoring 
normative agents negotiating multiple demands, desires, and aspirations; by making 
personal commitments (and building norm-generating communities which are also 
committed) to eradicating the social conditions that have normalized forms of street-
involvement that do not contribute to street-involved people‘s autonomy and agency; and 
perhaps most importantly, creating conditions for self-transformation by re-evaluating of our 
common sense beliefs and assumptions about our ‗others.‘    
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 The cinematic register can, in short, remind us that street law is about human 
creativity and our ability to engage in self-directed behaviour and the pursuit of both 
individual and shared goals. To think about law cinematically gestures towards the ways in 
which some street-involved people and their interlocutors have created conditions in which 
relationships can be constituted, reconstituted or abandoned through interactions based on 
reciprocity, recognition, and inter-subjective understanding. Individuals in their daily 
interactions do create conditions that further justice and do embody alternative conceptions 
of the institutions through which those conditions may be generated.   Moreover, thinking 
legally about cinema invites us to consider how recurring definitional tropes - such as the 
tramp and the vagrant - can be a canvass for exploring other symbolic fields from which 
street-involved people may be excluded but also the symbolic fields that they themselves 
create: moral and social geographies, alternative expressions of normativity, moments of 
inter-subjective exchanges, and performances of legal agency.   Finally, it enjoins us to 
consider our own assumptions and expectations of street law: the cinematic legal register 
demonstrates that street law already points to abstract standards that help us recognize the 
responsibilities we share for each other. It also suggests how we may further attend to those 
duties with the understanding that people have the capacity to know how to behave justly, 
how to live morally, and care for one another.   
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APPENDIX: ETHICS APPLICATION & TEMPLATES 
ETHICS APPLICATION 
1. Purpose of the Research  
Describe the proposed project and its objectives, including the research questions to be investigated (one page 
maximum). What is the expected value or benefits of the research?  How do you anticipate disseminating the results 
(e.g. thesis, presentations, internet, film, publications)? 
Proposed Project  
My research is about the law that people who panhandle create, negotiate, and subvert.  People 
who panhandle reach out to others - often relative strangers who are located along different axes of 
privilege - in shared public spaces. Unstable housing, intellectual and physical disabilities, addiction 
and health concerns, poverty, and unemployment are some of the challenges that increase experiences 
of marginalization among this heterogeneous group.  In addition, people who panhandle experience 
criminalization through legislative regimes - such as Ontario‟s Safe Streets Act which creates the 
offense of aggressive panhandling - and judicial decisions - such as R. v. Banks which upheld the Act‟s 
constitutionality.  Several socio-legal scholars have argued that a person‟s engagement in panhandling 
reflects and reinforces the individual, institutional and structural marginalization and criminalization 
experienced by the urban poor.  While I agree that behaviour can be shaped by social context and I am 
critical of material structures that govern panhandlers‟ everyday lives, I diverge somewhat from this 
earlier work to centre the informal law or guidelines that people who panhandle negotiate, challenge, 
subvert, and create.   My research asks two kinds of questions.  
First, in relation to law: How are people who panhandle constituted by (subjects) and 
constituents of (agents) rules around panhandling?  What strategies do they deploy to negotiate, resist, 
transform rules around panhandling?  In so doing, do they also provide new conceptions of public 
space?  Is the concept „panhandling‟ linked to issues of identity and autonomy? Is the identity 
„panhandler‟ one to which most people who request small change to generate income ascribe?  Is it 
used against those same people in a manner that creates boundaries, excludes, marginalizes? Is there 
shared recognition among panhandlers as to the rules and possible sanctions for transgressing those 
rules?  Are there hierarchies among panhandlers?  
Second, in relation to film: If film can reflect, intervene on, transform, pervert, romanticize 
reality, can it also assist in grappling with the tensions between determination (material structures) 
and freedom (agency)?  What about for people who panhandle in particular?   Can a film for and about 
people who panhandle shed light on perceptions and experiences of law‟s violence, its weaknesses, 
and its creativity?  How can film foster meaningful dialogue between individuals who differ but who 
can nonetheless gain from inter-subjective understanding from such differences?   
This research draws on the insight from critical legal pluralism and deploys reflexive 
documentary practices. A legal pluralist view of law reminds us that the „rules‟ around panhandling 
are constituted both on the „formal‟ and „informal‟ levels.  Rule-making agents tolerate one another 
or they can be in conflict; more often than not they lie somewhere on a spectrum between the two. As 
law-creating agents, human beings pursue their own purposes within these frameworks of rules while 
struggling for recognition and respect from others perusing similar or conflicting purposes.  Reflexive 
film theories remind us that attempts to represent others (and our relationship to them) and a desire to 
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be loyal to people‟s self-representation inevitably raise questions about: the difference between 
fact/fiction, the universal/the local, objectivity/subjectivity, self/other, belonging/being an outsider.  
I am critical of receive assumptions in law and other disciplines about objective observers 
making reasoned judgments about their distanced other.  But my aim is not to „give voice‟ to people 
who panhandle. Rather, I invite participants to speak for themselves and include my own distinct voice 
as researcher/filmmaker in order to engage in dialogue.  This approach will (I hope) advance a more 
meaningful understanding of the (externally imposed) rules that they must negotiate daily and the 
rules they themselves create during that process of negotiation.  
I use documentary film to open up conceptual paths to different ways of thinking about the how 
the panhandling relation is governed.  My research methods include: open-ended interviews with, and 
observations of, people who panhandle; interviews with other key informants; discourse analysis of 
formal and informal laws around panhandling; and close reading of filmic representations of the  
panhandling moment.  The goal of the interviews and observations is to provide as representative a 
sample as possible of people who panhandle (accepting the limitation in identifying a true sample of 
such a transient and diverse population).  
The documentary film and the written thesis will stand on their own as separate artifacts in a 
relation of metissage. They will emerge in dialogue with one another.  
 
Anticipated Contribution:  
 My aim is to contribute to the work already being done by street-involved people and other anti-
poverty activists who are countering stereotypes and stigma surrounding life on the street.  I start from 
the view that people who panhandle are legal agents able to generate their own rules around 
panhandling: they are full and active members of our social, economic, legal, political worlds.  
 View a view to quell the concern that ethnographic research is vulnerable to “giving little and 
taking more than little” (Minh-ha, 1991: 68), I will engage in a collaborative research approach.  
Participants are integral to the direction of my work. I want to explore ways to involve people who 
panhandle as researchers (rather than limiting their role to that of „the researched‟). Further, my hope 
is that my legal experience and analysis can be a useful resource to participants.  To this end, I strive 
to enhance relationships based on reciprocity (information-sharing, empathy and mutual identification).  
 In addition, a film made in collaboration with people who panhandle can be a valuable 
pedagogical tool.  True, it may elicit feelings of compassion and empathy; but film also has the capacity 
to „release the imagination‟ and transcend what we think of as the „known‟ (Greene, 1995).  While I am 
not of the view that film necessarily leads to direct social and political change, it can be produced in a 
way that generates community-building and that can potentially bring seemingly different people 
together - despite social, political, economic, cultural differences – to grapple with panhandling and 
broader issues of poverty and social exclusion.  
 Finally, with the backdrop that film is a normative site, my research will be a valuable 
contribution to critical legal pluralist scholarship.  Instead of viewing the law as words on paper (case 
law and legislation) or simply as an institution of social control (wielded by those marked by social and 
cultural privilege), I further the view that law can be thought of aesthetically and in terms of 
relationships and values. Thus, there are multiple sites of normativity or values that organize our ways 
of being; these norms or values may be in conflict; and they may not always be ranked according to a 
universal standard. Insight from critical legal pluralism will assist me in asking new ontological, 
epistemological and axiological questions and perhaps provide new insight about the experiences of 
people who panhandle and about my own experiences with people who panhandle.  Specifically, self-
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reflexive in design, this research project invites openness to my own personal transformation and the 
development of more meaningful understanding of the strategies favoured by the urban poor.  
 
Dissemination:  
 I will publish work in the form of peer-reviewed journal articles, fact sheets for organizations 
working with people who panhandle, and my final (bound and electronic) doctoral dissertation.  I will 
also give lectures, seminars, and workshops with other researchers and policymakers.  My thesis also 
includes the production of a film which will be accessible to people who panhandle, agencies working 
with street-involved people and other academics. Ideally, research participants will also be involved in 
its dissemination of this research, especially at screening in educational and community settings.  For 
instance, HomelessNation, a website run by and for street-involved people, has expressed interest in 
posting portions of my written and filmic texts once completed. 
  2.  Recruitment of Subjects/Location of Research  
Describe the subject population and how and from where they will be recruited.  If applicable, attach a copy of any 
advertisement, letter, flier, brochure or oral script used to solicit potential subjects (including information sent to third 
parties). Describe the setting in which the research will take place.  Describe any compensation subjects may receive 
for participating. 
Subject Population:  
 The adult (over the age of eighteen) subject population can be divided into three related and 
sometimes overlapping groups. Group A includes people who panhandle or who have panhandled.  
While heterogeneous, participants from Group A may be perceived as vulnerable because of 
overwhelming of criminalization and marginalization, the prevalence of physical and intellectual 
disabilities, economic disparities, particular forms of racialization and addiction concerns among this 
heterogeneous population. They will be asked how they understand the rules around panhandling.  
Group B includes representatives from service-providers for street-involved people.  These participants 
will be asked about how they perceive people who panhandle to be governed by formal and informal 
rules around panhandling. Group C will include anti-poverty activists and academics. These 
participants will be asked about how they perceive people who panhandle to be governed by formal 
and informal rules. There may thus be overlap with members of these various groups.  
Recruitment:   
 A recruitment form will be sent electronically or by mail to members of Groups A and C.  The 
research proposal, interview guide and consent form will be attached in order to allow potential 
participants to be fully informed on the process and the nature of the study. The recruitment form has 
been worded in accessible language.  It is in English and will be translated in French if participants 
prefer to conduct the interview in that language.  Participants from Group A sometimes have no fixed 
address and are difficult to contact directly.  They will be recruited through snow-ball sampling, word 
of mouth, and other contacts, especially through the researcher‟s on-going affiliation with Groups B 
and C and volunteer work with members of Group A.  I will contact a few members of Groups B and C 
who are already known to be and I will ask my initial contacts to ask people they know who might be 
interested in participating to contact me.   In my recruitment form for Group B, I will also request that I 
set up regular drop-in hours (e.g., from 2:00-3:30 on Mondays) that are convenient for the organization 
241 
 
and convenient for potential participants.  These regular drop-in hours will permit potential Group A 
participants to approach me if interested, to ask questions, and to assess whether they would like to 
participate.  It will also assist me in developing a greater sense of connectedness with participants by 
keeping in regular contact with members of Group A, many of whom are transient.  Importantly, it will 
provide me with the time required to meaningfully assess whether or not interested individuals are 
capable of consenting to participate in this research project.  Finally, it will be during these drop-in 
hours that I will conduct my interviews, unless participants prefer to have an interview take place at 
another time.  
Research setting  
 Participants from Groups A and B who accept to have an interview with me will be interviewed 
in a private and neutral site.  Interviews will take place in as comfortable surroundings as possible. 
They will be held in English unless participants prefer to have the interview conducted in French.  
Participants from Group C will be interviewed in a private and neutral site of their choice.  Footage from 
these interviews will serve as data-gathering and may be included in the documentary film portion of 
my thesis.  
 I will ask participants for permission to observe their panhandling interactions on the streets.  
Footage from these observations will serve as data-gathering and may be included in the final filmic 
component. I want to observe how people who panhandle are governed by formal rules when they 
engage in this income-generating activity.  I also want to observe how they create their own rules 
among themselves and in relation to other rule-making agents (such as the police, shop-owners, and 
other people using the street).  The camera will remain focused on my informants but it may, in order to 
challenge realist conventions of traditional documentary film, from time to time be focused on me.  This 
method is intended to destabilize the researcher/researched dyad. The conditions under which the 
participant observation is conducted can and should then be negotiated orally between key informants 
and myself in an on-going way. Participant observation will be long-term and will likely occur over a 
period of one year.   
 Participants will not be compensated.   
 
3.  Other Approvals 
When doing research with various distinct groups of subjects (e.g. school children, cultural groups, institutionalized 
people, other countries), organizational/community/governmental permission is sometimes needed. If applicable, 
how will this be obtained?  Include copies of any documentation to be sent.    
 
 Participants from Group B (service providers) may require the expressed consent of the 
organization for which they work or volunteer. Participants from Group C (anti-poverty activists) 
operate on a consensus-based model and will require the consent of the entire organization before 
accepting to participate in this research project.  Three separate consent forms have been carefully 
crafted to address the concerns that arise for each research group. A copy of the consent form, also 
signed by me, will be left with each research participant.  I will retain another copy for my files.  
 Certain people may not in a position to decide whether to consent until immediately after their 
participation (e.g. inadvertently being in the documentary as they walk down the street) Most people 
are not likely to object to being filmed in this way. However, during the filmed observations of select 
members of Group A, it is possible that passers-by and on-lookers are captured by the camera when 
they do not want to be.  Strict precautions will be taken to address such consent issues.  First, like any 
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other documentary filmmaker, I will disclose and advertise as broadly as possible that filming is taking 
place within a particular radius on the street.  I will erect a sign behind myself and my informant that 
“Filming in Progress.”  I will have similar posters within two meters of myself and my informant 
alerting passersby to the filming process. Second, if a passer-by objects to his or her filming, I will 
immediately stop the camera and none of the footage capturing their image will be used for the 
purposes of my research. My goal is not to collect pejorative or demeaning footage of people who 
respond to panhandlers. Should people respond in this manner, however, I will take notes of their 
responses and use this as data-gathering for my analysis. 
 
4.  Methodology/Procedures 
Provide a sequential description of the methods and procedures to be followed to obtain data. Describe all methods 
that will be used (e.g. fieldwork, surveys, interviews, focus groups, standardized testing, video/audio taping).  Attach 
copies of questionnaires or draft interview guides, as appropriate. 
 In September 2002, I began volunteering with Ottawa‟s Ticket Defence Program [TDP], a 
coalition of activists, service providers, and students acting as agents before the provincial court and 
contesting tickets issued to panhandlers under Ontario‟s Safe Streets Act.  I remained an active 
member of TDP until 2005 when I moved away from Ottawa.  I intended to continue this work in a 
more formal research-based capacity.  However, as I became more involved in the anti-poverty 
community in Montreal (where I was studying), especially with RAPSIM (Réseau d'aide aux personnes 
seules et itinérantes de Montréal), Equity Access (McGill University), and HomelessNation, I felt that I 
could ask similar questions while remaining based in Montreal.    
 My research methods are primarily qualitative semi-structured interviews. Data will be 
collected through approximately twenty-five videotaped in-depth semi-structured interviews.  They will 
last no more than 1 ½ hours.  They will be conducted by  me in English or French if participants 
prefer.  Before the interview takes place, the participant will be advised that his/her informed consent 
is necessary. I will go over the consent form, its content, review the purposes and aims of my research 
and answer questions I will highlight the following points:  
 
 Voluntary Participation: Participation is strictly voluntary; there are no repercussions for non-
participation or withdrawal from participation at any time.  Should a participant choose to withdraw, 
any data collected from that participant will be destroyed without question.   
 Anonymity: Participants can use a pseudonym to preserve anonymity during the entire interview.  
 Right to refuse: Participants have the right to refuse to answer any question and that s/he can stop 
the interview at any time should s/he no longer wish to continue 
 Right to withdraw: Participants have the right withdraw entirely from the research at any time.    
 Permission to Film:  I will request permission to film the interview.  The interview is intended as part 
of a documentary film and that it may be used for educational or other academic purposes in public or 
semi-public venues (such as schools, universities, community groups).  I will provide them with a copy 
of the documentary upon its completion.  If a participant elects not to have the interview videotaped, I 
will request permission to take careful notes instead. 
 Anonymity during filming: If a participant chooses to use a pseudonym, it will be used throughout 
the interview.  I will also position the camera in a way that their face will not be revealed.  If there are 
concerns about his/her voice or face being recognized, I will explain that their face can be blocked out 
and their voice altered during editing to preserve their anonymity. 
 Review of the Transcript: I will transcribe the interviews and the participant will be able to review 
the transcript. There may be, for instance, passages to omit because they divulge personal information 
that render comments easily attributable to him / her.  Should the participant choose to review the 
transcript I will offer three ways of forwarding them back to me: (1) in person; (2) by mail (with a self 
addressed postage pre-paid envelope provided by me); or (3) electronically. In the first and second 
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instances, I will ask him / her to cross out any portions to omit and to initial each page of the transcript 
(indicating that s/he gives me permission to use the transcript as edited by him / her). If the 
participant chooses to forward the document back to me by e-mail, I will ask that s/he indicate the 
deleted or edited passages and forward the edited transcript as an attachment to me with a message 
stating (i) that s/he has reviewed the transcript and (ii) consents to the use of the transcript as edited.   
 Transparency and Reflexivity: I will engage in research and documentary practices that 
emphasize transparency (using research / film to look outward at the world) in addition to reflexivity 
(using research / film to examine aspects of myself evoked by that world).  I am not of the view that 
participant observation, and filmed observation in particular, is an objective means of recording 
experiences. I recognize and grapple with the fact that filming, like other research, is about selectivity 
and subjectivity and that I will constantly be making choices about what does and does not fall into 
the camera‟s frame and what will and will not remain in the final edited version of the documentary 
and written thesis.  I will also draw on principles of direct cinema which requires filmmakers / 
researchers to build strong relationships with their subjects / participants.  To this end, I will take 
several precautions to ensure that my observations are as non-voyeuristic and as respectful as 
possible. I will attempt to have participants as engaged with the observations and offer them the 
opportunity to observe at any point during the filming process.   
 Collaboration: Participants will be encouraged to ask me questions, to offer insight, and to be 
involved in the various stages of the editing process. I will invite them to turn the camera on me, to ask 
me questions, or even – should they want to - film my responses to their answers. Moreover, during my 
weekly drop-in time. I will bring footage to show it to the participants who were filmed and who are 
interested in providing feedback on the editing process.   
 
5.  Potential Harms and Risk 
5 a) Describe any known or foreseeable harms, if any, that the subjects or others might be subject to during or as a 
result of the research. Harms may be psychological, physical, emotional, social, legal, economic, or political. 
 The most substantial potential harm is for members of Group A who may experience 
marginalization and criminalization and to whom I will be asking to share personal narratives about 
their experience while they engage in panhandling.  Panhandling is not illegal in Canada.  However, 
answering these questions may increase the risk of legal or social harms such as backlash from 
particular police officers, unwanted publicity, or judgment by friends. Similarly, psychological or 
emotional risks may arise such as self-image issue, loss of confidence, regret for disclosing personal 
information, unpleasant memories or disruption. Economic inconveniences may include expenses 
incurred for participation (i.e. not being able to panhandle) or long travel to research site.  Some 
physical inconveniences for all participants include muscle pain or fatigue from an interview that has 
gone too long.  
5 b) In light of the above assessment of potential harms, indicate whether you view the risks as acceptable given the 
value or benefits of the research. 
Research engaging with individuals and groups who experience marginalization and 
criminalization is of fundamental importance because they are often denied proper venues to voice 
their concerns.  As noted, my research aims to countering stereotypes and stigma surrounding life on 
the street and the documentary aspect of my thesis can be an valuable pedagogical tool that can  bring 
seemingly different people together - despite social, political, economic, cultural differences – to grapple 
with panhandling and broader issues of poverty and social exclusion.  Additional benefits to 
participants include: having their stories heard, feeling empowered, contributing to a larger discussion 
on how people who panhandle experience the law in their daily interactions, and providing crucial 
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insight to a research project that will potentially learning and teaching new skills related to 
documentary production. The research will benefit me as well; I will be part of a project that will enable 
me to develop a more nuanced understanding of relationships among people who panhandle and 
between people who panhandle and people who do not.  The likely benefits to the broader community 
include alternative and possibly more empathetic responses to people who panhandle and movement 
towards the breakdown of barriers between people who share the city street space.  The risks listed 
above are those that emerge during any honest intellectual inquiry. Though every effort will be made to 
avoid them, these risks remain acceptable given the value and benefits of the research.  
5 c) Outline the steps that may be taken to reduce or eliminate these risks.  If deception is used, justify the use  of the 
deception and indicate how subjects will be debriefed or justify why they will not be debriefed. 
There seem to be minimal risks of the harms mentioned above; however, that minimal risk is 
recognized and additional safeguards will be taken.     
Psychological / emotional / social / legal harms:  
 
A number of precautions will be taken to avoid potential psychological / emotion or social / legal 
harms and inconveniences to members of Group A, which includes obtaining their informed consent. 
Group B‟s representatives all have accountability procedures in their organizations and a participant 
from will be asked to obtain the full support of his or her boards or organizing committees before 
participating.   He or she will also be reminded of her rights.  
 Lack of deception or coercion on my part and an approach founded upon trust and respect for 
participants will also greatly reduce the likelihood of these harms. Establishing a trusting and lasting 
relationship with participants will help diminish the possibility that they (especially those from Group 
A) will be further marginalized by virtue of their work on this project.   
 Trust can be established and maintained by sufficiently explaining my purposes. I will, to the 
extent that I am possible, be overt with participants about the purpose of my research.  I have decided 
to present myself as a graduate student in law who has worked for anti-poverty associations and who 
is concerned about how people who panhandle are governed.  However, as other researchers with an 
„emancipative‟ paradigm, highlighting the experiences of people who have suffered marginalization, I 
recognize that the unique context of my informants‟ lives may require a “re-definition” of my presented 
self in order to enable me to hear often “unheard stories of troubled lives” in order to “prevent a 
perpetuation of the stereotyping, stigmatization, and marginalization” my informants‟ face (Paradis, 
2000; Li, 2008: 101). This may, for instance, require that I downplay my academic background or 
professional status or my overall privilege by virtue of that social, cultural, and economic capital.  This 
is not to suggest, however, that I will present an identity other than my own or be deceptive.  
 A second indicator of a trusting relationship is respectfully explaining to participants the 
potential consequences of being filmed during the interviews and participant observation. Third, I 
recognize how I am situated in relation to the research participants.  I am a white graduate student 
with a formal education in a professional program. Participants who have not been privy to the bundle 
of rights and privileges that come with my social location may perceive me as a threat or may be less 
inclined to trust me as an „outsider.‟ Indeed, there is often a lack of trust on the part of people who 
experience marginalization and criminalization in outsiders‟ ability to tell their stories in a respectful 
way.  Despite almost ten years of work with anti-poverty groups, I am not a person who panhandles in 
order to generate income and I have biases and assumptions about people who do.  I will attempt to 
recognize these assumptions, question them, critique and account for them throughout my research.     
 A final component of a trusting and respectful relationship is to recognize the individuality of 
each participant. While exposed to similar forms of oppression, homeless and street-involved people 
are not a homogenous group. Research participants may be from a culture, ethnic group, class, sexual 
orientation or gender that is different than my own and from each other‟s. To prepare for this 
eventuality, I will engage in research that is mindful of the diversity of people's experiences which can 
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vary along class, gender, race, sex orientation, and cultural lines. This is not to say that I will approach 
my research by indexing people‟s relative disadvantage but by focusing on people‟s individual 
experiences and how they relate to broader structures of inequality.  
 
Economic harms:  
 It is unlikely that members of Groups B and C will suffer economic inconveniences as a result of 
their participation in this project.  Members of Group A may suffer economically during field 
observations while they are engaging in panhandling.   Because the participant observation will 
involve a long term relationship with research participants, I must ensure that my informed consent 
process is dynamic and on-going.  I will therefore ask whether or not my presence is hindering their 
ability to work and remind them that we can stop filming at any time.   
6.  Privacy and Confidentiality  
Describe the degree to which the anonymity of subjects and the confidentiality of data will be assured and the specific 
methods to be used for this, both during the research and in the release of findings.  This includes the use of data 
coding systems, how and where data will be stored, who will have access to it, what will happen to the data after the 
study is finished, and the potential use of the data by others.   Indicate if there are any conditions under which privacy 
or confidentiality cannot be guaranteed (e.g. focus groups), or, if confidentiality is not an issue in this research, explain 
why.   
Anonymity and Confidentiality during interviews and other filming and in the release of 
findings  
 Participants from Group A may have the legitimate fear that using their real name will result in 
backlash from particular police officers, unwanted publicity, or judgment by peers. Anonymity is also 
important for individuals working within organizations that provide services and support to street-
involved people (Groups B and C).  They may feel more inclined to express personal and perhaps 
critical views about the work they do and the communities they work within without fear of reprisals 
from funding agencies or other community partners. Participants may thus wish to remain involved in 
the research project in an anonymous manner.  A potential participant will immediately be informed 
that s/he may choose to use a pseudonym.  When a participant uses a pseudonym, other identifying 
information will be fictionalized in the research report and in the documentary to protect his/her 
privacy and anonymity.  S/he will be thereafter be referred to by the pseudonym in all transcriptions 
and for the remainder of the research. Identifying information such as names, age, unique traits and 
uncommon experiences will be modified immediately following transcription.  Further, identifiable 
speech patterns or idiosyncratic sentence structure will be rendered unrecognizable.  If s/he is 
concerned about his /her voice or face being recognized, I will explain that their face can be blocked 
out and their voice altered during editing to preserve their anonymity.  The need for anonymity must be 
balanced with the requirements of qualitative research of the kind endeavored here, which will 
necessitate the use of quotations from the participants.  Participants will have the opportunity and the 
right to review their transcripts and withdraw any statements that they consider inappropriate.  
 Only my advisor and I will have access to the raw data.  Any computer files will be stored 
electronically on my personal computer under password.  Typed transcripts and computer files will be 
destroyed ten years after the completion of the research project. Videotapes and other data will be 
conserved for five years following the end of the research project.  Some of my findings will be in the 
form of my PhD thesis. Participants will be referred to during the interviews, in all raw data, in the 
documentary, and in my written thesis by their pseudonym.   
 
7. Informed Consent Process  
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Describe the oral and/or written procedures that will be followed to obtain informed consent from the subject. Attach 
all consent documents, including information sheets and scripts for oral consents.  If written consent will not be 
obtained, justification must be provided. 
Principles of Informed Consent  
Informed consent is a process of communication; it should be an open exchange between 
potential and / or actual participants and me.  The signed form is intended as a summary and written 
record of the participant‟s participation but written consent should not automatically be understood as 
informed consent.  Discussions about consent should be in simple, understandable language; it should 
be accurate enough so that the participant can assess whether the risks in getting involved outweigh 
the potential benefits.   It is my obligation as a researcher to adequately and understandably 
communicate these risks or inconveniences without romanticizing the benefits. Informed consent is on-
going and relational.  It is important that participants feel they can ask questions at any time during 
the process especially because questions may only arise once they have already begun to participate 
(or for instance if I ask a question that relates to sensitive personal information).  The individual life 
experiences of potential participants should be taken into consideration when requesting informed 
consent.      
Assessing Ability to Consent  
Attention to clear communication, respect, trust, on-going comprehension, and good decision 
making must be at the fore of the informed consent process. These concerns are all the more important 
when dealing with a vulnerable population that may struggle with issues around mental illness and 
addictions.  I am reluctant to focus on these issues that people who panhandle may face because of 
the potential for stereotyping or for reinforcing stereotypes that already exist about his population.  
However, I am very aware and take very seriously the real concerns that research participants, 
especially those from Group A, may well be dealing with issues related to intellectual disability or 
addictions. The ability to assess whether a potential participant is suffering from mental illness or has 
addiction issues is imperative when determining whether someone can provide informed consent.  For 
almost ten years, I have worked in the anti-poverty field with people who have experienced social 
marginalization and criminalization. I have undergone, among other things, training in crisis 
management and counseling for addictions and trauma. I believe that my experience in the field will 
allow me, through informal conversations, to assess whether a person has the capacity to consent. An 
informal conversation, my experience has shown, will usually reveal whether a person is dealing with 
intellectual disabilities or addiction issues that may vitiate their consent.  When in doubt, I will err on 
the side of caution.  Further, I will also defer to the judgment of service-providers from Group B and 
may ask them for their counsel from time to time without disclosing the identity of the potential 
participants.  For instance, I can ask service providers whether x or y behaviour might indicate a 
serious addiction that would render a person incapable of providing consent. Informed consent in an 
on-going communication and must be dynamic.  I will continually be assessing and re-assessing 
whether any participant is able to consent.  Should I at any moment be of the view that a participant is 
no longer able to consent, they will be withdrawn from the project (insofar as being interviewed and 
filmed). 
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Written Consent  
Individual written consent will be sought from research participants from each Group. Before 
engaging in semi-structured interviews or video-taped observations, each participant will be asked 
verbally and in writing to agree to have the content of the interviews and video tapes used for the 
purposes of my doctoral research. I will then go over the consent form with the participant.  The form 
will include my name, my advisor‟s and our contact information, a brief description of my research 
project and anticipated disposition for the results (through my thesis, publication, conferences and a 
short documentary), how the data will be stored, the potential benefits of my research, a statement 
that participants are under no obligation to participate and that they may withdraw at any time.  It will 
also clearly indicate (in a separate approval line) that I am requesting permission to video-tape and 
directly quote participants (with or without attribution). I will also sign the consent form.  A copy of the 
form will be left with the participant and I will retain a copy for my files.     
Before the interview process begins, I will go through the entire document with each participant 
and highlight the most salient points. Subjects who agree will be asked to sign the consent form. The 
content of the form will be explained and the subject asked if s/he has any questions. Free and 
informed consent also includes the adaptation of language so as to be understood by participants.  The 
consent form and all other materials have thus been written in accessible language.  
 
Verbal Consent  
Informed consent with participants from Group A may well be given verbally, rather than in 
writing.  . For instance, participants may be unable to read English or French, or it may be otherwise 
culturally inappropriate for me to request written consent.  In these cases, I will obtain verbal consent 
from research participants. The principles listed above will be adhered to when obtaining verbal 
consent.  Ideally, I will have their verbal consent documented on film.  Importantly, I will only film their 
consent if they have already provided it.  I recognize that to ask someone to consent while the camera 
is running can be daunting, intimidating and may be a form of coercion.   I will follow a verbal consent 
script and will read the entire informed consent document to them and explain each section as I go 
through the document. If the participant agrees, I will have one of his/her trusted friends or colleague 
witness the verbal consent. I will sign the Verbal Consent Script and give them a copy of it. Even if 
consent is provided verbally, I will give potential participants a copy of the written consent form (which 
includes research purposes and procedures); this form will be signed by me.  
8.  Other Concerns   
a) Indicate if the subjects are a captive population (e.g. prisoners, residents in a center) or are in any kind of conflict of 
interest relationship with the researcher such as being students, clients, patients or family members. If so, explain how 
you will ensure that the subjects do not feel pressure to participate or perceive that they may be penalized for 
choosing not to participate. 
Participants are not a captive population and they will be informed that participation is on a 
voluntary basis. 
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b) Comment on any other potential ethical concerns that may arise during the course of the research. 
Filmmaking Practices   
In classical documentary, the voice of the filmmaker transcends the visible field and comes 
from the (indeterminate and undisclosed) space off-screen; positioning the filmmaker thus reinforces 
his/her role as infallible „knower.‟ This tendency is especially true in documentary where the film is 
perceived as offering first-hand „evidence‟ or „facts.‟ More recently, there has been a shift toward self-
reflexive documentary-making through which the filmmaker asks him or herself a number of ethical 
questions.  These include:  Is my approach one that centers transparency (using the camera to look 
outward at the world) in addition to reflexivity (using the camera to examine aspects of myself evoked 
by that world)? How can I make my research as non-voyeuristic and as respectful as possible? In 
asking myself these questions, I reject a positivist approach to research that assumes that the 
phenomenon called „panhandling‟ and the people who panhandle exist independent of me.  Instead, I 
acknowledge and will be critically aware of the fact that I am actively mediating, interpreting and 
defining events and people through my broader research and through my documentary in particular.      
Communication  
All documents are currently in English.  Should participants feel more comfortable in French, I 
will conduct the interview in that language.  In that event, I will also translate all the attached 
documents.  These will be forwarded to the Research Ethics Board Office for approval before sending 
them to potential participants.     
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TEMPLATES  
 
PRESENTATION TEXT  
 My name is Suzanne Bouclin. I am writing a doctoral thesis on the formal and informal rules 
around panhandling.  I have been involved in work, volunteering and research with street-involved 
people and people who panhandle for almost ten years. I am a lawyer and a graduate student at 
McGill University. I write to you in your capacity as ***.  I am particularly interested in the perspective 
of service-providers from your adult drop-in centre because of its holistic, life management, and 
empowerment-based approach to issues around homelessness, poverty and social exclusion.   
 I have two requests. First, I would like to invite you and your co-workers to participate in a 
filmed interview about your perceptions on how people who panhandle experience rules around 
panhandling.  The data from these interviews will be used in my doctoral thesis.  Part of my research 
includes the production of a short documentary on these rules, primarily from the perspective of people 
who panhandle but also from the perspective of people who work with people who panhandle. Footage 
from these interviews may thus also be used in the documentary.  Second, because my goal is to 
centre the voices of people who panhandle, I would like to interview people who panhandle and 
potentially film individuals as they engage in panhandling.  I am aware that people who panhandle 
are a diverse group with diverse experiences but that most face issues of unstable housing and 
homelessness.  They are thus often transient with not fixed address. It can be challenging to maintain 
regular contact with people who panhandle.   I request your (and your board‟s) permission to establish 
regular drop-in hours (such as 2:00-3:30) on a day that is convenient for your organization and that 
would not interfere with your programs and services.  These regular drop-in hours would allow me to 
explain my research project to your clients who express interest in it.   
My research question 
 The object of my research is to understand - from the perspective of people who panhandle and 
also from the perspective of people who work with people who panhandle - the formal and informal 
rules around panhandling.  I am interested in how people who panhandle are subject to particular 
rules that do not apply to people who do not panhandle; how they can and do negotiate these rules; 
and how they can and do create their own rules when engaging in panhandling.  
Why I believe this research is important 
 I hope to contribute to the work already being done by panhandlers, street-involved people and 
anti-poverty activists who are countering stereotypes and stigma surrounding life on the street. I 
believe that people who panhandle are agents able to highlight their own concerns.  I believe that 
participating in research and in the production of a documentary film that centers their voices and 
experiences can be an empowering experience for people who panhandle. I also believe that my legal 
experience and analysis can complement and provide an additional perspective to their understanding 
of the rules around panhandling. This project can, I hope, be a source of information-sharing and 
mutual learning.  Finally, I believe that this research and the documentary film that will emerge from it 
can be a valuable education tool.  A documentary film for, by, and about people who panhandle can be 
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perceived as a form of community building that can potentially bring seemingly different people 
together - despite social, political, economic, cultural differences – to grapple with panhandling and 
broader issues of poverty and social exclusion.   
The interviews with service-providers  
 As a service-providers, you will be asked if you feel comfortable having the interview recorded 
on film. If you agree, the interview will be recorded and transcribed.  If you prefer not to be filmed, I 
will tape record our interview.  Upon your request, the full transcript will be forwarded to you.   Should 
you prefer not to be filmed or tape recorded, I will take detailed notes.  In this case the processed notes 
will be made available to you as soon as possible. In either case, you reserve the right to delete any 
information which you consider to, in any way, endanger yourself, co-workers, employers or friends, 
family or associates. You would be entitled to a follow-up interview should you feel that clarification or 
additional information is required. 
Interviews with Attendants  
 During my regular drop-in hours, I hope to meet people who are interested in my research.  
Should someone express interest in being involved in this project, I would first ascertain whether she or 
he is capable of providing informed consent.  Interested attendants would be asked to sign a consent 
form or would provide verbal consent (witness present) indicating that they agree to have an interview 
with me and that the content of those interviews used as research materials for my thesis. The same 
procedure indicated above will be followed during interviews attendants. I understand the importance 
of stressing to any potential participant that they are under absolutely no obligation to agree to the 
interview. I will only interview attendants who are over 18 years of age.  I will not interview people 
who do not have the capacity to provide informed consent to being interviewed.   
Observing Attendants as they engage in panhandling  
 Part of my research will also include observing some attendants on the street as they 
panhandle. After assessing whether or not the potential participant can provide consent, I will request 
permission to film him or her while they engage in panhandling on the street. I will explain that the 
footage collected is intended as part of a documentary film and that it may be used for educational or 
other academic purposes in public or semi-public venues (such as schools, universities, community 
groups).  Before filming takes place, the participant will be advised that informed consent is 
necessary.  I will go over the consent form‟s content, review the purpose and aim of my research, and 
answer any they may have. I will explain that participation is voluntary; that there are no 
repercussions for non-participation or withdrawal and that s/he can stop the filming at any time. I 
will also explain that she /he can use a pseudonym. During filming, I will use a hand-held camera. 
My goal is to have participants as engaged with the project as possible and to offer them the 
opportunity to give me feedback or ask questions at any point during the interview and / or filming 
process.  Moreover, during my weekly drop-in time, I will bring raw and edited footage to show it to 
the participants who were filmed and who are interested in providing feedback on the editing 
process.   
  
251 
 
RECRUITMENT FORM 
 
 This recruitment form is for you and other staff. If you and /or other staff would be 
interested in participating in this research, please fill it out.  I will contact you as soon as 
possible to further discuss my research with you.  Please find attached my research 
proposal, which has been approved by the McGill University’s Research Ethics Board.  
Please feel free to ask me any questions.  My phone number is 514 482-1432. I can be 
reached at: Suzanne.bouclin@mail.mcgill.ca. My supervisor’s name is Professor Macdonald. 
He can be reached at Roderick.macdonald@mcgill.ca.  
 
 
NAME:     _______________________________________ 
 
 
CONTACT INFORMATION (If applicable): 
 Phone:    _______________________________________ 
 E-mail:    _______________________________________ 
 Cellular:    _______________________________________ 
 
I PREFER TO BE CONTACTED BY (Please circle):  
 Phone 
 E-mail  
 Cellular  
 
IT IS BEST TO CONTACT ME IN THE (Please circle): 
 Morning 
 Afternoon  
 Evening  
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INFORMED CONSENT  
Researcher: My name is Suzanne Bouclin. I am a graduate student at McGill University. My 
supervisor‟s name is Professor Roderick A. Macdonald.  
Project Description: I am writing a doctoral thesis about how people who panhandle are subject to 
rules around panhandling but how they also create their own rules around panhandling.  Part of my 
project is the production of a film.  For my written thesis and for the film, I would like to interview 
people who panhandle and people who work with people who panhandle.  I am required to obtain your 
informed consent before you can participate in an interview and before I can film you during your 
interactions on the street.     
What am I asking you to do? You are being asked to agree to an interview and to have me film you 
during your interactions on the street.  I will ask you questions about what you believe are the rules 
regarding panhandling, how you experience these rules, and whether you have your own rules around 
panhandling.     
Confidential and Anonymous: Both the written and audiovisual parts of my thesis will be available 
to the public.  I may present data at conferences or give information to other organizations working 
with street-involved people. I may also screen parts of my film at schools and universities and 
distribute copies to other service-providers, anti-poverty activists and academics.  Should you agree to 
participate in this study, I will not refer to you at any point by your real name unless you tell me that I 
you prefer me to do so.  If you wish to remain anonymous, you will be asked to choose a pseudonym.   
I will only refer to you by that name in both parts of my research. No one (except for me and my 
advisor) will have access to the interview transcripts or the interview tapes.  You can review the 
written transcripts or the actual footage and tell me if there are parts you would like omitted (for 
instance, they may reveal sensitive information) for any reason.  During our interview, I may take 
notes.  These notes will also be confidential. 
No Obligation to Participate:  You can refuse to answer any question and you can end the interview 
or the filming at any time you choose.   
No Compensation: There is no financial compensation for participation in this study. 
Questions/ Clarifications: Informed consent is on-going and you should feel comfortable to ask me 
questions at any point before, during or after the interview or the filming. There can be some risks 
involved in participating in this research (unwanted publicity, negative feedback from your friends, 
backlash from police or regret for disclosing personal information, for instance).  I want to be sure that 
you understand these risks and/or inconveniences and that you still feel that participating in this 
project is interesting to you.  
Please stop the interview or the filming at any time, offer feedback on the questions I ask, and ask me 
any questions that you might have any time during this research.  
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Statement of Consent: 
By signing this form, I consent to Suzanne Bouclin interviewing and filming me.  I also consent that 
she uses what I say in this interview or in any of the footage for her written thesis and / or in the 
documentary on the rules around panhandling. I understand that she will not use my real name unless 
I tell her that she can.  I understand that I do not have to consent to this interview and that I can stop 
the interview at any time.  I understand that if I change my mind and no longer want to do the 
interview that she will not use anything that I say for her thesis and her documentary film. I 
understand that I will not be compensated for this interview.  Suzanne Bouclin has read and explained 
this consent form to me and I consent to this interview.  
Please place a check in the boxes that apply:  
Suzanne Bouclin has gone through this form and explained this consent form to me  
 
 
I have read and I understand this consent form  
 
 
I consent to have an interview with Suzanne Bouclin 
 
 
I consent to Suzanne Bouclin sitting with me, talking to me, and filming me while I 
engage in panhandling  
 
 
I consent to have a filmed interview with Suzanne Bouclin 
  
 
I consent to have footage of me used for Suzanne Bouclin‟s thesis and documentary  
 
 
I consent to having images of me in the form of footage show in public places including 
schools, universities and community organizations 
  
 
I consent to Suzanne Bouclin taking notes during our interview 
  
 
I will use a pseudonym during the interview  
 
[Please refer to me as: __________________________ 
 
 
Name: (Printed) ______________________________ 
Signature: _______________________________________________ 
Date: ____________________________________________________ 
Interviewer   
I have read and explained this consent form to the participant. I have answers all 
of their questions to the best of my ability.    
 
 
Name:  Suzanne Bouclin 
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VERBAL CONSENT SCRIPT   
 
I would like to talk to you about my research on the rules around panhandling. I would like to have an 
interview with you about your experiences while panhandling.  I will be filming you with a hand-held 
camera while you engage in panhandling. I will talk to you and ask you questions.  
You can film me too, ask me questions anytime, or to make suggestions about what you think should 
be in the film.  The footage might be part of a film that makes up part of my thesis.  I may use it for 
educational purposes in schools or with community groups.  Do you have any questions for me before I 
go on?  
To interview you and / or to film you, I need your informed consent. There are some risks involved in 
participating: unwanted publicity, negative feedback from your friends, backlash from police and regret 
for disclosing personal information, to name a few. I will take strict precautions to limit these risks such 
as ensuring your anonymity, deleting particular names of police, and reminding you that you can 
always refuse to answer a question. I want to be sure that you adequately understand these risks and 
/ or inconveniences and that you still feel that participating in this project would interest you. It‟s up to 
you to weigh the possible risks with the benefits.   
Participation is totally voluntary and that there are no repercussions if you do not want to participate or 
if you withdrawal at any time.  You may be worried about being recognized in the documentary or in 
my written thesis and that some of the information you share could get you into trouble with police or 
your friends. You can use a street name or pseudonym if you would like. I‟ll use that name throughout 
our interviews and the filming.  If you would rather that your voice or face not be recognizable, I will 
make sure that your face is not on camera (or if it is, I will block it out during editing). I can also have 
your voice altered electronically during editing.  
If you are interested in reading the transcripts from your interview or having me read the transcripts of 
your interview, I can meet you at your convenience. You can tell me if there are parts you would like 
removed or if there are things you would like to add.  I can also show you any footage that I have 
taken of you, before or after it has been edited.  You can tell me if you would like things taken out of 
the documentary or if you think there are things I have forgotten or things I should look into.    
Do you have any questions for me?  Do you understand what I have just explained?  Do you consent to 
being interviewed by me?  Do you consent to that interview being filmed? Do you consent to me sitting 
with you, talking to you, and filming you while you engage in panhandling?  Do you consent to me 
using that footage and other things that you say for my written thesis and / or for my film? Do you 
consent to me using images of you or your words and showing those images of you in public places 
(schools, universities and community organizations)?  Do you mind if I take notes while I talk to you or 
film you?  Would you like to use a pseudonym? If so, what would you like it to be?  
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INTERVIEW GUIDE  
Pseudonym / Name of participant:   ____________________________ 
Date:      ____________________________ 
Location:      ____________________________ 
Duration:     ____________________________   
Background information  
 Before we begin, do you have any questions for me?  
 Can you tell me your (chosen) name and age?  
 Can you tell me a bit about yourself?  
 Where do you currently live?  
 
The Street  
 How much of your time would you say you spend on the street?  
 Are there rules that you follow when on the street?  
o If so, who makes these rules?  Where do they come from?  
 Do you know of anyone who has ever broken a rule? What happened?  
 
Panhandling  
 What is panhandling? 
 Are there rules that you follow when panhandling?  
 Do you use the word panhandling?  
 Do your clients panhandle?  
o Are there rules that they follow when panhandling? Where do they come from? Who 
makes these rules? 
 What are your thoughts on panhandling?  
 Do you have any thoughts on the problems faced by panhandlers in Ottawa?  
 
Interactions on the Street  
 Have you ever witnessed someone reacting to something you were doing on the street?   
 How often do police officers talk to you? What do they talk to you about?  
 
Thinking about change / Wrap up  
 Is it possible to change the rules on the street? 
   If so, what would you change?  
o If not, why not?  
 Is there anything you would like to add?  
 Do you have any questions for me?   
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